

Tanzania: Ujamaa and Development

by

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The Agricultural Economics Department is pleased to make available this report on Ujamaa and Development in Tanzania prepared by Dr. Oleen Hess. During the academic year 1974-75 he was on "sabbatical" at Cornell University, taking course work, improving his analytical skills and carrying on some research activity.

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His interest in preparing an assessment of Tanzania's approach to development through socialism, and a more equitable distribution of the production, income and other benefits of development evolved during nine years involvement with Tanzania's development efforts; two years as agriculture backstop office in AID Washington, and the balance of the time as USAID Tanzania Food and Agriculture Officer.

Tanzania's philosophy and development policy of Ujamaa are based on the pre-colonial, extended family life pattern of cooperation, mutual dependence and sharing-cooperative family-hood. His conclusions are that successful implementation and achievement of the goals of the policy are confronted by two major constraints. The first is the collectivization of agricultural production concurrent with and dependent on movement/settlement of the population into discrete, collective Ujamaa villages. The second is the imbalance of resource allocation to social services at the expense of directly productive services. The former appears to be generating and facing increasingly stiffer resistance from the populace. And the latter, by restricting resources and services for directly productive efforts, minimizes the potential for the production increases essential for growth and development and financing the ever increasing recurrent costs of providing social services.

This paper was prepared at Cornell University during the "sabbatical" granted him by USAID. It represents his own personal experience, research and views. It is not an official statement from AID Washington, USAID Tanzania, or Cornell University.

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TANZANIA: UJAMAA AND DEVELOPMENT

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PART I

BACKGROUND

Introduction

Ujamaa, the basis of African Socialism and Tanzania's design for nation building and development, according to its chief architect and mentor, President Nyerere, is based upon the African traditional extended family and society, society's organization, mutual respect and dependency, cooperative nature, land ownership and use, productive and distributive customs, ways of life prior to disruption and contamination by external non-African forces. Ujamaa literally means familyhood-cooperation. It is the foundation and philosophy from which all political, social, economic and development policies, goals and actions flow under the guiding hand of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), Tanzania's one political party government. President Nyerere states "African socialism did not have (and he implies it did not need) the benefit of the Agrarian Revolution or Industrial Revolution (as did European socialism). It did not start from the existence of conflicting classes in society. Indeed, I doubt if the equivalent for the word class exists in any indigenous African language; for language describes ideas of those who speak it, and ideas of class or castes were non-existent in African society. The foundation and the objective of African socialism is the extended family."

"In our traditional African socialism we were individuals within a community. We took care of the community and the community took care of us. We neither needed nor wished to exploit our fellow men. To us in Africa land was always recognized as belonging to the community. Each individual within our society had a right to the use of land because otherwise he could not earn his living, and one can not have the right to life without also having the right to some means of maintaining life. But the African's right to land was simply to use it; he had no other right to it, nor did it occur to him to try and claim one." (27)

Even prior to independence TANU, under the guidance of the President-to-be, initiated papers, discussions, and actions toward structuring and developing a nation, society, and government based on African Socialism.

The Arusha Declaration was the first comprehensive statement and broad outline design for initiating a national ujamaaization of society, a nation of ujamaa villages based on a collective cooperative society and effort. The Arusha Declaration was delivered to the nation from Arusha town, February 5, 1967 by President Nyerere.

The purpose of this paper is an assessment of ujamaa as the vehicle for achieving political, social, economic, urban and rural development, and self-sufficiency. Ujamaa is based on society as it existed and functioned in the historical past, therefore the paper is presented in two parts. Part One reviews history and development leading to the emergence and establishment of TANU and independence, land tenure and agricultural change, and the current agricultural and national situation to provide a background for the role of ujamaa in Tanzania today.

Part Two discusses and assesses the philosophy of ujamaa and the policies and action programs it has generated. TANU, government and ujamaa are thoroughly intertwined and are used interchangeably throughout part two.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Migration and Settlement

Tanzania's present population is a composite of successive overland migrations primarily of Bantu origin. Since there was more land than people to occupy it they settled in an empty area and placed the surrounding land under trust whereby elders and ruling chiefs became the trustees and guardians of the land. The migrating group may have been a small tribe, clan or units of an extended family. The farm work and practically all other activities designed to earn a living, function as a society, or provide security were conducted by the social group, some by the individual household, some by the extended family. Finding no obstacles in the new settlement area a village compound was established whereupon crop or livestock production could begin.

From the beginning of this migratory movement to the present time there have been a number of external and internal forces that have shaped the modern Tanzania. Generally the people arriving overland came to stay, to build homes and their future. And those arriving from the sea generally came to extract the maximum resources possible with little thought to reinvesting the resulting capital beyond the bare minimum necessary to assure continued maximum extraction.

Swahili - The "Lingua Franca"

Tanzania's basic population migrated at a very early date and by 500 A.D. had reached and began settling on the East Coast. The area subsequently became Bantu speaking, the basic component of Swahili. Concurrently Arabs, Persians and Asians utilizing the monsoon winds, visited the East Coast each year, trading goods and solidifying contacts with the Africans. Some took up residence and intermarried with the Africans resulting in the emergence

of persons of African/Arab/Asian descent, the Swahili. The mixture of Arabic and Asian words with the Bantu language forms the Swahili language. It is generally conceded that Swahili, the "lingua franca" of Tanzania, has been one of the main unifying forces of the nation, and that the slave trade and colonialism were forces that disrupted its normal development.

Trade in ivory, gold and slaves resulted in the establishment of trading centers or city-states along the coast. These city-states developed as independent entities which periodically established cooperative alliances with neighboring cities. But they never became unified into an empire or federation, remaining essentially city-states, whose strength rested on their land trade with the interior and their maritime trade overseas. The coast was an integral part of a continental and an international mercantile system. As this coastal development was occurring the tribes from the interior established commercial trade links with the coast. Expanding maritime trade demands increased the interior trade activity and the number and size of city-states. Maritime traders intermingled with the Africans further developing the coastal Swahili culture and language. (8)

The Slave Trade

"The slave trade persisted in East Africa for about 2000 years" (2) as the Arab-slave trade until the arrival of the Europeans. Tanganyika was especially hard hit by the slave trade since it was also the gateway to Mozambique, Malawi, Northern Zambia, and Eastern Congo, the other major zones of human export from East Africa. The loss of population and labor had drastic consequences on the area's social and economic development. During the colonial periods migration of labor upset the farming and social routine and often resulted in famine. Slave trading was migration of labor 100 times more brutal and disruptive. (31)

The population loss was particularly critical because it concentrated on extracting able-bodied young men and women in their most productive years. This vast export of Africa's youth adversely affected future social relations, productive effort, innovation, and economic and cultural development. Disrupted political growth, leadership and development resulted. In addition, the Africans not captured were under constant stress and fear of being captured, diminishing their contribution to society. (31) The uncertainty of the future discouraged long-range planning for agriculture, trade or other endeavors.

The loss of population was significant in socio-economic development. Population pressure in Europe and Asia led to intensive use of the land. With the low population density in East Africa people as units of labor were more important than land as a factor of production. And Africans were conscious that population (labor) in their circumstances was the most important factor of production. (31)

Social Evolution and Development

Prior to European penetration, East African societies retained many communal features, but realized that some lineages were destined to rule.

Livestock, unlike land, lends itself to uneven distribution in a relatively short period of time and families with the largest herds became socially and politically dominant. The pastoralists generally were overlords of the cultivators. (31) In most societies all functions--social, political and economic-- were developed around the family, the social entity, encompassing the extended family concept.

Prior to the 15th century the predominant principle of social relations was that of family and kinship associated with communalism. Each member of society had his position defined in terms of relations on his mother's or father's side. This was crucial to the daily existence of a member of society because land, the major means of production, was owned by groups such as the family or clan. The head of the group was responsible for the land on behalf of all kin, including fore-parents and those as yet unborn.

A household's labor might share some joint or social benefit activities with other members of the community. Annual hunts or fishing were usually conducted with all the village participating. Each individual household was assigned land adequate to its needs so long as the family utilized it, tilled its own plot and was responsible for feeding itself. Cooperative household production activities were carried out in this endeavor rather than on a community-wide collective production basis. When necessary the resulting crops or goods were distributed on the basis of kinship ties. If a household's crops were destroyed by a calamity relatives in the village came to their aid. If a whole village met disaster, people moved in with kinsmen in another village where food was not scarce. The concept of family dominated the traditional societies' development and affected the two primary factors of production, labor and land, and the system of distribution.

Land and Agricultural Production

While there are arguments pro and con about whether collective organization of labor might have produced or developed more, the principal change in the productive functions was comprised of new techniques, tools and skills in dealing with the environment, plus new plant species and animals.

The first prerequisite for mastery of an environment is knowledge of the environment. Africans generally understood the ecology--climate, soils, animals, plants and their multiple interrelationships. The practical application of this lay in trapping animals, building houses, making utensils, finding medicines, and above all, devising systems of agriculture. Prior to contact with Europeans the dominant activity in East Africa was agriculture. In all the settled agricultural communities people observed the peculiarities of their own environment and developed techniques for dealing with it in a rational manner. However, the single most important technological change underlying development was the introduction of iron tools, notably the axe and hoe, replacing wooden and stone tools. On the basis of the iron tools new skills developed in agriculture and other spheres of economic activity. (29)

The coming of iron, the rise of cereal growing, and the making of pottery were all closely related phenomena. Generally these things came about after

the birth of Christ. The rate of change over a few centuries was quite impressive. Millet and rice were domesticated from wild grasses. Yams evolved from selected wild roots. Societies mastered cultivation of their own particular staple food. Even the wide-spread practice of shifting cultivation, with burning and light hoeing, was more prudent than the first European colonialists supposed. The farming system was based on a correct evaluation of the soil potential, which was less than the heavy vegetation seemed to indicate.

African standards of crop and livestock husbandry were unlike those in Asia and Europe. This was partially due to the lack of need for acquiring scientific knowledge, and devising tools to reduce labor requirements and transform hostile environments into areas suitable for human activity. Under communalism every African was assured sufficient land to meet his own needs by virtue of being a member of a family or community. For that reason, and because land was relatively abundant, there were few social pressures or incentives for technical changes to increase productivity. (31)

Religion might also have been another factor in the relatively slow development of agriculture and production since religion can play either a positive or negative role in a society's development. Belief in prayer or the intervention of ancestors or gods substituted for innovations to moderate the impact of weather or environment. Regardless of the definitive reasons East Africa developed at a slower pace politically, socially and economically than other areas of Africa up through the 13th century. This may have been partially due to the Arab slave trade already in force. Iron tools were also acquired much later in East Africa than in West or North Africa, and the range of technology and skills was narrower. Generally the societies were in the communal stage. (31)

Pre-Colonial Foreign Intervention

New forces were fermenting as tribal groups began forming kingdoms in the interior and the city-states on the coast were in transition. However, the 15th century impact of Europe with its superior technology intervened, altered the course of history and precluded development of essentially meaningful African institutions. (8) Although Western societies generally consider African societies and backwardness as synonymous, Europeans visiting East Africa at this time indicated development along the coast was generally comparable to European development.

During the 16th and 17th centuries Tanganyika was comprised of numerous kingdoms generally in the communal stage. Later inequality in the distribution of land, produce, and rights granted to individuals developed in the northeast. However, at no stage in the pre-colonial independent history of Tanganyika did land become a purely personal possession to be monopolized by a given class. (4)

At the end of the 18th century the tribes were getting bigger and stronger through inter-tribal war. One tribe or area might be strong under one chief or leader, but break up when he died. There was no continuous form of government, or development of a dominant group or tribe. (2) However, at the time of the European penetration Africans generally were striving for centralized

self government. The Africans responded to these external challenges with dignity, sometimes as collaborators, or resisters, or both, but always in the hope of guaranteeing self-determination. (8)

The Colonial Periods

World trade played a significant role in change in East Africa. On the coast there was limited unity among the Africans, but they did periodically cooperate to resist Arab authority. Meanwhile commercial adventures extended deeper inland until Germany declared Tanganyika a protectorate in the 1880's and increased the penetration and control of the interior. Conflicts and uneasy peace existed until 1905 when the Maji Maji revolt occurred. The guerilla action and war continued until 1907 when the Germans put it down. The reasons for the outbreak were taxation, forced labor, brutality, insult, a general loss of freedom, and disrespect for European rule.

Although defeated, the uprising was important because it incorporated traditional religion in support of an ideology of solidarity and resistance. This was based on the widespread Kilelesho cult which was built upon by religious leaders, assisted by an appeal to blackness. In this way Africans united against Europeans. The belief was that a water medicine, maji, from which the rebellion got its name, would prevent injury from bullets or spears. This provided a continuity of traditional beliefs and implanted an idea similar to the master race concept. Psychologically these ideas were effective as a Pan-Africanist movement that engulfed people of several ethnic and geographic areas, perhaps one of the first. The later realization of the need for unity is a legacy of the Maji Maji movement. The Africans also realized that in addition to religious and traditional beliefs arms and modern techniques were required. The outbreak remains as a symbol of resistance to colonial rule and nascent unity of purpose among small diverse tribes and people of which Tanzania is composed. This is an important aspect of today's political rule. Following the Maji Maji rebellion the German administration attempted to redress grievances.

The plantation system initially emerged about 1535 and was generally resisted by the Africans. These were large tracts of land administered by the Dominican and Jesuit religious orders under Portuguese rule. The planters collected head taxes, dealt in slaves, and for years were the most powerful local forces in the area. The plantations and settlers caused conflicts and were part of the reason for the Maji Maji rebellion. The settlers, however, resisted reform and continued to exploit the territories' human and material resources. Plantations grew coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco and sisal among other crops, and African labor was conscripted to work on them.

The Germans used Swahili or Arab administrators to help supervise the colony. Swahili thus became more widely disseminated and deeply entrenched as a vernacular language. Newspapers and other secular and religious tracts were printed in Swahili. Missionaries, traders and colonial administrators also facilitated the development of Swahili as a language thereby fostering a strong common cultural bond and unifying force. (8)

The settler and plantation system continued and expanded, but to a much

lesser extent than in other colonies. During both colonial rules large plantations were established on which modern management and production techniques were applied, but they made no conscious attempt and did not change the technology of African agricultural production. As President Nyerere stated "The vast majority of Africans went into colonialism with a hoe and came out with a hoe." In some cases technological backwardness resulted. When Africans were crowded into inadequate areas of land, suited only for shifting cultivation, and were forced to practice intensive agricultural production with techniques appropriate for shifting cultivation the land yielded less and less. (7)

In pre-colonial times there was a division of labor between the sexes with men doing the heavy work, felling trees, clearing land, building houses, warfare and hunting. The women did the planting, cultivating and harvesting. During the colonial period men left the community to work for wages and women remained at home to do all the work formerly done by both men and women. Under the new value system men's work became modern and women's work traditional and backward. Women's status deteriorated along with the concept that African rural/agricultural activities were backward and inferior.

Colonial plantation policy resulted in a mono-culture system, and over-dependence on one or two cash crops. Agronomists, botanists and historians have conclusively shown a great variety of foods and crops were grown in pre-colonial Africa. Numerous cereals and fruits were domesticated and useful crops of Asian and American origins were adopted. The African culture and tradition were diversified agriculture. Often the concentration on mono-culture for sale abroad was at the expense of producing food crops, and periodically resulted in famine within the African community. Inherited by the independent nation, the mono-culture system, its products and the economy were subject to the vagaries of world prices.

Other spheres of society were also slighted, left to their own devices, or inappropriately approached. Education was generally ignored during the colonial period, but in 1930 agricultural education was introduced and lasted nine years. Although offering new agricultural skills, the Africans viewed the program as defining the correct attitudes and the natural place the Europeans thought appropriate for the natives. (31)

Following World War I, by League of Nations Mandate, Tanganyika came under British colonial rule. One of the first acts in 1919 was to end slavery. No slave trade existed outside Tanganyika, but there was said to be 20,000 slaves in Ujiji. All slaves were declared completely free men in 1922.

Another important issue was disposition of former German settler plantations producing most of the country's wealth from sisal, cotton and coffee. Few Africans had the requisite skills to manage them, and to avoid bankrupting the country, the plantations were sold to non-Africans. Farm land totaling slightly less than one percent of the total land area was leased for 99 years following which the land reverted to the government. The colonial administration advocated a long-term lease to assure proper development, improvement and conservation of soil and related water resources.

LAND TENURE

Pre-Colonial

Unwritten customary or tribal land law was the typical system, except as noted in the North East, until late in the 17th century. The land was owned communally by the group, and being a member of the group assured every one land sufficient to their needs. Slash and burn shifting cultivation was the usual practice and following each move to a new site land was allotted. Upon return to a previous site there was no assurance or practice of real-lotting a specific plot of land to a family that had previously cultivated it. Therefore, little incentive existed for instituting permanent improvements.

Cooperative Associations

Village cooperative associations evolved as a form of collective endeavor to a limited degree in the past. The village farm where one existed, was operated with cooperative labor/effort with the proceeds used for social insurance purposes for the aged, sick and unfortunate. Excess proceeds were distributed among the villagers. However, collectivization was the rare exception. "The more usual pattern of land tenure and agricultural labor was centered around the single family. The family as a working unit was typical and formed the most important example of cooperative labor. Instances of community wide collective farms or working groups were the exception." (17)

German Colonial Policy

Under German administration, 1880 to 1919, plantation agriculture was expanded with land alienation and land tenure the main objectives. Although adequate land, four times that under cultivation, was to be left for the Africans in native reserves any native reserve could later be alienated by the Governor, and often was. Although land systematically proven to have been occupied by Africans was not supposed to be subject to freehold by the German administration, about 1,300,000 acres on the coast and in the northern highlands were alienated in freehold to settlers. This presently encompasses some of the most highly developed and valuable land.

British Colonial Policy

The British colonial administration, 1919 to 1961, ruled in 1922 that all rights to public lands were vested in and exercisable by the Governor who was empowered to make grants or leases of public land. Under the League of Nations Trusteeship Agreement the administering authority was to give consideration to native laws and customs and safeguard the present and future interests and rights of the native population. Subsequently all lands, whether occupied or not, became public lands to be held, used or disposed of on rights of occupancy for the benefits of the Africans. Titles to land lawfully acquired prior to January 26, 1923 were exempted from control of the Governor. At the time of independence about 2,500,000 acres, one percent of the total land area, had been alienated.

The right of occupancy was redefined in 1928 to include an African, or African community, lawfully utilizing or occupying land according to customary law, but did not establish the procedure for safeguarding this principle, and therefore failed. Subsequent legislation precluded transfers of property from an African to a non-African. This stopped voluntary transfers to immigrants but did not prevent compulsory acquisition of African land for the benefit of immigrants.

The Situation at Independence

By independence in 1961 there had been some deviation from the ancient principles of land tenure in some areas to private ownership of land due to land scarcity, recent settlements resulting from migration of the population, introduction of cash crops and tenant-landlord relationships that had developed over time.

Evolving the Policy

Population density is of some significance in the traditional land tenure structure. The type of crops grown is also an important factor. In areas growing cash crops common land tenure evolved. Where land was plentiful and subsistence agriculture predominated the indigenous system existed.

Land tenure structure and agricultural and rural development are interdependent, particularly when designing a development strategy. The design and strategy must examine what is done or planned to be done with it, who owns it, who uses it and who benefits from the land.

President Nyerere in a pamphlet "Mali ya Taifa, 1958," opposed individual ownership and freehold land tenure. He felt that if a person is given land in freehold he may use or abuse it. And that an estate owner's rights of disposition would work to the detriment of Africans and the advantage of rich immigrants. In Tanganyika, with poor Africans and rich foreigners, if Africans were allowed to sell land like a robe within 80-100 years all the land could belong to the immigrants and Africans would be tenants. Even without immigrants, rich and clever Tanganyikans would emerge and shortly a few Africans would possess all the land, the masses would be tenants. (17)

Since African socialism was not generated by conflicting social classes, Tanzania's approach for realizing economic and social changes is gradual transformation. The land tenure structure focuses on remolding existing forms to realize the objectives in a systematic way. While the essentially non-traditional system was and still is the right of occupancy, generally on repossessed alienated land, African customary law regulates transactions and institutions of land of over 90 percent of the people. The heterogeneity of today's land tenure structure resulted from the political past of both colonial periods, and the pre- and post-Arusha Declaration periods.

Pre-Arusha Declaration Policy 1961-1967

With independence and a government committed to building a socialist society Tanzania was confronted with determining which course of action to

follow relative to land tenure. The decision and basic policy was defined in "Ujamaa -- The Basis of African Socialism, 1962" in which the government opted to enlarge the public sector of land ownership. The Freehold Titles Act of 1963 converted all freehold lands into government leaseholds on the basis that all land must be owned by the people as a whole. This added 1,000,000 acres to the public sector land tenure structure and emphasized ancient principles: "land belongs to society not individuals - though the role of trustee or caretaker passes to the government; one's right to land is dependent on the use made of it - in this respect land husbandry requirements were substituted for the use and abuse right inherent in the freehold property concept of a price for land was reduced to a mere obligation to reimburse the old holder for unexhausted improvements existing on the land surrendered." (17) This was essentially nationalization of alienated land making the state the only effective landlord, and consequently allowing the landholder or user only a limited interest in the land.

A World Bank report in 1961 recommended two approaches to agricultural development and land tenure: assisting peasant farmers to improve production practices and output without radically changing the traditional society and legal systems; and transforming agriculture, land use and tenure by organizing farmers into government supervised settlement schemes. Both were based on individual rather than collective farms.

The transformation approach was initiated as The Village Resettlement Scheme. This was generally dropped by 1968 for several reasons: heavy capital investment was required; the schemes were initiated and managed by officials rather than the farmers, and the farmers did not move into management; the special treatment given the farmers resulted in the farmers regarding themselves as a privileged class, which was opposed to the country's philosophy; and the scheme's impact on overall development was minimal.

Post-Arusha Declaration Policy: Ujamaaization

With the 1967 Arusha Declaration's emphasis on development, based on the people's effort and capital not being a substitute for hard work, the policy of ujamaaization was implemented. The previously implemented and now defunct Resettlement Schemes allowed individual ownership of plots and private production activities, with cooperative purchasing and marketing, and reckoned primarily with the landless opening new lands. Ujamaa continues the cooperative purchasing and marketing and adds collective production. It also aims at pooling existing traditionally/customarily owned land for large scale socialist production, or as regards land tenure, transforming the traditional sector land tenure into a collective sector.

State Ownership of Land

Although the private sector of land tenure structure/holding is withering away, various geographic, historical and population factors have resulted in entrenchment of a private traditional system that defines individual and group rights relative to ownership. It provides the framework for buying, selling, leasing or pledging lands. The collective sector is very significant and is still in an experimental, theoretical stage. But socialization

of the land tenure structure is the most crucial and politically sensitive problem at this time. Although the common pattern of land tenure is group control or communal tenure, and land in Tanzania has been declared public land, this did not automatically obviate the continued existence and development of the traditional land tenure system. Rather, the maintenance and protection of traditional land rights were assured with the definition of a right of occupancy to include lawful occupation of land according to customary law. (17)

Land Use Rights

Land tenure change since independence has emphasized agricultural development by designing policy conducive to land utilization, and to penalize non-users such as absentee owners or landlords. This is based on two main principles, land security being dependent on land use, and non-commerciality of land. Policy implementation has broken up non-socialist institutions revolving around land title and regranted the land. Alienated tribal lands have been acquired by negotiation, or by compulsion if necessary, and handed back to the customary occupants. Similar action has been taken against landlords, absentee, and customary, with the government acquiring title of the land for the benefit of the occupier/tiller. This also removed the tenant's fears that his improvements would accrue to the landlord. However, the occupier/tiller must properly and appropriately utilize the land regranted or allotted to him, otherwise he will lose his right to use the land.

Legislation was also enacted to forestall land accumulation by government/political leaders and prevent exploitation of the workers or peasants. This was based on socialist ideology and TANU's Creed of non-exploitation that a true TANU member is a socialist who would not live off another's labor, and who must make this principle part of his day to day life.

The Arusha Declaration and TANU Creed propose that a classless society cannot be created where there is exploitation of man by man such as would exist under a landlord-tenant system. Whether with land in the rural area or housing in the urban area, the aim is for government to eradicate any type of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery or corruption, and see that no TANU or government leader owns houses or land which are rented to others.

The right of occupancy land tenure system is acceptable to socialist Tanzania because it presupposes maximum exploitation of the land under state control, a special form of socialist ownership. It "arises from and assumes state ownership of all land and minerals; it excludes a notion of private ownership of an interest or estate in land; and the rightsholder is a trustee for the benefit of society." (17)

Attempts by government since independence to control land use and assure improvement and collectivize tenure and production have not been entirely satisfactory. One factor which may be a partial cause of resistance to collectivization of agricultural production is past traditional practices based on individual family rather than community collective farm production systems. (17)

The land reform effort has experienced extreme difficulty and is likely to continue to do so unless improvements are made in administrative procedures and organizational competence. There has often, if not generally, been inadequate popular responsiveness and limited understanding of what was being attempted. (36)

Ujamaaization

The policy of ujamaa development is cooperative effort, but no clear policy has been legislated relative to tenure on ujamaa village land. The Ministry responsible for ujamaa development in 1972, Maendeleo, opposed legislation to incorporate the villages. It felt that legislation would introduce bureaucratic rules and rigidity, and inhibit development. Villages had formerly been registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, but in 1971 this was stopped since conflict could arise between the Registrar of Cooperatives who had statute powers, and Maendeleo and TANU who were responsible for ujamaa development. Legislation under trustee incorporation and producers cooperatives provide for incorporation of ujamaa villages and registration of villages as agricultural associations to facilitate loans. However, none of these are fully appropriate for the requirements of ujamaaization. (17)

The Range Development and Management Act of 1964 provides for issuing rights of occupancy to land to ranching associations formed in accordance with the Act on designated Range Act lands. This was not done for ujamaa villages, and they have exerted constant pressure for some type of incorporation such as formerly accorded to village settlement, or is now conceded ranching associations. James feels it is important that some form of grant suitable for the collective sector be evolved. A land tenure system based on principles of ujamaa and enacted by legislation would appear a priority need. He continues that with enlargement and strengthening in 1963 and 1969 of the public sector land tenure structure the state now effectively controls all alienated lands in the best interest of the community. It is empowered to retake any land in the sector for breach of rental or development clauses. It is difficult to justify similar steps not being taken in the traditional land tenure sector, at least in the stage prior to total collectivization particularly since this land should have been the first subjected to meaningful development requirements, i.e., to relate effective development to the principle of security.

James concludes that "in rural Tanzania the peasant farms of individuals or family units will be replaced in part by agricultural producer cooperatives and in part by ujamaa villages. Finally and ultimately ujamaa villages are intended to supercede whatever cooperatives exist. Each stage would require and result in larger agricultural planning units and more socialization of the factors of production." (17)

AGRICULTURAL CHANGE

Equality to Differentiation

Rural development is the main concern of government policy and public

discussion. This originates from President Nyerere's paper "Socialism and Rural Development," which states the colonial period brought very important economic and social changes. "Our society, our economy, and the dominant ambitions of our people are all very different now from what they were before the colonial era." The change was from a relatively equal and undifferentiated society to one with considerable social differentiation and inequality at independence. This resulted largely from the impact of European capitalism on Tanzanian societies, the incorporation of those societies into the international economy, and the acceptance of individualistic attitudes by some Tanzanians. The trend towards inequality took three main forms: between urban and rural areas resulting from the growth of towns and wage labor; between rural areas resulting from the greater development in ecologically and environmentally favored regions; and within particular areas between individuals, largely due to cash crop production for the world market. The basic difference between present and past rural life stems from the widespread introduction of cash crop farming. These changes, however, did not alter two fundamental features of the pre-colonial economy: "they did not alter its basic poverty or produce any major change in its technology." (26) Thus, according to President Nyerere the main change during the colonial period was regional and social differentiation, due to the impact of capitalism, but not associated with any major technological change.

According to Eliffe very significant changes were underway in pre-colonial agriculture, but the effect on circumstances in the 20th century remains unclear. The population increase from 4,000,000 in 1911 to 12,000,000 in 1967 has been a factor. (26) Since population growth has been a major cause of agricultural change in other countries this undoubtedly played an important role. The existence of a plantation system since the 1500s has had its effect on African agriculture in certain areas. Regional differentiation resulted from commercial agricultural growth in the more favorable ecological areas. The combination of these factors operating alongside commercial agriculture produced the differentiation.

Pre-colonial Tanzania was not an undifferentiated area with each family and village producing purely for its subsistence. The agriculture systems varied from shifting cultivation producing sorghum and millet, supporting 10-40 people per square mile to intensive cultivation, banana culture, using irrigation or higher rainfall supporting up to 500 people per square mile. There were also areas of pure pastoral production and of mixed livestock-crop production.

New Crop Introduction

Agricultural change and diversification resulted with the introduction of maize, rice, wheat and cassava. There is evidence this diversification permitted the population growth which apparently was simultaneous with increasing fragmentation of clan lands and inter-clan disputes.

Tanganyika's pre-colonial introduction to capitalism and the world economy occurred through establishment of the plantation economy and the slave trade on Zanzibar. However, the demand and change was for more than slaves and porters. It included food production for the plantation's popu-

lations which Tanganyika farmers supplied. This was later expanded to supply the plantations and the slave and trade caravan routes on the mainland. African entrepreneurs emerged responding to the new market opportunities and introduced innovations into the agricultural system. The combination of new crops, population growth, innovations and intrusion of a capitalist sector, resulting in the agricultural change in the 20th century, were underway prior to colonial rule, and continued throughout the colonial period.

Plantations and African Cash Crop Production

A main objective of both colonial governments was to draw the Africans as far as possible into the international economy--induce them to produce more than the food stuffs required for family subsistence, either as hired labor on European plantations or by producing cash crops on their own land. Tanganyika's recent economic history describes one of the few colonies where neither the European nor the African farmers dominated the economy during the colonial period. Simultaneously, there was a plantation system and an African cash crop system, with constant struggle between the two. The plantation owners sought to reduce the Africans to laborer status and the Africans sought to retain maximum economic independence. Some Africans remained relatively economically independent and others, as hired or conscripted laborers, were dependent on the plantation economy.

Although an initial motive of the German colonial period was to acquire land for white farmer settlement, this never became a colonial policy. White settlers arrived intermittently and individually, and obtained land unsystematically. The main development came after 1890 along the newly built Tanga-Mombo railroad, and later in Morogoro-Kilosa as the railroad reached there. During the British period land alienation basically followed the German period pattern, mostly concentrated in the northeastern corner of the country, with the most productive land not always alienated to Europeans. The plantation sector became substantial about 1930 by which time an African cash crop sector had developed to balance it. The surrounding African farmers, therefore, supplied food to the plantations as well as adopted and produced the same cash crops as the plantations.

The Africans dependent on the plantation economy were generally those previously involved in the trading economy providing portage and similar services. But others entered the migrant labor net due to pressures of labor recruiting and taxation. By 1950 one out of every thirteen adult male Tanganyikans was a long distance migrant laborer. However, this did not prevent the labor exporting areas from commercializing their own agriculture when conditions were favorable, as evidenced by the African cotton, coffee and tobacco enterprises. In the full sense Tanganyikans were not proletarianized by the plantation economy during the colonial period. (26) Those close to plantations usually responded by commercializing their own agriculture. Those more distant became migrant laborers where no opportunity existed for earning money. But once that opportunity arose, they generally turned to cash crop production.

No Tanganyikan society lost its economic independence in the sense that the Kikuyu did in Kenya, or the Sotho in Southern Africa. The societies re-

tained the capacity, but did not always use it, to transform their own agriculture once it was linked to a wider market, and production could be specialized. The plantation sector influenced the development of other sectors, but never succeeded in dominating the total economy.

Between World Wars I and II the main cash crops produced by Africans were coffee, cotton and tobacco, generally limited to certain areas for several reasons: requirements of a favorable natural environment; the need for surplus land and labor so a new crop did not adversely affect the subsistence economy family food production; relatively cheap transportation setting pre-conditions for roads and railroads nearby; colonial policy such as compulsion to grow cotton in Sukumaland and tobacco in Songea; and African entrepreneurship. (26)

Evolving Private Enterprise

Commercial agriculture for territorial or international markets provided conditions for inequality such as in large-scale mechanized farming in Ismani and Mbulu, and in smaller-scale cash crop areas. In 1933 one in three taxpayers produced coffee on Kilimanjaro. Of the growers, 84 percent owned less than one acre while only 4 percent owned over two acres and hired labor. In 1937, four-fifths of the total Matengo coffee crop was produced by four of the 230 growers. This was the general pattern with other crops and areas where there was a mass of small growers from among whom a few larger producers emerged as actual or potential employers of labor. Private enterprise was evolving in several areas where the market economy had stimulated African commercial farming. (26)

By World War II agriculture had restructured itself into the pattern which survived until independence. The export sector's output provided the population's purchasing power, and for the limited development and welfare projects financed by government. There were advances in subsistence food production through improved planting materials and diversification due to introduction of new crops such as wheat and potatoes, wider distribution of maize, rice, and cassava, and technological improvements in the form of better farm/hand tools, expanding use of oxen ploughs, and more and better transport and roads. (26)

Regional Inequality

Development within the country led to a pattern of relatively fixed regional inequality by the 1930s which continued until independence. This encompassed three types of economic regions: areas specializing in cash crop production for export; areas surrounding and supplying the export-producers and towns with food and other services; and the peripheral areas spreading beyond the export and food producing areas supplying migrant labor, or stagnating in isolation from the territorial economy. Thus, the pattern was regional specialization focused on export crop production. By the early 1940s different, but equally serious, problems arose in both the export-producing and peripheral regions. (26)

In those areas producing cash crops the major problems were land shortage

and exhaustion, the unsatisfied ambitions of the larger farmers, and a growing discontent with dependence on international markets. The shortage of suitable land due to increasing cropping and population was reducing the output of coffee in Bukoba in the late 1930s. By 1941 the land shortage led some 3,000 Nyakyusa families to migrate from Rungwe to the Mbeya District. In the early 1930s, Sukuma peasants, who historically had expanded southwards and eastwards, began to move west. Meanwhile government concern increased over exhaustion of the soil from human and animal population pressure in northern Sukumaland, where landless youths were already numerous. (26) Another and more fundamental problem is now evident. Cash crops had supplemented subsistence agriculture, rather than replacing it. And for some unexplained reason the cash crop systems failed to induce specialization in the subsistence crop systems from which, perhaps, increased exchange and economic growth could have resulted. The main change/effect cash crops had on subsistence farming was to reduce the land available for subsistence crops.

Eliffe suggests that if the export and food producing areas suffered from unbalanced development, the peripheral areas experienced stagnation or involution, partially through depopulation. The peripheral areas entered a cycle of labor migration concurrent with expansion of the tsetse fly. Without men little labor was available for clearing bush allowing the fly to advance and make the area uninhabitable, and probably was a major factor in regional underdevelopment. An increasing population in an unsuitable environment, confronted with inadequate transport, land shortage and soil exhaustion experienced a gradual involution of agriculture in the form of reduced yields and periodic famine. This suggests that the impact of external factors lead to structural underdevelopment and differentiation between the export crop producing areas, the food crop producing areas, and the peripheral areas. In each of these areas for different reasons critical agricultural problems had arisen by the 1940s. (26)

Compulsory Land Rehabilitation

By 1945 perceptive Africans and colonial administrators were aware that a new deal was needed for African agriculture. British policy between 1945 and 1961 consisted of two approaches. The first lasted until the mid-1950s and emphasized soil conservation, due to awareness that previous agricultural change had disturbed the balance between men, animals and the land. Concern with soil erosion since 1930 became priority at the end of the World War II. "Once full war-time production is no longer a first priority the rehabilitation of all native lands must be our watchword." Rehabilitation, it was felt, required legal compulsion and enforcement. "The African will have to be compelled to help himself." (26)

The policy of compulsory land rehabilitation and usage resulted in development schemes throughout the country between 1945 and 1955. The Sukumaland Development program was the most elaborate. Each family had to plant one acre of cotton, tie-ridge one acre of cultivated land and remove livestock above the quota determined by the Agriculture Department. Most of the schemes faced serious opposition or were abandoned by the late 1950s. Attempts to restrict cattle ownership were generally unsuccessful because

cattle represented potential capital and few were willing to sell, and because destocking benefited the larger cattle owners by increasing the value of stock relative to grain. Sukuma politicians protested in 1954, stating "Destocking has taught every African that it is Government's purpose to make the Africans beggars." (26)

The improvement regulations failed for several reasons. Yields were frequently higher on untterraced land than on the terraced land. Such regulations required labor the cultivators believed could be more profitably devoted to other purposes. The African Association in Usambara, in 1947 declared, "one of the objects of the Association is to break terracing rules." (26) People also worried that rehabilitation might result in the loss of land to European settlers. The regulations were inadequately explained and were designed for benefits over a longer period than the peasant considered relevant. Perhaps a more fundamental reason for failure of the policy was that it attempted to solve a number of problems which had emerged in the agricultural systems: the growing shortage of land due to population growth; plantations and expanding cultivation; mixed subsistence and cash-cropping without major technological change, and the tendency towards involution.

The policy could not solve these problems without first altering the basic factors that resulted in their existence. An obvious contradiction existed in attempting simultaneously to intensify agricultural production while opening new land in Sukumaland, since it is primarily the pressure of land shortage that makes intensive agriculture worthwhile.

Individual Freehold and Commercial Agriculture

By 1955 the colonial government modified its policy from preserving the peasant cultivator and stabilizing his farming system using communal land tenure, and the subsistence cultivator began losing favor. The main reason for this was probably political. It was thought that the emerging class of wealthy African farmers would increase political stability in the rural areas faster and better than the subsistence farmers. The same thinking came out of the most influential policy document of this period, the 1955 Report of the Royal Commission of Land and Population in East Africa. Aware of the Mau Mau movement and growing political discontent the commission saw the solution to be one of hastening the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture to better meet the demands created by a rising population and higher income expectations.

The colonial government adopted the policy that communal land tenure was not appropriate for development because cash-cropping and population growth, under communal tenure practices were reducing soil fertility, and because unless individuals personally owned land they would not adequately safeguard and develop it. The policy to be adopted, therefore, was "the encouragement of the transition from native customary tenure to freehold in appropriate areas. The government accepted that this might produce a landless class; and that the authorities would not impose restrictions over land transactions between Africans unless a particular community demanded them." (26)

This policy was immediately condemned by the Annual Conference of TANU.

If land could be sold---soon only a few persons would possess land and all the others would be tenants, and Tanzania would be faced with the problem which has created antagonism among peoples and led to bloodshed in many countries of the world. (26) This approach was exemplified in a new policy in 1956 which rather than regulate agriculture by legal sanctions concentrated the work of the Agriculture Department on the most progressive farmers in the hope their example would spread to less responsive people and areas. The progressive farmers were also anxious to pursue this policy. The dominant feature of agricultural change during the final years of colonial rule was a rapid expansion of export production due to the large rise in the world prices of primary products.

During the boom years of the 1950s a distinct group of progressive farmers called master farmers emerged in several parts of the country. The Mbulu wheat growers were a good example, but similar groups appeared elsewhere. By 1959 about 270 Africans were farming more than 50 acres each in the Northern Province. A group of small holders was established on the old Groundnut Scheme area by the East African Tobacco Company to grow tobacco under close supervision, utilizing hired labor. By 1965 their average holding under mechanical cultivation was 21 acres, grossing an average of Shs. 12,790 per year, perhaps ten times as much as the average cotton grower in Sukumaland.

Individual plots of 25 acres were cultivated in the densely populated lake plains of Rungwe during the mid-1950s, where the average holding had previously been 1 1/2 to 2 acres per family. "It must be understood," the rules of the Nguu Coffee Grower's Society stated bluntly, "that the aim of this society is to enable members to own farms without working on them themselves." (26)

Cooperative Movement

Generally, the larger commercial farmers led the cooperative movement, a major development of the 1950s. The Ismani African Maize Growers' Cooperative Society evolved from an informal association of the larger growers. The Cooperative Society chairman cultivated 190 acres of maize, its treasurer 126 acres.

The Mweli Farmers' Union in Geita evolved from a group of master farmers. By 1952 the cooperative had 1,700 members and Shs. 40,000 in the bank. It had built a road and a club house, and was planning to buy a tractor, and build a school, a soap factory, and a hospital. The chairman later was elected the first president of the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions in 1955. In other parts of the country similar but more subtle forms of differentiation were evolving.

In the late 1960s about 10 percent of Iraqw households owned 75 percent of the tribe's cattle. In Bulambia, Rungwe District, 10 percent of the households owned 45 percent of the most desirable riverine land, while 34 percent of the households owned none. The wealthiest 20 percent of the families held 67 percent of the government and party offices. (26)

Export Economy

Cash crops expansion increased the country's economic dependence on the industrialized nations, but the increased acreage rarely resulted in increased yields per acre. Cotton yields in Sukumaland changed little during the decade, and then often resulted at the expense of food production, or of the less fortunate members of society. Some of the previous peripheral areas managed to break out of their subordinate position, but others experienced further involution. Concurrently, migrant labor drew many young men from their home areas.

Infrastructure and Production Tools

There was an expansion of communications, social services and wealth, with some of this wealth expended on improvements in agricultural technology. Ploughs were widely utilized in the Southern Highlands, and to a lesser extent in parts of the Lake, Western and Arusha Regions. There were also a few hundred tractors privately owned by Africans in these same areas, and in the Eastern Region. Although this was a good period for the progressive farmers there was increased differentiation among the rural population. (26)

Altering the Pattern of Change

Since 1967 Tanzania has attempted to alter the pattern of change which occurred over the last century. The main trend of change had been towards social differentiation and inequality, due to a complexity of forces: the pre-colonial background; the impact of colonialism and capitalism producing both foreign managed plantation and African commercial farming systems; the emergence of a pattern of structural underdevelopment, evidenced by dependence on external economic forces, and regional inequalities within the country, and the intensification and modification of this pattern by population growth. The colonial government made numerous attempts to modify this pattern of change and to correct its abuses, but in the final analysis they could not alter the general trend because it was a result of their most fundamental policy. (26)

Over the last century the country increased in wealth, and certain areas and individuals prospered markedly, increasing inequality among regions and individuals. This was the dilemma the new socialist government felt independent Tanganyika inherited from the previous century of agricultural change.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE

Colonial Past

One of the greatest influences on Tanzania's development today is its colonial past. The formal colonial period was relatively short but the impact was profound. During this period much of the infrastructure was laid. A rudimentary transportation system (port development, trunk roads, railways and later East African Airways); communications (telephone, posts and tele-

graph); and British style law and order and other administrative institutions and practices, including the shape that government was to take, became a reality. A formal education system through university level was initiated in East Africa and the relevance, perhaps more precisely non-relevance, of formal education to development took shape. According to President Nyerere this was a time when most Tanzanians' attitude towards economic development were formed, or as he argues were deformed.

The three most relevant background factors of the colonial era were first the budding and shaping of a national consciousness, second the structuring of Tanzania's economy and third, the undermining through the above two factors of traditional society - political, social and economic. The fight against foreign rule transformed Tanzania from a land of loose tribal groups into a country with a growing national consciousness. Its leaders saw as the most critical tasks of independence the building of a nation where none had existed, the discarding of colonial mentality, and reinstituting a development ethic in a people long suppressed, conditioned by authoritarian/paternalistic rule, and treated as culturally and intellectually inferior. The economy was also structured during the colonial era with some distinctions between the rural (farm) sector and the urban-commercial (non-farm) sector.

Rural Farm Sector

Rural Tanzania's population at independence lived in unevenly scattered shambas (farms) in separate or communal holdings, or as semi-nomadic herds-men. Few people had progressed very far beyond illiteracy, and the majority of farmers operated at subsistence with capital consisting mainly of hand tools. The power supply was human muscle, animal power being generally ruled out due to tsetse flies inhabiting large areas, causing sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) in humans and domestic animals. In obtaining and applying technology cattle herders were more backward than cultivators.

As was usual in Africa, the traditional food producing sub-sector of agriculture had been neglected. Public attention had been focused on cash export crops to increase foreign exchange earnings and provide a basis of trade with the metropole. Where African farmers were concerned colonial policy reflects a series of trials and errors. Under German colonization two major changes occurred. First the plantation system emerged under European management, especially sisal and tea. These units continued to multiply through the British mandate. Second was the importation of European goods and development of indigenous demand for them.

The outcome was the movement of an increasing mass of cheap migrant African labor onto the plantations. By the 1950's whole districts showed a near void in male population of working age for months at a time. In order to buy European goods, and pay taxes and school fees, many African farmers shifted to commercial export agriculture, but nowhere did commercial crops do more than supplement subsistence farming. There was hardly any shift to large-scale specialization and exchange or up-grading of technology.

Subsequently British administrators felt that outright European control

was the only way of transforming African agriculture - this thinking led, for example, to the later discredited Tanganyika Groundnut Scheme. Later, policy turned again to promoting African commercial farming with emphasis on soil conservation and resettlement. These fits and starts in agriculture lasted to the eve of independence.

Political Evolvment

During the earlier colonial era there obviously was very little opportunity or consistency by way of indigenous political guidance and cohesion. As in other colonies and mandated territories, Tanzania was under British tutelage, but it was not until the late 1940's and early 1950's that indigenous political leadership crystallized around Julius Nyerere. From the very beginning the concept of opposing political parties had practically no appeal to most of Tanzania's future leaders and apparently to the general population.

The new leaders felt that instilling a national consciousness among 120 tribal entities, and the cleansing and restoring of African attitudes which had been corrupted, was a critical task that could not stand the luxury of an opposition party. Although the British themselves supported opposition parties the concept was alien to African decision makers where there is almost reverent respect of authority as personified historically in ruling Chiefs. Thus, TANU encompassed the political setting for independence. During the colonial era very few unifying bonds were to be found in economic pursuits. Except for economic cooperation in the East African Community (EAC*) the only unifying forces for nation building were Julius Nyerere and the political resources he created. Even after independence unifying ties were tenuous at best. Perhaps for these reasons economic guidance and inspiration were sought in the older African principles of ujamaa. Even under ideal conditions realizing unity is difficult in new countries like Tanzania. Backwardness itself tends to keep people in isolation, as does poverty. Tribal histories and relative economic statuses resist commonality. Such were the prevailing conditions as Tanzania moved toward independence and launching its first development plan. In some respects these conditions corresponded to other African nations, but in other respects they took on a uniqueness that has become more distinct with the passing of time.

Post Independent Indicators: The Leadership Factor

Tanzania's candidacy for development cannot be discussed beyond the surface without making special mention of its only President and philosophical leader Julius Nyerere. In fact a vital clue for understanding any of Africa's countries is to recognize the great respect for authority that exists - a chieftaincy complex. This is not meant to imply subservience to a postindependence leader, just because he is a leader, regardless the method used to gain leadership.

People who have read President Nyerere's books and learned tracts have

* The EAC is a regional arrangement created by the British before independence consisting of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. It involves common services such as ports, railroad, airways, customs, post and telegraph, and exchange of personnel.

concluded that he is politically enlightened and is a scholar in his own right. While this is a justified conclusion, his real power and conditions of command within Tanzania have very little to do with his outside popularity. Rather this power derives from the manner in which he carries out his role as Chief, not of the tribe or clan, but of the country.

Under normal international standards, African leaders should be accorded the esteem that is accorded other Heads of State. But within their own countries they are more than that. Their relationship with the citizenry (i.e., wananchi) is traditional. It is that of a father figure in close and perhaps mystical communion with the people. President Nyerere utilizes TANU and the government as the main organs for implementing policy and exacting compliance; although he must keep looking over his shoulder to see what's happening in the military, by virtue of his position he possesses the authority and power to function with few if any restrictions. One of the readable factors, therefore, for detecting and explaining the broader happenings in African countries can be found in the person and acts of one man - their Head of State. In Tanzania this, of course, is President Nyerere. An African country may obtain its character and style, even its stability or instability through its national leaders. In Tanzania, by taking a fix on President Nyerere, one has a very good and dependable barometer for how the country will approach its problems. Much credit is due the country for remaining as stable as it has. Perhaps the single factor that sets Tanzania apart, that gives it self-identity and a degree of status, is its claim to a special brand of socialism.

THE CURRENT AGRICULTURAL AND NATIONAL ECONOMY

General

Tanzania has a human population of 13.5 million, increasing at an annual rate of 2.7 percent. The country is bounded on the East, North, West and South by the Indian Ocean, Kenya, Zaire, and Mozambique respectively. The total area of 364,900 square miles includes 22,800 square miles of inland water, and except for the narrow 550 mile coastal strip, lies above 1,000 feet elevation. Much of the country consists of a plateau averaging 4,000 feet elevation with mountainous areas rising to 10,000 feet on its southern and northeastern borders.

The country has a wide range of tropical equatorial climatic and ecological conditions due to the different altitudes and location relative to the ocean and inland lakes. Mean daily temperatures range between 22°C and 32°C. Annual rainfall ranges from 14 inches in parts of the Central Plateau to 80 inches northwest of Lake Malawi. About half of the country receives less than 30 inches of rain annually.

The country began independence with 77 nationals who had attended a university, not all of them graduates, none were in agriculture; and with ninety-five percent of her population in the subsistence sector, with almost no industrial base, and with limited natural resources other than agricultural potential. Population distribution is highly influenced by the quality of

agricultural land with most of the economic activity located on the periphery of the country. The better production areas encompass 20 percent of the land and 73 percent of the population. However, 65 percent of the people occupy 10 percent of the land concentrated in geographically wide dispersed locations with many distribution points 400-800 miles from Dar es Salaam. The other 27 percent occupy the remaining 80 percent of the land, consisting of the middle-arid plateau with its lower soil fertility and rainfall. The average population density is 39 per square mile compared with 49 and 131 per square mile in Kenya and Uganda respectively.

The country at independence was a classic example of an open, dualistic economy, a modern sector and a traditional sector, at a low level of development. The modern sector consisted of urban commercial activities, limited manufacturing accounting for 3 percent of GDP, commercial farms and plantations and African cash crop producers who were almost completely dependent upon external sources for markets for primary exports, and for providing manufactured imports. Linkages with the traditional sector were sporadic, limited mainly to buying supplies and selling cash crops when such were produced.

Of the 20 percent of the land classified suitable for crop production on a sustained yield basis about 9 percent is used for cash crops, 9+ percent for subsistence farms and ujamaa villages, and one percent for state farms, and very limited private plantations. The remainder consists of 23 percent in utilized range land, 40 percent in tsetse fly infested virtually idle range and bush, and 10 and 8 percent, respectively, set aside as forest and game reserves.

About 60 percent of the total land area is infested with tsetse fly, some of it heavy enough to preclude, or make utilization difficult. This generally encompasses the idle range, forest and game reserve land. Some of the lighter infested range can be and is utilized in conjunction with tsetse fly control/prophylactic drug treatment measures.

Tanzania has considerable natural resources for agricultural development. Despite marked differences of temperature and rainfall distribution and intensity the climate and soil conditions are generally favorable for productive agriculture. Near term increases in production, given sound management of resources, are potentially substantial. This potential supported by an efficient marketing system and other institutional services argues well for the future economic and social development of the country. Accomplishing this will require favorable policies and support services; it will also require trained and motivated human resources to plan, allocate and utilize the available internal and external resources effectively, to manage and utilize production, to insure that appropriate innovations and incentives are provided, and to formulate and implement the necessary administrative, organizational, planning and operating procedures.

Capital resources are scarce and must be carefully allocated. The government wisely gives complex industrial enterprises a low priority. Principal economic efforts are concentrated in agricultural and rural development. The nation's overall economic and social development largely depends upon developing a broad cash market agriculture sector, which must also be diver-

sified to reduce the extreme dependence upon a few export crops.

Within the dual farming economy the plantation sector produced 40 percent of the agricultural exports in 1960. By 1966, although total production increased, the plantations' share dropped to 30 percent. This was mainly due to increased small-holder production, by expanding acreage cultivated rather than intensive cultivation. The rate of expansion and production increase has been disappointing since 1966. However, small holder export crops are produced under traditional systems. And, as has historically been the case food crops until recently were relegated to a secondary position. When this was recognized by the government, policies and actions were initiated to refocus attention and resources on food production.

Agriculture, for the foreseeable future, will be the overwhelming mainstay of the economy as a source of income and employment. The following table shows the percentage of GDP generated by agriculture from 1960 to 1972. The percentage, although decreasing due to advances in other sectors and other factors, is and will continue to be substantial.

Agricultural Production as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product
Tanzania

Year	Percent of GDP	Year	Percent of GDP
1960	61	1967	51.7
1961	59	1968	49
1962	59.3	1969	48
1963	61.3	1970	40
1964	58	1971	40
1965	54.2	1972	39
1966	53.4		

First Five Year Plan 1964-69 (FFYP)

The plan envisaged that the relative income originating from agriculture would, with expansion of other sectors, fall to 48 percent of GDP by 1970 and to 37 percent by 1980. Even though this projection has been surpassed the GDP generated by the agriculture sector is still a very important part of the nation's economy.

Agriculture accounted for 90 percent of the total employment and 40 percent of the wage earners, but only 39 percent of GDP (1972) with subsistence production accounting for over half the value of the sector's total output. The total value of agricultural output in 1971 was US \$466 million. Production increased over the past decade at a rate barely equal to population growth, mostly from small farms, cultivated by hand, using family

labor. The main export crops produced on small farms are cotton, coffee, tobacco, tea, cashew nuts, pyrethrum, meat and hides.

Plantations and state farms produce coffee, sisal, tea, coconut, wheat, rice and livestock, but private plantations have almost disappeared. In 1960, 1964, 1967, and 1973 agriculture generated 85, 80, 73, and 60 percent respectively of the total export earnings. Total agriculture exports in 1971 were valued at US \$176 million.

Agriculture accounts for 40-50 percent of the monetized sector of the GDP, and including the subsistence component accounts for 55-60 percent of the total national output.

The Arusha Declaration emphasized the primacy of agricultural and rural development in determining the pattern and rate of social and economic development and change in the country. This was demonstrated when the 1967 GDP grew 4.5 percent compared to 11.2 percent in 1966 and 6.7 percent average for the period 1960-68. With the exception of 1969, GDP increased 5.6 percent per year from 1968 to 1972. These variations stemmed in part from adverse weather affecting agriculture. In 1972 the GDP was US \$1,500 million at market prices. Per capita GDP, at market prices, was about US \$100. However, the estimated effective per capita income at the subsistence level, covering most of the population, is only US \$26. (11)

This contrast between the 1966 and 1967 economic growth shows the economy's overwhelming dependence on agricultural production which is highly vulnerable to weather, policies and world market prices. The growth of the non-agricultural sectors is slowly reducing this dependence. Regardless, during the next decade any year with a slump in agriculture is unlikely to show more than 2 to 3 percent growth of GDP. Similarly, any year especially favorable in agriculture could record a 7 to 8 percent growth. The potential that does exist has not been matched by agriculture's performance in recent years. The growth rate in the agriculture sector, in constant prices, was 3.6 percent during 1968-72 compared to an economy-wide rate of 4.3 percent, and well under the SFYP target of 7.2 percent. (11) Improved planting materials, land use, farm management and production practices can, to some degree, offset the adverse effects of unfavorable weather. Government action will be required relative to policies.

The Arusha Declaration spells out the awareness of dependence on agriculture for implementation of economic and social development plans, the disparity between the benefits derived by the farmer from his labors and the urban dweller from his, and the need to improve the farmer's comparative advantage vis-a-vis the urban dweller. It states, "Most of our money is spent in the urban areas. We obtain loans to establish industries in towns; therefore, the largest proportion of the loans are spent in and for the urban areas, but the largest proportion of the repayment will be made through the efforts of the farmers." (27)

Self-reliance and rural development are two of the central themes in the Arusha Declaration through which the government aims to rectify rural/urban disparity. Self-reliance adopts the thesis that Tanzanians themselves

must be primarily concerned with, and only they are capable of achieving their own national development. This has promoted programs to secure increased domestic resource mobilization at all levels in those areas of development in which Tanzanian efforts can be most successful.

Rural development is essential to provide social and economic gains to the vast majority of the people. The percentage of the total national budget allocated to agricultural and rural development each year during the FFYP is shown below:

Allocation of Agricultural and Rural Development Funds
During First Five-Year Plan, by Year

Ministry	Percent of total national budget				
	1964-65	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68	1968-69
Agriculture	11.6	10.5	10.5	9.9	10.9
Lands	17.3	14.9	19.0	19.0	16.0

Considerable funds were also expended on rural development during this period by other Ministries for revision of education programs to serve the agricultural community better; increased attention to rural health and water supplies; creation of the Rural Development Fund (subsequently the Rural Development Bank was established); and greater emphasis on feeder road improvement. Government policies and regulations also insure that excessive wage increases do not redistribute income from the poor rural areas to the less poor urban communities.

Second Five-Year Plan 1969-74 later extended to 1975 (SFYP)

The plan continued and increased attention to rural development including extension services and credit. Even more than the First plan it demonstrated the Government's determination to achieve agricultural and rural development. The three Ministries involved in rural development and their 31 percent of the total SFYP Budget were: Agriculture, 23.1 percent; Regional Administration and Rural Development, 6.2 percent; and Lands, Housing and Urban Development, 1.7 percent.

The SFYP was partially nullified by the Arusha Declaration with much of the government's energies absorbed in launching the Tanzania-Zambia pipeline, railway and road projects, and in adjustments required by other actions and programs. The SFYP stressed progress toward meeting basic social needs (healthy diet, adequate clothing, shelter and access to basic health and educational facilities). It continued structural change aimed at creating a high investment, high growth economy with rural mobilization and social change laying the foundation for continuing agricultural expansion, and

development of efficient investment institutions to provide a local bias for industrial growth. Quantitative targets were accorded a distinctly secondary role.

The SFYP initiated priority actions on rural development, primarily through establishing ujamaa villages, and reiterated that ujamaaization would permit peasants "to farm ... with modern techniques and share the proceeds according to the work contributed ... People, farming together, can obtain the economic advantages of large-scale farming, through better utilization of machinery, purchase of inputs and marketing ... It is easier for extension to provide technical advice to a group than to scattered shambas ... and easier to provide social services and facilities ... water, medicine and education ... to villages than to scattered holdings." (7)

Implementation strategy opted for a frontal or broad-based approach, to mobilize the widest possible participation in socialist activity throughout the rural sector. (7) The task of ujamaaization was entrusted to TANU who was to enlist cooperation of all levels of local government and relevant central ministries.

The SFYP did not set forth an industrialization strategy, which instead was to be part of the TFYP. The education goal was universal primary education by 1990, basing all post-primary education on manpower requirements for development. It emphasized increased numbers of primary school graduates, revision of the curricula to make education more relevant to rural life, and strengthening sciences and mathematics instruction at all levels. Increased emphasis was placed on preventive medicine and expansion of rural health services. The number of health centers, serving roughly 50,000 people each, was increased from 50 to 130, out of 240 required, projecting full coverage of the rural population by the mid-1980s. Other features were the designation of nine towns, other than Dar es Salaam, as poles of development, and establishing a ceiling for expenditures on urban services.

Economic Indicators

In terms of quantitative targets the SFYP set annual GDP target growth rates of 6.5 percent, compared to under 5 percent during the FFYP; a gross investment rate of 25 percent of GDP; growth of monetary sector agricultural production of 7.2 percent; and growth of industrial output of 13 percent. Based on these growth rates subsistence production was to decline to 22.4 percent of total GDP by 1973-1974, compared to 26.4 percent in 1968-1969; agricultural output was to decline from 50.4 percent of GDP to 47.2 percent; and manufacturing was to increase from 6.2 to 8.4 percent. The growth of wage employment was projected at 7 percent per annum.

Measured against these targets the economy's performance by July, 1974 was only fair. While gross investment exceeded 25 percent of GDP, the average overall growth rate declined slightly to 4.4 percent per annum, implying that the efficiency of investment was decreasing. Per capita GDP increased about 1.7 percent per annum. Both monetary agricultural and manufacturing output grew at only half the SFYP target growth rates. This can be partially blamed on drought conditions in the case of agricultural output, but obviously

policy and organizational factors played a very significant part as well. The stagnation in agricultural growth has put increasing pressure on the balance of payments. The widening trade and current account deficits were more than offset by higher prices for exports and high foreign aid inflows until recently.

Institutional Developments

Perhaps part of the explanation for the relatively poor growth performance during the SFYP lies in the continued rapid institutional changes: nationalization of wholesale trade in 1970, rental properties in 1971, coffee estates in 1973; major reorganization of parastatal bodies (particularly the break-up in 1973 of the State Trading Corporation into six product-line entities and 18 regional entities); and further developments in TANU organization leading toward greater mass participation in decision making.

Potentially the most far-reaching change was government decentralization in July 1972, designed to increase government response to rural local development needs and efficiency. Under decentralization each of the 20 regions continues under the administration of a Regional Commissioner as the chief political officer with ministerial rank and, the Regional Development Director as head of the civil service with rank equal to the principal secretary of a ministry. The Area/District Commissioners and the District Development Directors are the respective political and civil service heads.

All civil servants working in the regional and district administrations are directly responsible to the regional and district directors and their subordinate senior staff, rather than to various central government ministries, agencies or authorities as before. These directors are directly responsible to the Regional Commissioner thence the Prime Minister's Office and TANU, which for all practical purposes are one and the same. Therefore, planning and implementing, and all other functions/activities of rural development and administration are ultimately responsible to one organ of government, rather than as formerly being fragmented through many. Ultimately the regional and district governments are to be responsible for spending 40 percent of the total recurrent expenditures and 10 percent of capital expenditures. They will be responsible for 26 percent of recurrent expenditures in 1974-1975.

(9)

Decentralization aims at bringing every one into planning and implementing development efforts. Annually the ten house cell or village level identifies priority needs and generates project proposals that are transmitted to the ward, thence to the district for incorporation in a district plan, thence to the region for incorporation in a regional plan, thence to the appropriate ministries, and the Prime Minister's Office and TANU for designing and approving the national plan. The approved national plan is then transmitted back down through the chain along with development and recurrent budgets.

The SFYP gives primacy to social and economic equality. Clearly income and wealth is less skewed than formerly among the 405,000 employed workers who account for 6 percent of the working age population. Wages and salaries at the lower end of the wage scale have outpaced the upper end, and generally

have kept up with price rises and productivity increases. It is less clear whether the rural/urban income gaps have decreased. Those producing cash crops, whose world prices have been rising recently, should have improved their relative positions, but pricing policies and the inefficiency of the marketing system hold gains below what they might otherwise be. For the rural population in general there probably has been some increase in welfare through improved access to health services and water, and the elimination of primary school fees.

Progress on economic integration has been disappointing. The East African Community has moved from crisis to crisis, due largely to Uganda's behavior under General Amin, and the increasing ideological divergencies between the three member states. Railways, the oldest of the common services, may have trouble surviving as an East African entity. Currently applications of other states to join the EAC seem muted. The decline of the EAC is particularly tragic for Tanzania, which as the least developed of the member states, could have gained the most.

Employment Factors

Discussing the implications of employment objectives is difficult since unemployment figures are not available. Inquiries receive replies that no one need be unemployed since there is plenty of land to farm. However, from a population of 13.5 million, 405,000 receive wages and salaries, and wage employment has an annual compound growth rate of 3.6 percent. More than a fourth are employed in estate agriculture.

The bulk of the population and the attendant labor force in the rural sector are engaged in some type of farming. Looking at this a priori the usual approach of donor agencies is to calculate the employment effect in project designs, and to substitute plentiful and cheap labor for scarce and costly capital. However, labor in African agriculture is not a perfect substitute for capital (even imported capital), and the optimum rate of substitution varies with the job to be done. The general admonishment, use labor don't buy tractors may not be the best solution for all situations.

In-house studies by IBRD show that while it is technically possible to use raw, unskilled labor over a considerable range of job possibilities, it is not competitive with machines at any feasible wage rate above zero. Regarding crop farming most soils during the dry season become brick-hard and unmanageable with the crude hand tools available to subsistence farmers. Therefore, they must await the rains when the soil softens and are more manageable. But then vegetation increases until an extended family working full tilt cannot prepare and plant more than a few acres within the proper planting period, and before weeds take over. Also labor shortages occur annually at peak seasons. As a result small low income farmers are doomed to remain small and poor unless appropriate capital and technology are made available. They can neither increase the size nor intensification of their farming operations without higher levels of capitalization and technology.

Therefore, it may be counter productive to increase rural employment by indiscriminate substitution of labor for capital. And reliable data are needed on optimum combinations and ratios of new and imported capital to rural labor; what cropping patterns and combinations of farm enterprises

will maximize returns to labor and capital; what farm management systems, new technology and manpower capabilities are best for the resulting systems; and what alternative productive uses can be made of labor displaced by the necessary machines or efficiencies?

Two problems persist. The employment issue in African agriculture has not received the intensive farm management type of research that it deserves, and rural development designs based on expanding on-farm employment in a country where 90 percent of the people are already on farms is over gratuitous for any reasonable long-range policy. Labor intensification simply is not applicable to all farming tasks and systems. Appropriate machines, which may be an oxen plow or a small garden type tractor, may be required to break the rural poor out of subsistence agriculture. However, rational decisions on the level and type of technology and management systems require much more research and reliable data on soils management and capability, farming systems, appropriate innovations, and the potential for intensive cultivation systems.

Crops and Livestock

Tanzania's agriculture is beset by the normal array of management, production and utilization practices characterized as traditional or subsistence agriculture, i.e., poor crop and animal husbandry and land use practices; inefficient farm management practices and use of natural resources; minimum technological and managerial skills; inadequate marketing, distribution and transportation systems and storage facilities, and low demand at local markets; tight credit; lack of organizational capacity and skills in the rural sector; and a shortage of trained manpower to plan, innovate and implement the required changes.

Crops - Although small-holder subsistence production dominates the agricultural sector substantial areas of Tanzania are well suited to vastly increased production of a wide range of cereals, legumes and other food and fiber crops. The institutional infra-structure - research, a seeds industry, cooperatives, marketing, credit, manpower development and extension services - are being developed and improved. Efforts are underway to develop new technology and to make production inputs accessible in the local areas. However, these are as yet inadequate to the task, and this, combined with the traditional practices and poor genetic quality of indigenous seed are partially responsible for the present low yields.

The problem is compounded by indications that collectivized agriculture is adversely affecting production, and evidence that since the mid-1960s production has not kept pace with population growth, worsening the already inadequate average diet. The highly visible food problem in 1973-74, requiring substantially increased food imports is the most dramatic manifestation of an inadequate production position made worse by a combination of factors. The current food grain shortages are causing a serious drain on foreign exchange reserves, which in turn is slowing down development efforts, as well as providing a potential threat to political/social stability.

Livestock - Livestock development is both an opportunity and a necessity.

For ecological reasons large areas are suited only for livestock production. With tsetse eradication and the opening of virgin lands ecology problems may multiply. Livestock products are a major source of protein, Tanzanians are meat eaters, and the export potential is still largely untapped. The cattle exist, the question is whether they will be a major asset or an illafforded liability.

Tanzania has the second largest national herd in Africa, after Ethiopia estimated to be 10,000,000 head. Total beef cattle offtake in 1972 accounted for about \$40 million or 4 percent of the total GDP. While the national herd represents a major resource most of the livestock are in the traditional sector, and although individually owned generally are grazed on communal land. A recent study indicates that cattle ownership is relatively concentrated with approximately 250,000 rural family cattle producers, of which one-half are effective producers and one-half are marginal producers. This is based on the number of animals owned/produced, rather than on quality or volume of production per animal unit.

The type of production systems vary from Sukumaland where livestock is a minor source of income in a mixed cropping/livestock production system, to Gogoland where livestock provides the greater portion of income mixed with cropping, to Masailand where the major income is from livestock with a very minimum of crop production.

Overgrazing is serious in some areas, is expanding in other areas, and will become a major problem unless the existing value system and management practices are changed. Generally, under all production systems herd size is a traditional symbol of wealth, therefore, unproductive and mature animals are not rigorously culled and marketed.

The traditional herd in practice provides for multipurpose utilization. It provides subsistence food and some income in the form of milk, meat, blood and skins; plays a significant role in traditional social customs; is used as a source of fertilizer and draft animals by cultivators; and serves as a self banking and insurance program. Thus, to a large degree, cattle reaching either local or national commercial market channels are in effect by-products.

PART II

UJAMAA: THE BASIS OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM

Organizational Changes (33)

Rather dramatic changes have occurred in the organizational structure servicing agriculture the past few years. In 1969 the Ministry of Agriculture was reorganized and renamed the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives to reflect the Arusha Declaration's emphasis on food production and cooperatives. All agricultural parastatals were responsible to the Minister, and the Ministry's field organization was decentralized to give greater autonomy to the regions and districts. And the Fisheries and Forestry and Water Development and Irrigation Departments were transferred out of the Ministry. With further decentralization in late 1972 the Ministry was renamed the Ministry of Agriculture to better reflect its role as a central government organization. In September 1973 it was further reorganized and respective responsibilities were shifted to the four designated divisions, Planning and Administration, Crop Development, Livestock Development and Manpower Development, with each of these responsible for research within its discipline. Undoubtedly these frequent changes have had an unsettling effect on the Ministry and perhaps on agricultural production even though implemented to improve performance.

A number of parastatals have been formed and reformed to handle various agricultural functions: the Tanzania Rural Development Bank to provide agricultural credit; the National Milling Corporation responsible for food crops marketing, processing and distribution; the Tanzania Livestock Development Authority responsible for production, processing and marketing; the National Agricultural and Food Corporation with a range of crop production responsibilities; the Tanzania Seed Company responsible for distribution of improved seeds; and numerous other bodies. Most have been formed since 1969 and have experienced the normal growing pains of new organizations with their operating effectiveness perhaps lower than is expected in the future.

Decentralization

These new organizations and changes in the Ministry of Agriculture were accompanied by TANU's policy of overall government decentralization. This unique approach to rural development emphasizes grass roots bottom-up involvement in planning and implementing rural development.

Decentralization has directly affected the agriculture sector through: re-orienting the cooperative movement structure toward multi-purpose cooperatives with a regional coverage instead of specialist cooperatives with a multi-regional or local coverage (there are now regional cooperatives in 18 out of 20 regions); projects and administration of programs operated by the regions generally with only token support from the central government; multi-disciplines, i.e., agriculture and water co-mingled into one project with no central ministry backstop/authority demarcation.

The decentralization of a former highly centralized administration has strengthened TANU's role at every level of administration, and has weakened

the role and power of the technical ministries and commercial farmers. TANU representatives are on all planning committees and plans made at each level--village, district, regional and national--must be approved by the corresponding party council. With this increased, nearly total influence over resource allocation, TANU has the economic muscle to achieve its political goals.

Although TANU's economic muscle is limited by the economic base and resources available to it, which must come from surplus production, its increased power has reinforced an already imbalanced allocation of resources to social services. Conversely the weakened power of the technical ministries has further reduced an already inadequate allocation of resources to productive programs and services. For TANU to achieve its goals much would apparently depend on correcting this imbalance and whether it can foster and have accepted by the total population a classless society attitude, provide appropriate incentives for all levels of the existing class and social level conscious society to make the transformation to a classless society, improve the planning, implementation and administration of development programs, and improve, develop or provide the other required supporting activities and services.

Decentralization, being relatively new, has not had time to either prove or disprove itself relative to the bottom-up committee structure decision making process, the factors that will influence allocative and implementing decisions, whether promptness of decision making will improve through the several step bottom-up process, and whether transferring the most competent staff from the central ministries to regional and district offices, with little or no direct line authority or communication to the ministries, will improve their effectiveness in local planning. (20) As a result of decentralization and staff transfers the regions and districts now have the best technical staff available. But the new administrative organization must vastly improve the effective use made of this technical expertise in design and implementation of development programs at the local level to justify their presence. Local, bottom-up participation in planning and implementing development programs is an essential component of development, and decentralization certainly is a move in the right direction.

The broad front development planning and implementation approach means the limited manpower resources available must be spread very thin to avoid regional/area imbalances. Experience with the FFYP concluded, due to the shortage and the resulting thinly spread trained manpower, that project planning and implementation and expenditure of funds, particularly on smaller local projects was far below expectations, and that much of the expenditure was on relatively larger national projects. This trend continued into the SFYP. Whether the constraints on the quantity and quality of manpower resources will have improved sufficiently for the TFYP to follow through on the broad front approach remains to be seen.

TANU: TANGANYIKAN AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION

Unity and Independence

Many factors were involved in unifying the diverse tribal groups of Tanganyika into a nation. The magnet that pulled all factions together and resulted in a unified state was TANU. Following World War I several tribal unions and associations were formed but the territorial level organizations with their political, social and economic goals, and their role in fostering mass nationalization were of greatest importance. Of these only the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) survived the onslaught of the colonial administration. It served to keep African Politics alive and gave birth to TANU.

During the late 1940s and 1950s the political consciousness among the Africans was potent. All the grievances necessary to mobilize them into mass political action existed: fear of loss of land through alienation; resentment and discontent against compulsory legislation for agricultural development; taxation; and extortion at the hands of businessmen. The gap between the colonial administration and the native authorities or chiefs on the one hand, and the masses on the other hand, had widened as a result of these grievances. Consequently, what was needed was a counter authority structure. TANU provided this and secured the mass base needed for success. The masses could only accept the legitimacy of TANU once TANU identified itself with the masses' problems. It was inevitable that TANU would continue to champion the cause of the masses because without them it would have no base. TANU's line of action after July 1954 was expansion and unity. To achieve this it followed the course already established by TAA and the leaders began to organize the masses. Where TAA had been semi-social and semi-political TANU was a political organization. (18)

By the end of World War II, and as an integral part of this evolvement the TAA leadership had mostly been trained at Makerere University-college, and was highly motivated to make rapid political change. Meanwhile, as the official British policy of parity among African, European and Asian representative bodies, four Africans were appointed to the legislative council in 1945 and one more in 1951. Continuation of this policy would have maintained an inferior status for Africans, but this could only be altered by a strong united front. With the return of Julius Nyerere from England in 1952 such a step was taken. He proceeded to transform TAA into a mass organization which in 1954 became TANU.

TANU opposed racial parity and sought majority rule. At the same time the party disavowed racism against settlers and many Asian and European settlers attracted to this moderate stance joined TANU. In 1955 and 1956 Nyerere visited the United Nations where he won international status. He proceeded to lead TANU to electoral victories which resulted in independence in December 1961 with Julius Nyerere as president. (8)

Socialism

Socialist aspirations probably figure more prominently and interestingly in Tanzania's development formula, and more powerfully affect the policies

pursued than in any country in Africa. The guiding principles for this flow from the mind and pen of President Nyerere rather than "arising from any particular group or mass pressure." However, "the relatively unchallenged acceptance of TANU party principles, and especially the attainment of widespread ideological conformity to novel socialist aspirations, testify in some measure to the relative social autonomy and plasticity of the African leadership cadre." It would be absurd to think that all will be clear sailing for Tanzanian socialism. Ideas and interests are still in flux and socialism has its enemies inside and outside Tanzania. As President Nyerere observed "We are not a socialist country. Our work has just begun." (4)

The political and economic situation relative to African socialism and development philosophy was rather well clarified with the Arusha Declaration. Tanzania maintains it did what everyone recommends developing countries to do, put its own house in order and choose clear development priorities. This it did despite foreign imposed constraints not to do so. (4) In taking this step, and the subsequent declarations, policies and actions, Tanzania launched itself on a vast experiment of social change which as yet is in the founding stage. The trajectory is charted, the outcome must await the passage of time.

Attaining the goal will largely depend on the individual and the collective dedicated commitment, resolution and motivation of TANU, and whether TANU can and will develop the political, economic, social and manpower resources and attract and hold the confidence of the peasants, and thereby generate the strength to foster the transformation. It will also depend on whether the incentives for, and pressure on the peasants to make the transformation can be applied without becoming increasingly, heavily harmful; and whether the leaders stop abusing privilege and position and adhere to the leadership code. (17)

African socialism and ujamaa, two terms used interchangeably, are the foundation upon which Tanzania's philosophy and design for development are based. The repeated references to African socialism indicate that development is guided more by political and social considerations than by hard economic analysis. The Arusha Declaration and its attendant concept of ujamaa, though containing economic overtones, are essentially political and social conceptualizations for development for which TANU has the ultimate responsibility and authority. For example, the Arusha Declaration carries the sub-title "And TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance." (6)

Membership

TANU membership is mandatory for all who aspire to positions of even limited responsibility or authority. All the TANU National Executive Committee, members of Parliament, senior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU, and of parastatals, every one appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU constitution, councilors, and senior and middle level civil servants must be members of TANU. (27).

Government

TANU plays the major role in, and in fact is, the development process. Having been the driving force in the independence movement it became the single political investment for nation building. It embodies a national movement as well as a political party, and party and bureaucracy are intertwined and share power from village up to the national level. (6) In fact government and TANU are one and the same and dual office holders frequently represent both government and party. Nonetheless, there is a system of contested elections within the one party system and competition is such that cabinet ministers are defeated. But after elections, while there are often sharp debates in the Parliament, they are on timing and detail not on basic policy.

New nations like Tanzania face a very difficult problem in the complex business of guiding development. Before independence the National Government's role was largely that of peace keeper and tax collector. It stayed clear of daily life in the villages. But with independence the new government had to vastly expand its horizons adequate to encompass the former role plus the new role, and to develop the personnel and capabilities to fulfill the requirements of both roles. With independence and a new government, with new ideas, there was hope for cooperation and support. A potential problem existed, and still does exist, that in the push for development force might well over-rule persuasion. The critical concern is whether the one party democracy evolves into a dictatorship.

Fortunately Tanzania has escaped dictatorship while achieving a level of stability that is rare for Africa. Moreover, with development planning and implementing authority decentralized there is wide-spread participation and the hope of being heard from the villages up through the bigger organ of party and government ministries. But it is TANU nonetheless that sets the broad policy for the country.

One Party System

TANU is the government and the guiding, directing and supervising hand of development, and all other functions within Tanzania. All leaders are members of TANU, and publicly at least, support the party's goals and program. The degree to which this support is lip service rather than commitment remains to be seen. The chasm between being a one party system in power and being a popular mass party with unanimity of public endorsement and consent has not yet been bridged, and will be one of the tests of TANU. The masses do not resent or oppose, and in fact generally endorse the concept of a one party system. But it appears that public resentment, resistance and opposition are arising as a result of the manner and methods by which the party members interpret and carry out policy actions in pursuit of government and party goals. (4)

Certainly indications of the character of a political system are its capacities to reign with a minimum of opposition, the interests it serves, and the policies it generates or fails to generate. TANU is developing capacity as a political system, has generated policies it feels are in the

interest of the people and the nation, and will probably modify existing policies and generate new policies as circumstances dictate the need. It is expected that in the final analysis the policies and actions of TANU will be in the interest of the people, as the people see them and are prepared to participate, rather than in the interest of adhering to a political doctrine as interpreted by the top leaders of TANU to be in the peoples' interest. However, actions taken in the latter half of 1974 on forced ujamaaization indicate official impatience with the rate of voluntary ujamaaization, and casts doubt on adherence to the policy of voluntary villagization.

The establishment of the one party system is seen as being linked to achieving economic and social progress devoid of antagonistic classes. Ostensibly this greatly reduces the individual TANU leader's security of tenure. They are supposed to shed their property, and they have taken salary cuts. Whether in the long run such sacrifices by the leaders are acceptable, and the interests of the masses will prevail depends on whether the democratic traditions initiated continue to gain strength, and the leaders remain responsive to the masses. (4)

Following an attempted military coup in 1964 all non-commissioned soldiers were replaced by men from the ranks of TANU, and the TANU Youth League, to assure a more loyal army, a people's defense force. Sizable wage increase demands and strikes resulted in the restructuring of the trade union movement into the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA). The workers union is subject to government control of its finances and appointment of key officials, and is affiliated with TANU. Other groups were also formed into national organizations, women's groups, cooperatives, etc., affiliated with TANU. Thereby all socio-political and economic functions were subject to TANU, with TANU the final authority and responsible for government. (18)

President Nyerere used two arguments as the rationale for a one party system: "opposing parties were unknown in traditional Africa, and where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where there are two or more parties, each representing only a section of the country." (4) However, whether in a one party or multi-party system, the successful candidates still represent a specific constituency and remaining in office is contingent on the benefits the constituency realize from his efforts. In this sense it is doubtful whether individual legislator actions relative to local and national interests vary much in either system.

Elections

Under the TANU election process primary elections are not held. Rather it is a selection process by the party members. At district conferences TANU delegates, who are at least partially from the locality, scrutinize all the nominees. Candidates are placed on the list by TANU officials, or by the individuals themselves. Any card holding TANU member who so desires can stand for election provided he can obtain 25 signatures on his nomination papers. How many of the self-nominated individuals finally end up as one of the two candidates the electorate votes for on election day is unknown. The delegates at the district conferences list the nominees in rank order

and forward the lists to the TANU National Executive Committee. The National Committee scrutinize the lists and select the two candidates to stand for election from each constituency.

Leadership Code

The TANU Leadership Code was designed to prevent a favored group in the society from obtaining political and economic power over the masses. Leaders were required to divest themselves of all rental property and forbidden to earn more than one salary, employ laborers to produce income, or hold shares or a directorship in a private company or enterprise. There has been some evasion of the regulations. (17)

The general population and members of the government are aware that many leaders, rather than dispose of or surrender their houses already let to tenants, created trusts thereof in favor of members of their families (excluding themselves and wives), thus retaining the management and control of the property, though not the equity ownership. The government has taken no steps to block this loophole by amending the laws. Such settlements take three forms: (a) a declaration by the settlor that he holds the property including all income, rents and profits in trust and as trustee for his children, but with power reserved to him to use the income for maintenance, education, marriage and advancement of the infant beneficiaries. In this case the legal estate does not change hands, rents and profits do not change hands. There ostensibly is no breach of the leadership code as the settlor is not technically the beneficial owner. (b) In the majority of cases the settlor executes two instruments, a deed or transfer vesting the property in trustees, not including himself, and a trust instrument creating a trust of the property, rents etc., absolutely and irrevocably for his children and other relatives. (c) A few settlements take the form referred to in (b) but the trust created is stated to be revocable on the happening of certain events, i.e., a power of revocation is reserved and can be implemented as long as the settlor lives. He would remain a suitable candidate for election to the national assembly or appointment to other leadership or government positions for neither he nor his wife are the beneficial owners of land or property leased to another. (7)

These leaders by using the trust loophole remain within the law, yet would appear to ignore the intent of the law. The avoidance of the Leadership Code, a fact which the government is cognizant of, substantiates the criticism of Professor Helleiner concerning the lack of seriousness on the part of government in enforcing all the clauses contained therein. There have been criticism leveled at the institution of trust which has become the scapegoat in the search for excuses to explain the avoidance of the provision that a leader cannot be a landlord. To criticize the trust institution solely on the basis of the evasion of the Leadership Code is to divert attention from the real causes of evasion. (17) The peasants are certainly aware of this evasion by some leaders and the effect upon them can only be negative with adverse repercussions on the overall ujamaaization movement.

A feature of TANU is the lack of personal commitment and revolutionary zeal among some leaders which is a potential future drag on genuinely trans-

forming the nature of the elite. Another factor is whether parallel efforts, through the democratic mechanisms peculiar to Tanzania's one party system and other institutions, can rouse the masses as a social force to put a brake on possible abuses by the leaders of their positions. Although TANU might otherwise appear the ideal vehicle for linking revolutionary leaders and the masses, it is as yet a relatively weak reed. (4)

UJAMAA

Objectives

The objectives of the government under its policy and commitment to ujamaa were stated in the Arusha Declaration and subsequent proclamations which articulated ideals and a plan of action for realizing socialism and self-reliance through ujamaaization. The policy of ujamaa is based on four major tenets: no exploitation; peasants and workers control over the major means of production; democracy, i.e., government elected by the people; and socialism as an ideology. The self-reliance policy states that only by increasing agricultural production through local efforts can the people realize an increased standard of living. (17) The policy and action programs of ujamaa focus the nation's effort on rural development.

President Nyerere in 1962 stated "socialism - like democracy - is a state of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind and not rigid adherence to a standard political pattern which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare." (27) This and concern for all members of society are further expressed in the TANU creed that: "all human beings are equal ... have the right to dignity and respect, to freedom of expression, movement, religious belief, and association, to protection of life and property ... to receive a just return for labor ... to insure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means of production ... intervene actively in the economic life of the nation to assure the well being of all citizens ... to prevent the exploitation of one person by another and ... to prevent personal accumulation of wealth inconsistent with a classless society." (27)

With respect to ujamaa, TANU's aims and objects in addition to the above are: "to see that the government mobilizes all the resources towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and diseases ... actively assists in the formation and maintenance of cooperative organizations ... gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion, or status ... eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption ... pursues policies which facilitate collective ownership of the resources of the country." (27)

Eradicating Exploitation

In view of TANU's creed and policy the central task of development for the leaders is to rule out exploitation of any kind, to work consciously for social equality, and to prevent further socio-economic stratification. Just replacing the expatriates in the old colonial stratified system with

Africans, but not doing away with the system itself, is inconsistent with the basic tenets of Tanzanian Socialism. The ujamaa movement is clearly designed to halt and eventually eliminate the stratification already existing.

This implies that the government is concerned as much with distributing the benefits of growth as with growth itself. President Nyerere reinforces this with the statement that "to build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by the peasants through the machinery of their government and their cooperatives. Further, it is essential that TANU be a party of peasants and workers. True socialism cannot exist without democracy also existing in the society." (27) To this end several concrete actions have been taken. A very steep progressive income tax was levied in 1974 starting on wages slightly above the minimum (\$48.00 per month), rising to near 75 percent of earnings. In reverse, but for similar reasons, there is no sales tax on food, and government subsidizes consumer prices of imported staple foods such as rice, maize, and flour, thus keeping the prices artificially low. The prevailing minimum wage is relatively high for Africa, and the labor legislation setting terms and conditions of employment and labor are enlightened. According to the Ministry of Finance the gap in effective purchasing power between upper and lower income public sector employees has decreased from a ratio of 10 to 1 to 5 to 1.

The government is dedicated to providing social services for the mass of its citizens. Rural health clinics rather than additional urban hospitals are now emphasized, and health care is free. Day care centers with government support for children of working mothers are being established. There is more discussion about nutrition. Well drilling projects are being launched in rural areas to produce potable water for villages. Elementary school fees, formerly a burden on low income people have been eliminated. While corruption and other means of exploiting the poor have not been totally removed, Tanzania has done more to rid itself of corruption than almost any other developing country in Africa.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on social equality, the President, and presumably other government leaders, recognize that increased productivity must be a priority. The government simply contends that growth is not its sole preoccupation. (6)

President Nyerere is committed to African socialism as the only path of development for Tanzania which avoids what he feels are the exploitative aspects of capitalism, and building upon the favorable aspects of traditional African society. He feels that colonial imperialism and capitalism disrupted Tanzania's development and deformed its society. "We have been oppressed a great deal. We have been exploited a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution, a revolution which brings an end to our weakness so that we are never again exploited, oppressed or humiliated." (27)

President Nyerere admits that African Socialism did not start from the existence of conflicting classes, as did European socialism. This may well

be one of the factors which intensifies the problems of establishing ujamaa in Tanzania. Other socialist countries such as China and Russia relied upon the galvanizing influence of revolution against an oppressor class to provide an impetus for rural socialist construction and development. The colonial regime in Tanganyika was not so unambiguously oppressive and it terminated peacefully. And life for most rural Tanzanians, before and since independence, has not been characterized by the degree of insecurity, exploitation and indignity that usually energized socialist movements. Thus, the difficulty of establishing socialism in Tanzania is compounded by the fact that most of the masses will not easily be persuaded to give up their current way of life and its future prospects for an unproven collective existence.

Self-Reliance

President Nyerere has chided and admonished the government ministries and officials that they have been overly concerned with money, that with plenty of money Tanzania would have plenty of food and be developed, then goes on to state that "the development of a country is brought about by people, not money. Money and wealth it represents is the result and not the basis of development. The four prerequisites of development are: people, land, good policies, and good government." (27) He in effect states that money is necessary, but that reliance should be on hard work, self effort and developing the nation's resources by the people, without undue dependence on, or expectation of outside help--self-reliance. This means "first and foremost that for our development we have to depend upon ourselves and our own resources. These resources are land and people. We have to think in terms of development through improvement of the tools we now use, and through the growth of cooperative systems of production. Instead of aiming at large farms using tractors and other modern equipment and employing agricultural laborers, we should be aiming at having ox-plows all over the country." (27)

President Nyerere's constant theme that the only sensible approach to development is through self-reliance guided by both economic and political considerations derives from his view that the relative weakness and poverty of African countries dictate that the cry for more money, more capital, and more foreign exchange in the face of this poverty is foolish. And that over-emphasis on manufacturing and urban development when over 90 percent of the people live in the rural areas is equally foolish. He also cautions against indiscriminate requests for foreign aid since he sees this as a threat to independence.

In keeping with its policy of self-reliance the government is working hard to mobilize both financial and human resources. Tax revenues accounted for over 22 percent of the monetary GDP, and internal capital formation as a proportion of the monetary GDP reached 26 percent in 1970. The country was able to finance 65 percent of the development expenditures in the FFYP. In 1961-1962, the first year of independence, the nation was able to spend only \$56 million equivalent on both recurrent and development expenditures. By 1973-1974 the figure had multiplied seven times.

There has been less success achieving self-reliance in trained manpower at the higher managerial and technical levels. In 1961 there were about

5,000 high level government and industry/commercial posts of which 90 percent were foreign held. By 1971, with doubling in real terms of the monetary economy, and the shift of government aims from simple administration and law and order to complex development planning and direction, there was an increase in high level posts to 10,000. Training and education, combined with an active Tanzanian strategy, increased tanzanian-held high level posts from 500 to 5,000, or from 10 percent to 50 percent of the total.

In the case of government service proper the number of expatriates actually declined, but in the parastatal sector it rose sharply. In both sectors in 1971, however, in large part the expatriates filled positions which had not existed in 1961, either because the functions had not existed, or the demand for services had expanded faster than the supply of qualified Tanzanians.

By 1981 the government estimates that the total number of high level manpower needed will double again to 20,000. On the basis of the present trend and manpower training plans there will be 18,000 to 19,000 Tanzanians filling 90-95 percent of these posts. The remaining expatriates will largely be in construction, engineering, technology and management positions, most of which do not exist today, plus a limited number of doctors, university faculty, etc.

While the numbers are impressive the quality of Tanzanian administrators, professionals and technicians varies highly from ministry to ministry, and among skill areas. Shortages seem especially serious in management positions, and those dealing with financial control. This is due to a lack of trained/qualified manpower, and of experience and exposure to requisite methods, techniques and ways of working. Notwithstanding the acceptance of expatriates from a number of diverse sources Tanzania has managed to resist political pressures from foreign powers and remains free of big power entanglements. (6)

Traditional Pre-Colonial Ujamaa

The principles of ujamaa according to the Arusha Declaration, and according to which the traditional family lived, were followed unconsciously and without any conception of what they were doing in political terms. They lived together and worked together because that was how they understood life, and how they reinforced each other against the uncertainties of weather and sickness, the depredations of wild animals, human enemies, and the cycle of life and death.

The results of their joint efforts were divided equally among them on the basis that every member of the family must have enough to eat, some simple covering, and a place to sleep, before any of them, even the head of the family, had any thing extra. Within the extended family, and even within the tribe, the economic level of one person could never get too far out of proportion to the economic level of others. Further, the inheritance systems generally were such that death led to the dispersal of, for example, a large herd of cattle among a large number of people. Inequalities existed, but they were tempered by comparable family and social responsibilities, and they could never become gross and offensive to the social equality which

was the basis of the traditional society--ujamaa.

Modern Day Ujamaa--Familyhood

The Arusha Declaration was a general outline for national social, economic and political development to be more fully clarified with definitive program designs and implementation plans relative to specific aspects of development in the various spheres of nation building. It did lay down a policy of evolution for Tanzania to become a socialist, self-reliant society through its growth. One of the later clarifications, the booklet "Socialism and Rural Development," September 1967, was the policy for rural development by returning to the traditional practice of ujamaa--familyhood.

According to President Nyerere an aspect of the traditional society Tanzania must break away from is its poverty, which was not inherent in the traditional system, but was the result of ignorance and scale of operation. And these can be corrected without affecting the validity and applicability of the three principles: mutual respect, sharing of joint production, and work by all. And these principles can be the basis of economic development if modern knowledge and techniques of production are used. Creating a nation based on African socialism requires taking the traditional system, correcting its shortcomings, and adapting to its service methods from the technologically developed societies of other countries. (27)

To clarify the policy and implementation of ujamaa President Nyerere proposes the agricultural organization be predominantly cooperative living and working for the common good. "Most farming would be conducted by groups living and working as a community. The community would be the traditional family group, or other group living according to the principles of ujamaa, large enough to utilize modern methods. The community would call the land 'our land,' the crops 'our crops,' the shop that provides day-to-day necessities 'our shop,' the work shop that provides bricks for buildings 'our work shop.'" (27)

He realizes that Tanzania has a long and difficult task ahead before attaining the goal of socialism, and that methods may need modification, but suggests that progress can be made in three stages. Persuade people to build their houses in a village and plant next year's food crops within easy reach of the houses. For some people this represents a big change in living habits for whom this may be the second rather than the first stage. Another step may be to persuade a group of people, perhaps the members of a ten-house cell, to start a small communal farm plot, or some other communal activity, on which they work cooperatively sharing the proceeds according to the work they contribute. Alternatively, the parents of children at a primary school might start a community farm, working with the children, jointly deciding what crops to grow and how to share the proceeds. In all these approaches, whether or not the people are living in a village, at the initial stage the people would have individual plots. However, the community collective farm would be the expansion, the extra effort, rather than each family expanding its own acreage. The final stage, when the people have confidence in a community farm and are willing to invest all their effort in it, simply keeping gardens around their own houses for special vegetables, will mean

the socialist or ujamaa village has really been established, and other productive cooperative community activities can get under way. (27)

Ujamaa Organization and Operation

Between 1967 and January 1974, 5,556 ujamaa villages* proliferated in Tanzania with 2,300,000 people, about 18 percent of the population, registered as members. Many have been poorly planned and are ujamaa primarily in name only with the beginnings of construction left dormant and little or no human activity evident since the initial burst of enthusiasm. Some have realized varying degrees of success in organization and management with communal labor and land tenure structure. Of the 5,556 villages 342 or 6 percent were registered as multipurpose cooperatives, or the final stage of ujamaa, as represented by being registered as cooperative societies.

Lacking legislation there is little uniformity of organizational structure, method of operating farms, or land tenure system. However, the better villages have some characteristics in common. They are managed as a cooperative with annual meetings where each member has a vote. The general assembly of the village forms the supreme organ with exclusive authority to frame by-laws and to admit or expel members. Generally the chairmen and management committees are elected, and committees are established for providing technical direction, arbitration and auditing accounts.

Team leaders supervise production teams in carrying out daily work with crops, livestock, clearing land, etc. It is each member's right and duty to share in collective work. The production in cash or kind is distributed on the basis of work performed, not family needs, and according to the annual economic plan which provides for reserves. This usually includes seed for the next year's planting and produce for relief. Cash income is first allotted to payment of taxes, stationary equipment, depreciation and educational and cultural funds, and the balance, usually about 80 percent of the net cash income, is distributed to members.

Village land use is controlled by villagers' representatives bound by trusteeship principles. Members' property rights are governed by fundamental principles of customary law since most of the villages are established on land under traditional, rather than the public land tenure structure. Each member receives a homestead or personal land allotment of about one acre. These homesteads are intended to be supplementary to the collectivized farm

* Registration of an ujamaa village as a multi-purpose cooperative requires that certain minimum standards of cooperative organization, management, development and member participation be achieved in cooperative/collective production, marketing, social services and relations, community activities, etc. However, the measure or evaluation of these functions, contingent upon registration, are not available to non authorized personnel so assessment is on observations, general trends, and published reports of surveys conducted by others rather than on personal in-depth surveys of villages.

in providing for the households' needs, since collective production is to be the main source of the households' livelihood. And individual effort is not to impair members observing their obligation to the village. A homestead includes the family's plot of land and a house constructed by the household, often with the help from the village. Some villages allow only a temporary structure the first two years until the farmer decides if he wants to stay, and the other villagers decide if they want him in the community.

There are a variety of attitudes, but no legislation relative to reimbursement to a member who opts out of a village, or if a man dies, how his share is divided among his family. James (17) suggests that in case of death the share go to the eldest member, including the wife, which would preclude the traditional discrimination against females that exists in patrilineal societies.

Ujamaa Organization and Policy

Participation of the rural population in designing and implementing development programs can help them develop self-reliance. Tanzania's very ambitious efforts to foster popular widespread involvement may have been somewhat thwarted by subtle forms of paternalism. Expanding and improving local participation has been an important objective of the rural development effort, and comprehensive political education in mass participation has been a primary component of the development strategy. Development programs, ujamaa villages, and rural activities have not resulted in the requisite attitudes or motivation, or developed genuine participation and responsibility among the rural population.

The effort on ujamaaization to date indicates that collectivization is not having a noticeable positive impact on the rural poor/subsistence farmers' income and productivity, nor is the effort generating or receiving widespread popular support for collectivization. Indications are, in fact, that the net effect and result on production, income and support are negative. Some actions would appear necessary if this trend is to be, or can be, reversed: "the critical organizational questions of who will do what, when, how and at what remuneration rate, faced in managing collective farms, need substantially greater attention than they seem to have received so far." (13) The continued uncertainty of land security and rights may well result in a disincentive effect on productivity if the decisions of whether to introduce a definite policy of collectivization across the board (which will very likely require considerable coercion and force to implement), and whether collectivization can be accomplished by persuasion alone are postponed much longer.

Capitalist, communist, socialist, most forms of government proclaim democracy with varying interpretations of what constitutes personal freedom and independence for its citizens. Tanzania would appear at this time to be walking a fine line. It has opted for democracy. And it is expected that despite TANU's impatience with the slow rate of voluntary ujamaaization democracy will continue with real, rather than merely espoused, personal freedom and independence.

A large part of the reason the agriculture services provided to, and the managerial standards of, the collective or ujamaa farms are poor, is

because the policy questions remain unresolved. Evidence indicates that the uncertainty relative to collectivization has affected yields on private plots (services first and only to ujamaa). Also, apparently, the farmers have felt little incentive for allocating scarce resources to collective farming, and the resulting production is even less on the collective farms than on the negatively affected private plots. Resistance to collectivization is much greater in the areas where cash or export crop production has been established. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that even though large inputs of donor assistance are provided for development of agriculture and the rural poor, the effectiveness of the various programs and efforts are restricted, perhaps seriously, by the haphazard collectivization policies, and the corollary neglect of the critical organizational questions. (20)

Transformation or Improvement Approach to Ujamaaization

The early independence transformation approach proposed by the World Bank was initially designed for new agricultural settlements in land surplus, low population density areas, later defined as villagization. And it appears the policy of ujamaa evolved from the transformation approach in an uneasy marriage with Tanzania's commitment to socialism, because ujamaa retains the emphasis on settlement in land surplus, low population areas, and adds collective production and cooperative social relations. The problem arises that these areas generally have low rainfall and poor soil fertility, and successful productive systems will require heavy investment and good management. However the prevailing attitude of TANU and other officials appears to be that these areas can be developed without the heavy capital inputs. The problem of high capital investment requirements to develop these areas and the government's decision to avoid this approach, following experience with the earlier settlement villages, presents an apparent dichotomy.

There has been a shift in policy since the FFYP away from the cautious, selective, relatively capital-intensive approach under the transformation policy. Now the approach is a more labor-intensive new settlement program, the improvement approach, aimed at being economically self-reliant while at the same time permitting the program to be greatly expanded. The experience of the early Village Settlement Schemes, the government decided, clearly indicated the uneconomic and socially undesirable character of heavy government support in externally provided, high cost management, buildings and equipment to the new settlements. Therefore, these aspects of the settlement program were dropped in 1965-66. While this at the time seemed a wise and desirable step, the consequences apparently were not altogether understood or remembered

Labor or Capital Intensive Development

In 1971 the government launched a concentrated ujamaa development program in the Dodoma Region, called Operation Dodoma. The extent of government material support provided for the campaign in the Region raises the question of whether this lesson has not been at least partly unlearned. Through an integrated emergency plan for the Dodoma District, one of the three districts of the Region, among other things the following was called for: 200 government vehicles to help move people to the villages by mid-August; provision of more staff, vehicles, and equipment to the regional water engineer--and many

other facilities--to provide emergency action to alleviate water difficulties; 3,000 youths from the National Service to help in the demolition of houses left by people moving to villages, the loading and unloading of equipment--building units from neighboring regions to come to Dodoma and help people to build the size of houses they want; an increase of medicine and government supervision of provision of medicine in dispensaries and the establishment of a mobile medical service; and forming a regional tractor unit. The Central Regional Cooperative Union provided Shs. 150,000/- worth of fertilizer, and donated Shs. 1,421,239/- to help buy tractors for ujamaa villagers and also sent 200 ploughs to ujamaa villages. (26)

This represented, in total, a rather heavy capital investment in the villages established. At the same time many other development projects were deprived of badly needed equipment and resources to carry out their on-going programs.

One wonders if the decision to concentrate on Operation Dodoma was based on a previous decision to move the national capital to Dodoma. The decision appears to have been guided more for political than technical reasons since this is an area of poor rainfall and soil fertility. Government sources related that TANU, with no reference to the Ministry of Agriculture, selected the area and sites for these ujamaa agriculture villages.

Ideally the new settlements should have been confined to areas of more fertile soil and adequate rainfall until heavy capital investment in cooperative agriculture becomes feasible. These areas include river valleys, i.e., the Kolombo and the Pangane/Wame basins, the Southwestern shores of Lake Victoria, and the vast Momba woodlands of Westcentral Tanzania. But therein lies the quandary, most such areas are fully populated or infested with tsetse fly. (23)

Mono or Multi Dimensional Approach

Although several forms of socialist organization to achieve modern cooperative/collective production and living have been espoused, basically only one has emerged and receives the bulk of TANU's attention, the ujamaa village based primarily on crop production. This one-dimensional approach appears to be unnecessary and undesirable in an over-all development strategy. A multi-dimensional approach with crop producing ujamaa villages forming one part appears as a preferred tactic. (23)

Although livestock programs are not excluded from ujamaa too little attention has been paid to their organization in the past relative to villagization (or preferably limited villagization), and the provision of requisite social services, with very limited crop production. Some food crop production can and should be practiced in the range livestock areas, but the sites for cultivation must be very carefully selected.

Such areas as Masailand and Gogoland lend themselves to livestock production very well, but the majority of the soils are light and shallow, and can not support sustained cultivation. And once the grass cover is removed for one or two years of marginal crop production, the cover reverts to weeds with

greatly reduced, if any, value for grazing. With well-planned water development and proper grazing management, coupled with improved livestock breeding and management practices, these areas can support efficient, economically productive livestock enterprises. Settled as crop production ujamaa villages they will very likely become a wasteland of weeds and eroded soils very soon.

Ujamaaization in the semi-arid range/livestock areas should not be based upon relatively large sedentary villages, and there is some indication TANU is giving increasing thought to this. The Masai insist that their livestock be inside the boma (corral, the outer perimeter of which is their houses) at night for security against theft and predators. This social/traditional custom will not be readily or quickly changed. Furthermore, to locate large numbers of people and their livestock in such villages would result in extreme trampling, overgrazing and soil erosion around the villages. Leaving the people in smaller, relatively scattered, but well distributed village locations over the range, coordinated with the range/forage stock carrying capacity and availability of water, is both rational and logical. Providing social services such as health, education, political orientation, etc., can be provided at major gathering sites such as permanent water points and tick dips to which the people come regularly with their cattle.

Regardless of whether TANU continues with basically a one-dimensional thrust or modifies to multi-dimensional, if Tanzania is to achieve its goals of socialism and national ujamaaization it is faced with two major tasks: convincing the rural population that collective producer cooperatives are the best way to achieve higher incomes and greater economic and social security, (backed up by the government with appropriate material assistance and services); and educating them to recognize individuals or groups whose interests run counter to socialism and identify, expose, and remove them from positions of economic and political power, if they cannot or do not accept the national policy and goals through reeducation. (23)

Ujamaaization - Persuasion or Compulsion

Tanzania, unlike some other newly independent countries has so far retained democracy, and certainly nowhere in President Nyerere's philosophy or actions nor in TANU's creed or goals, is there design for any thing but complete democracy and individual freedom. However, TANU is in a sense under the gun. Internally it has committed itself to socialism and ujamaa. It also knows that externally it is watched by those who encourage and hope for success, and those who doubt the system can be successfully implemented, and both wait to see their opinions proved true. TANU has accepted the challenge on all counts.

Problems could arise from the exuberance with which leaders at all levels take actions to achieve the goals, and their impatience with the slowness with which progress is achieved. Cases of compulsion have not been isolated. In TANU's impatience to make progress just a little more force may seem justified, and then continue increasing in intensity until force, compulsion and repression replace persuasion, to the detriment of the peasants, rural development and national welfare. Although this may not be widespread at present, the exuberance and impatience is a fact, and increasing evidences

of force and compulsion are facts. It is hoped that the trend will be reversed.

All public utterances and policy statements, until very recently, have repeated that establishing an ujamaa village or other cooperative activity is to be totally a voluntary decision by the peasants or workers concerned. TANU leaders are to use only persuasion. Apparently the peasants are better able than TANU leaders to distinguish at what point persuasion ceases and compulsion begins. The clashes that have ensued over this attest to periodic recurrences of over-zealousness. Police or military are sometimes at meetings as a hint of gentle persuasion during discussions to persuade people to join villages, as well as in the actual physical movement of people, voluntary or forced, to the site where a village is to be established. (35)

A large number of individuals who are established self-sufficient farmers have come under the persuasion umbrella to join ujamaa villages. This means, and the individual knows, that either immediately or subsequently he will be required to distribute his holding, surpluses, and other indicators of material success he may have accumulated through his own work and efforts among less fortunate, or less ambitious countrymen. In some cases the farmers have pulled up stakes and left the area, leaving what they could not carry, rather than join a village. Others have argued, then resisted, but acquiesced. And some have resisted, violently objected, and taken hostile action which invariably lands them in serious trouble or jail. At the same time these peasants are being persuaded they are aware that some TANU and government leaders are breaching the leadership code relative to rental property, individually operated commercial shambas, etc.

The ward development committee recently replaced by and renamed the Ujamaa Development Committee is another form of collective effort for development through self help. The committee is charged with initiating development schemes for agriculture or pastoral areas or roads, community centers, etc. They operate jointly with ujamaa villages or independently if no ujamaa villages exist. All adults between 15 and 50, except non-citizens, the pregnant and mothers of newly born must participate in implementing ward schemes. If in default they may be charged money or goods after notification of the Area Commissioner of the default. The defaulter can appeal to the Regional Commissioner who then disposes of the case. (17) The number of cases appealed to the commissioner or the disposition of the cases is unknown. In view of the stated policy one would assume that the dispositions are unfavorable to the appellant.

There are still sizeable numbers of farmers not yet in ujamaa villages but the policy of attention only to ujamaa villages makes it extremely difficult for them to obtain government assistance, advice, support or credit outside an ujamaa village, which results in subtle coercion. In view of this practice the declaration by TANU that membership in ujamaa villages is voluntary may be less valid than it appears on the surface.

There has been considerable discussion by non-citizens and outsiders as to whether compulsion was being used in conjunction with ujamaa, and considerable soul searching by Tanzania's leaders about the morality and feasibility of instituting compulsion of some degree. Compulsion has been

a part of Tanzania's rural development efforts since the German colonial administration tried to direct the villagers' behavior, and first attempted to force cotton farming on neighborhood units. This was continued by the British colonial regime.

Tanzania's leaders, like leaders of other nations, face the problem of promoting individual behavioral changes to facilitate and accomplish national objectives. Efforts planned and carried out to change a people's behavior is a combination of persuasion on the one hand, and coercion on the other hand, or at least a threat of coercion, and often this is less than subtle. (13) Although there is a general negative attitude toward compulsion, Gunnar Myrdal noted in a study of South Asia that success in planning and implementing development requires a readiness to place and rigorously enforce obligations, with compulsion playing a strategic role, and to a greater degree than was being done in the study area on peoples of all social levels. He felt this was a value premise running parallel to, and partially identical with national consolidation and effective government. (25)

Compulsion was definitely a development technique of colonial policy and it exists to some degree in any political system today. One could assume that with independence in Tanzania force would be unnecessary in rural development efforts. But the compulsion technique to promote rural development has persisted. There have been mixed attitudes between officials relative to using persuasion or force in promoting rural development.

President Nyerere counseled and favored persuasion rather than compulsion from the time of independence. But by 1968 he apparently was having some second thoughts. There is no question of his commitment to personal freedom, but apparently the hard practicalities of achieving rural development caused him to reflect on the limitations of persuasion and reason in attaining the goal. Increasingly since independence in speeches and writing he has considered the morality and feasibility of state applied compulsion in national development. The shift has been from considering the morality of using force, to how to employ compulsion in the development effort. (13)

In 1969 a paper "Freedom and Development" and a Supplementary Directive announced a fundamental and revolutionary decision that provided villages increased authority to discipline members that failed to participate in self-help projects. The communities were permitted to impose discipline if the project had support of the majority of the members and it satisfied the following criteria: the "project was for agricultural, pastoral or forestry development; any work contributing to the establishment of a village industry was to be communal or cooperatively owned; the project would improve the standard of life or the social welfare facilities available to the members of the community; and work on the construction of wells, water pipe lines, drains, road/highway projects, bus shelters, etc., could be considered a self-help project."

President Nyerere therefore came to grips with the application of force for rural change using the technique, unusual in any society, of decentralizing the responsibility for applying coercion to the local communities themselves. In effect the question of the morality of this technique was shifted to the

villages benefiting from the developmental effort. President Nyerere apparently envisaged that forced planting, production activities, etc., initiated and administered by an external agency, is very different from coercion originating from within the locality. (13)

Ingle (13) concluded from his research findings that from independence on, the people, more than their leaders, accepted the fact that some form of coercion was necessary, and that President Nyerere assumed the influence and penetration of TANU into peripheral areas was adequate to insure that the will of the communities could be directed toward national goals.

President Nyerere initially chose about the only path to national development according to his own moral principles; give the people concerned authority to formulate and enforce their own decisions within their communities since as he accurately warned "people cannot be developed, they can only develop themselves." (12) It would appear, however, that the turn of events relative to villagization during 1974 has somewhat obviated this policy.

Directives were issued in late 1973 that all the rural population must be members of and living in ujamaa villages by 1976. This is being met by stiff resistance which could evolve into serious political unrest and problems, and sets an almost impossible target. About 3 million people have been moved into villages and an additional 10 million will have to be similarly relocated or ujamaaized by 1976. Although TANU is one of Africa's most disciplined political parties it is doubtful such a massive undertaking can be organized and implemented without extreme compulsion. And the population appears to be near the saturation point on the compulsion, coupled with irrationality, employed in moving the first 3 million into villages.

In a very definite reversal of the policy of voluntary ujamaaization the government paper, Daily News, published several articles, editorials and speeches during mid to late 1974 to the effect that unless the people agree and start voluntarily moving into ujamaa villages the government will use whatever force and methods are required. Apparently to register dissatisfaction fires of unknown origin have burned ujamaa villages in the north, but only after personal belongings had been removed.

Collectivization and Anti-Ujamaa Forces

As stated previously, decentralization has strengthened TANU's influence and position and weakened the influence and position of the technical ministries, as well as those forces opposed to ujamaa. Despite this it is doubtful TANU can achieve its goals without considerable difficulty. TANU's Mwangozo policy, February 1971, specifies sacrificing rapid economic growth for social and political gain; improving the welfare and living standards of the impoverished rural poor; and organizing a collectivized rural sector. This is based upon a redistribution of wealth from the developed areas to the un- or lesser developed areas, to the rural poor, and has resulted in considerable opposition to the policy. The developed areas generally consist of small cash crop farmers, themselves just barely escaped from and/or existing above subsistence, who are adamantly opposed to losing their hard earned gains. (20)

TANU's policy of a broad front development approach giving priority to ujamaa villages, combined with scarce resources, means independent farmers will be unable to obtain government assistance and services for credit, production inputs, technical advice, etc. And the policy of priority resource allocation to social services and political orientation, rather than directly productive services, will further reduce the future resources available for either social or productive activities.

Very limited hard data are available to support the conclusion that collectivization has so far resulted in reduced agricultural production. But where the collectivization policy is pushed production drops. As one example government sources indicate maize production in the Ismane area near Iringa dropped from 57,000 tons in 1968 to 9,000 tons in 1974. This may be partially due to the drought in 1973 and 1974, but drought is only a partial cause. It was this same area where considerable coercion was used and open hostility resulted, and production dropped 70 percent in the two-year period prior to the shooting death of the Iringa Regional Commissioner by one of the coerced farmers. (13) Indications are that collectivized production, ujamaization, and production declines have been somewhat synonymous.

Land-owning peasants seem determined to retain their private holdings. This is aptly illustrated by the experience of the IDA financed tobacco project initiated in 1970. The project was to enlist 15,000 small farmers in tobacco production. Development was to take place along ujamaa lines which was initially interpreted to mean private farms and common processing and grading facilities. The number of farmers participating in the program grew moderately during the first year of activity. However, in 1971 government pressure led to calls for the immediate collectivization of all tobacco production within the scheme. According to Agarwala and Linsenmeyer recruitment became a serious problem and over the next six months there was a 25 percent decline in the number of growers participating in the project. Tobacco yields also declined significantly. This trend was reversed only after President Nyerere visited the area and proclaimed that the farmers could retain their individual holdings. In the three months following the President's visit, 844 new farmers joined the project. (20)

In view of the small cash crop farmers' resistance to ujamaa it is understandable why villages have spread most rapidly in the areas where cash crop commercial agriculture is least developed. According to Robinson and Abraham of the reported ujamaa village population only 10 percent were in the six regions that provided 55 percent of the GDP while 70 percent were in the five least developed regions that provided less than 25 percent of the GDP in 1967. (30) This general trend continues. The agriculturally most developed areas have been under far less pressure to ujamaaize.

One would think ujamaa would have the greatest appeal to the poorest of the poor, who have nothing to lose, and therefore, would stand to gain since almost anything is better than they have. Apparently TANU realizes this since official attention and pressure has focused on the least developed and populated regions, and even here ujamaaization pressure has been focused on the least developed areas of the less developed regions, and for practical reasons. Ujamaa is most strongly opposed in developed areas; disruption of

developed areas prior to achieving greatly increased production in the poorer, less developed areas would be counterproductive relative to wealth to transfer, food for the nation, etc.; less developed areas have sparse population and uncultivated land creating less conflict between villages' and other farmers' claims on land. Yet in most of these areas the population is sparse and land is uncultivated (but usually resting under shifting cultivation) specifically because of low soil fertility, erratic, unreliable rainfall, and inability of the land to withstand sustained cultivation and support a larger population. Ujamaa expansion generally has been pushed with little if any technical assessment of the ecology or of the land and water resources, and potential population supporting capacity, prior to movement, often forced, of the people.

Gathering of scattered farmers into villages under ujamaaization may allow for economies of scale in provision of services, but this is not always so. It might also require greatly increased allotment of time to productive activities. Such technical problems require far more attention than they have received. According to Robinson and Abraham, in a number of cases farmers were persuaded or forced to move into ujamaa villages in new areas with little or no previous knowledge on the part of the government and party officials of soil characteristics, amount and pattern of rainfall, suitability of the crops farmers were to grow, disease situation of the area, including the possible incidence of tsetse fly, malaria, etc. In some cases farmers were forced to move into new areas with no provision for food during the build-up period.

The lack of data and operation-oriented studies means the government is not in a position to advise on activities amenable to ujamaaization; which crops can be grown with the greatest benefit on a cooperative basis; optimum sizes for the different operations; and appropriate size range in launching ujamaa so that benefits of scale are reaped without sacrificing the sense of belonging and cohesion so essential for success. On the organizational side the government is not in a position to advise on the type of committees that need to be established, on the size of work groups, or on relative sizes of communal and private plots.

Robinson and Abraham further point out the current criteria for success of ujamaa, and the unrealistic nature of these criteria, if the ujamaa strategy is to be analyzed from the viewpoint of long-term viability. Success in most cases is pinned to villagization, i.e., people living together in one place, rather than increases in production. Schools, dispensaries, water wells, roads, grinding mills, new buildings, etc., are pointed to with pride, while disappointing production is attributed to bad weather, wild animals, late planting, lack of tractors, etc. In the short run there may be social and political gains consistent with the ujamaa ideology, in the absence of substantive economic achievement. But there is a fundamental fallacy in the notion that peasants who gave up certain elements of a traditional lifestyle in order to improve their economic well-being will be satisfied with socio-political gains, or progress in the absence of an increased economic standard of living. They will merely have changed one way of life for another, in their own eyes not necessarily better than they previously had.

The commercial farmers appear to be supported in their opposition to

ujamaa by the technical ministries, which may have triggered decentralization, strengthening TANU and weakening the ministries. This support is based on two factors according to Cliffe. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie generally have a similar class background to commercial farmers and tend to identify with their interests. Resistance from this source will probably increase since the children of commercial farmers have access to education and are joining the civil service at an ever-increasing rate. (3)

The technical ministries personnel generally possess an institutional bias and favor priority efforts on increasing economic productivity over social welfare. This opposition may dissipate, however, for as ujamaa review noted, there is a growing number of young educated technocrats dedicated to the ideals of improving the lot of the peasantry. However, few of these technocrats are prepared to permanently join, live and earn their livelihood in a village, or share their output for productive activities, in this case income and other benefits in the total cooperative/collective nature they propose the peasants do.

The anti-ujamaa interests have suffered a setback through decentralization of rural administration. However, recent actions by the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) indicate that the tensions between the opposing forces remain. CUT, the guiding body of Tanzania's cooperative organizations, proposed in 1972 that it be responsible for organizing and supervising new cooperatives. Since new cooperatives include ujamaa villages, CUT in effect proposed that it assume control of the ujamaa programs. Whether this proposal was intended seriously or merely as a bargaining position to prevent further encroachment by TANU is unclear. CUT has also tried to exempt itself from the government's decentralization exercise arguing that the cooperatives already enjoy local autonomy, and that for them decentralization means more rather than less government interference. These moves have been viewed with suspicion by TANU which tends to see the cooperative movement as a reactionary political force more capitalistic than socialistic oriented. Whether or not Tanzania's commercially oriented cooperatives will survive in their present form remains to be seen. (20)

The existence of deeply entrenched opposition to ujamaa raises important questions as to the relative roles of spontaneity and constraint in rural development. The dilemma basically is how to convince the rural population to follow voluntarily the path to development that, in the opinion of the leader, they ought to follow. Among the poorest classes the philosophy of communal rural living is expected to be inculcated through the close links between the peasants and the party structure. TANU's educational efforts seemed to have borne fruit. In their field visits Robinson and Abraham observed that people living in ujamaa villages could articulate the TANU ideology. However, as Cliffe observes, "as the emphasis begins to move away from merely creating new ujamaa settlements to promoting a change on existing cultivated land, from individual to collective production, attempts thus to persuade run up against difficulties ... some recent events can be extrapolated to show both how national and local vested interests are in fact resisting a thorough-going spontaneous programme of genuine ujamaaization, and also show small justification for the belief that an organized and conscious peasantry might effectively challenge the bureaucratic elements in the system." (3)

There is increasing tendency of high government and party officials to accept using force for the creation of ujamaa villages. This of course runs counter to TANU's avowed purpose of ensuring "that the leaders and the experts implement the plans that have been agreed upon by the people themselves." In addition, as the Ismani episode indicates, forced collectivization may be a self-defeating alternative. Given the fact that compulsion is being discussed and used as a means of rural development, the success of the decentralization exercise in transferring power to the poorest peasants seems problematic at best. (20)

Collectivized Agriculture Production

Collectivized agricultural production was an uncommon occurrence in the history of Tanzania and its traditional societies. The people participated widely in communal/cooperative activities within the society, and had good social welfare programs to assure no one lived below a basic minimum standard, if there were resources in the village. However, according to the literature, collectivized village or community wide agricultural production was a rare exception.

The societies conducted much of their socio-political and economic functions in a cooperative manner. The land was owned and controlled by the village, but was freely available in the amounts required by each household to provide for its needs. Those unable to provide for themselves due to age, sickness, or catastrophe were provided for by the household, the village or clan. However, collectivization extended only to a very slight degree to agricultural and other production activities. The household was the collective agricultural food production unit. And in those rare cases where tribes tried to operate a village collective farm for relief, welfare, and such community purposes it was a continuing struggle to obtain adequate volunteer labor to operate the farm. The people apparently preferred sharing produce from their private shamba to working on a collective shamba. (17)

Apparently collectivization of agricultural production is creating one of the two most serious problems arising out of the ujamaaization movement. The other is arising from forced villagization. (35) The major reason people have to be forced into villages is opposition to collectivized production. Other problems exist, but are of a less serious nature by comparison. Ujamaa village leaders, TANU leaders, and civil servants often discuss and complain that the peasants are interested mostly in social services--water, education, health, etc., that an ujamaa village promises. They will operate their own farm plot in the village and help each other on a trade off exchange labor system on these individual plots, work together constructing houses and public use buildings, and even help in joint land clearing. But there are continual excuses made and large absences recorded relative to ujamaa village members working on the collective farm.

Collectivized agriculture production promises to be the most difficult single aspect of ujamaa to implement. This may be particularly difficult due to several factors: it very seldom if ever played a part of the traditional society, in the sense and magnitude it is proposed for eventual implementation under ujamaa and TANU goals and Tanzania generally has had long exposure

to private agriculture enterprises, and turning the coin over completely, without undue force or compulsion, promises to be a difficult task.

A modification of the general policy might work better. The basic objectives of ujamaa are a land tenure policy of state ownership of land, preclusion of the evolvment of a landed aristocracy and landless peasants and equity in the distribution of the benefits of production. Placing a limit on the number of acres of land any household could obtain a right of occupancy for, right to use, to cultivate or exercise any management, production, or produce sales control over would accomplish this goal, particularly since the right to use land is based on the actual and appropriate use of the land by that individual or household. The reason for placing the limit on the household rather than the individual is that a large family with young children could subsequently control a large area by assigning plots to each individual in the family. However, considerations would have to be given for family size to assure large families adequate land. The size of the plot would have to be based on the ecology, environment, rainfall and soil productivity potential of the area. Therefore, the size of the allotment would vary from area to area.

Limited collective or communal production might be encouraged if it was presented to and viewed by the villagers as a trade-off. Each village could retain a moderate sized communal farm, the proceeds from which would be utilized for administration, operational and development funds for the village: development or expansion of a water system, road, health center, school or social center. It might even be proclaimed and accepted as a substitute for taxes. But the collectivized farm would be a relatively minor activity adequate for agreed upon community and social/developmental purposes. The individual family plot would be the source of the family's food, livelihood and economic well being. The other cooperative activities within the community, including villagization where appropriate, could be implemented as planned. This in effect would be similar to past and current practices of the people, and would likely be more acceptable.

Ujamaaization and Food Production

Tanzania is making Africa's only real effort at developing a socialist state. But it stands at the crossroads following a disastrous 1974 food crop harvest which required that it sign overseas contracts for nearly \$250 million worth of staple foodstuffs. The magnitude of the disaster, expected to increase the country's balance of payments deficit to \$300 million by mid-1975, has resulted in the postponement of some important political goals while others hang delicately in the balance.

President Nyerere said in late 1974 there was no use talking about socialism and self-reliance if Tanzania could not use its own resources of land and labor to produce enough basic foodstuffs to feed the nation. As the reasons for the enormity of the 1974 crop failure became apparent in early 1975, Tanzania formulated plans for modifying the policy and political basis for its socialist development--the movement of its 12 million peasants into ujamaa villages. The demand for a total commitment to collective production has been widely resisted and apparently the government since late 1974 has

insisted only that peasants move to planned villages where it will be easier to provide essential social and productive services. And more recently, because of inadequate planning and poor implementation of the villagization policy, which in turn has worsened the already serious food situation, the government has called a temporary halt.

An estimated 3 million people were moved into ujamaa villages during 1974 and the mass move was largely a tale of bureaucratic bungling, intimidation by TANU officials, and a drastic slump in agricultural production, which it may not be possible to reverse in less than two years. Large numbers of the people moved in the latest exercise found their planned villages fell far short of what TANU had promised. Some had no water, few had schools or health centers, and in many the land was either poor, or in need of extensive improvements to make it productive. Many people were moved only weeks before they were due to start planting crops. According to a government official from Iringa in the Southern Highlands TANU officials just went into villages and told people to move in blind execution of party directives, and even when the irrationality of the move was pointed out to them they shrugged their shoulders. When people refused to move their huts were knocked down or burned by the militia, and there were several reported instances of serious clashes between the militia and the villagers.

The result of this gigantic rural upheaval is that instead of helping to resolve the food crisis many normally productive peasants are now dependent on government aid, and are likely to remain so for some time. Of the 50,000 tons of maize, rice and wheat currently being imported into Tanzania each month, 20,000 tons are being used to prevent famine in the rural areas while another 10,000 tons are being bought on the open market by subsistence farmers forced to sell livestock to survive. Assistance to the subsistence farmers, who make up 90 percent of Tanzania's population may well have to increase significantly by the middle of next year as home grown supplies run out. If the 1975 crop is also short or a failure Tanzania could have famine on its hands.

According to government sources Tanzania has placed orders for enough grain to keep the country going until October 1975 by which time the harvest should be in. Although no government figures are available for this year's agricultural production the massive foreign grain purchases, thought to be nearly 1 million tons in total, indicate that the total 1974 crop was 80 percent less than normal production, and this can only in part be due to drought.

President Nyerere says self-sufficiency can be achieved by 1976. In addition to shelving many political goals he has introduced a number of measures which could increase production by providing incentives. In the background there is the possibility of compulsion if production is not increased. Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa said in October 1974 that it was now becoming a matter of life and death for Tanzania to increase agricultural production, and that the government would force farmers to work hard if they refused to do so willingly.

The food crisis is a serious blow to Tanzania's chosen path of development, and from the government's point of view it poses two fairly serious threats.

The first is that in going cap in hand to capitalist sources for aid money to pay for food, Tanzania runs the risk of being forced to make political concessions. The International Monetary Fund, for example, recently made it known that it favors a marked slow-down in rural collectivization, and a re-evaluation of plans for moving the capital to Dodoma. The second danger, and perhaps the most serious in the short term, is that a poor 1975 crop leading to famine in the latter part of the year, could have serious political repercussions.

Famine in the Sahel and Ethiopia last year was a major reason for this year's coups. Although it seems unlikely that a similar thing would happen in Tanzania it is not impossible. The situation is compounded by the pending famine, the critical financial condition of the country, and the increasingly serious widespread opposition to ujamaaization, as a result of the compulsion used in the mass movement of people strongly resisting being moved into the villages.

Planning

The striking thing about ujamaa strategy is the attempt through decentralization to develop local planning and implementing capacity, able to take into account the diverse local ecological and socio-economic and political constraints in designing rural development programs. This is in response to serious constraints in planning, implementing and evaluating development programs confronting the development effort, and to assure programs are relevant to the areas they are designed to assist.

Regional specialization in crop production, a major objective of Tanzania's development plans, has not been realized due to poor or ignored knowledge of crop production technology and location and specific environmental potentials or limitations. Crop production targets have not been clearly defined. Consequently, regional and national production plans are more a shopping list of crops that can be grown in the areas than comprehensive plans based on each area's potential, giving appropriate consideration to its constraints. (22)

With the paucity of planning capability little attention has been given to setting planning priorities, or to ensuring proper use of planned expenditures. Even the crop acreage and yield figures are often unknown, and there has been little systematic data gathering for planning or evaluation. The best staff available has now been posted to the regions. The task is one of helping them gain the necessary technical competence and experience for planning and implementing. Such a task is partially facilitated due to Tanzania's singular emphasis on regional planning. An important step towards improving development program's planning and implementation has therefore already been taken.

It is also noteworthy that many of the ujamaa strategy shortcomings (broad generalities and doctrinaire cliches) are already reflected in the strategy evaluations carried out by the Tanzanian Government. Donor technical assistance and the Tanzanians involved in planning and implementing rural development programs must go far beyond generalities in assessing specific

constraints, providing solutions, and evaluating the prescribed solutions for removing constraints. The current approach to project preparation, sector activities, and work makes it difficult to evaluate efforts, and to identify and tackle the specific constraints.

Logical ways of improving the planning and implementation capacity are by providing technical assistance on a long-term basis to regional administrations, and concentrated training programs in-country and abroad for the local staff. The emphasis must be on improving the effectiveness and/or utilization of the resources already available, and to the extent possible, on mobilizing additional domestic resources. Such an approach supports self-reliance, a declared policy of Tanzania. This is currently being done indirectly in regions where various donors are assisting with on-going projects, and as is implicit in decentralization, there is close coordination of all project planning, implementation and evaluation through the Regional Development Director's Office.

The training and academic qualifications of the extension/field service have increased but field service performance--reaching and motivating the rural population, introducing innovations, increasing production, and improving the rural welfare--appears to have deteriorated. (22) Performance assessment of the delivery systems, particularly extension, has received little attention. The result has been a much slower rate of growth of agricultural production than had been anticipated in the SFYP. The specific reasons are difficult to identify with certainty, partially because far too little is known about the effect of collectivization on incentives, and production data on collective farms are poor. However, production does appear to be on the decline, and obviously if the ujamaa strategy is assessed on the criteria of increased production it is not achieving its objective. (30) How much of this is due to poor plans, implementation and extension services, rather than to the disincentives inherent in collective production systems is not clear.

Future efforts in Tanzania need to augment not only the supply of development planners, designers and implementers, but also technical manpower, such as plant breeders, agronomists, hydrologists, and civil engineers who can identify technical constraints and provide technical solutions; and to improve the performance of planners and administrators so the administrative functions are clearly specified, deadlines to fulfill these functions are set, and procedures for improving coordination between various ministries, and for decision making within individual agencies are devised. (20)

UJAMAAIZATION APPROACHES, PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS

Approaches and Problems

Various religious groups and donor agencies have assisted with the ujamaa movement. One of these is the Catholic Maryknoll Mission in Musoma. Fr. Carney relates that the Mission between 1946 and 1973 has modified its program from one basically concerned with its member's spiritual development to include social, economic and political development. This is being done through establishing farming and rural training programs under the guidelines of rural

socialism and ujamaa, and in close coordination with local government and TANU officials.

As is to be expected in implementing a national program of this nature, problems arise. The government has made a convincing case that communal villages/collective production is in the best interests of the majority of the rural population and the nation. (1) However, the majority of the cultivators and pastoralists do not view collective production as being in their own best interest. In surveys conducted in ujamaa villages about why members joined the ujamaa movement the answers were: "possibility of higher incomes; improved life through the availability of social services; no other job; ordered to do so by local politicians, but rarely, if ever, for reasons even vaguely socialistic." (34) TANU has a major task in changing these attitudes if socialism is to succeed.

Some of the Maryknoll Mission's social and economic programs begun during early independence have, with cooperation from government officials, evolved into ujamaa villages. These generally are making satisfactory progress but problems are experienced, particularly in starting new villages. Tribal traditions of autonomy, existing systems of subsistence agriculture, and in some cases cash crop production, and little or no understanding of the central government's intentions and plans for rural development, or of the details and rationale for ujamaa, have resulted in people being from slightly to extremely resistant to joining an ujamaa village. For many people collective production has no ultimate responsibility since they view the communal farm as belonging to no one, and therefore unworthy of any extended effort or attention from themselves. Negative reaction to development plans and ujamaaization is becoming more commonplace as misunderstandings and compulsory practices and techniques fail to reflect common traditions of all the people concerned. This seed of discord is exactly what President Nyerere is striving to avoid while uniting the people in nation building.

Other problems, or at least areas of concern, have been identified by Luttrell. (23) The areas of Tanzania in which the policy of ujamaaization is facing its most severe test, and having very little success, are the heavily populated cash crop producing areas. Establishing ujamaa villages in these areas from the beginning of ujamaaization is not possible if development is to be voluntary and democratic. Since the people in these areas live close together, if not in consolidated villages, discrete villagization would appear to be unnecessary. This apparently is given inadequate consideration in the move to ujamaaization.

These areas are very important economically since the crops produced, cotton, coffee and tea, comprised 65 percent of the total value of cash crops in 1970. The system of land tenure and the attitudes that have evolved, and the movement into the cash crop money economy of these farmers, do not make them willing or receptive candidates for socialism and ujamaa. Conversely, if socialism is to be implemented nationally, a practical development program to halt the inroads of capitalism, and achieve transformation to socialism is needed. Numerous incidents have occurred in the efforts to socialize these money economy farmers. Resistance ranges from heated arguments to open hostility, and has resulted in some deaths.

Problems and Measures

Dramatic measures have been taken that indicate considerable political resources and commitment by government. University students initially refused to consider spending time in the National Service and the university was closed to give them time to reconsider. Civil service salaries were reduced. Extravagant wage demands by NUTA were refused and the labor unions were reorganized under TANU control. Curbs were placed, but not rigorously policed, to preclude ownership of rental or income property and wealth accumulation by an elite. The principal means of production, firms, banks, insurance, processing and manufacture were nationalized to assure that the total population, rather than a few individuals realize the benefits, and that the wealth is owned by and distributed for the benefit of the total population. Recent salary increases for the lower wage scales concomitant with increased income taxes on higher salaries reduced the differential in purchasing power between the upper and lower salary levels. This was all accompanied by the most dramatic action, the interjection of ujamaa into the total society.

Although the philosophy of ujamaa has not been the result of a particular group or mass pressure, neither has acceptance of the overall ideology been widely challenged by the masses. (4) There is perhaps as much potential difficulty with labor and the urban population, as with the rural population. There is no assurance yet that the labor aristocracy will transcend, what is referred to as the narrow horizons of labor in other African countries, despite the efforts to elicit a greater socialist commitment from them. One of the main objectives is curbing the politics of urban consumptionism.

Concerted actions have been taken to correct such problems as the rural-urban dichotomy and rural stratification, but they have not been totally eradicated. Political education is a dominant theme in the public schools, and with the general public, relative to ideology and a higher level of socialist consciousness to be attained.

A glaring void in the overall development program is a clear policy and plan of action on the relationship between agricultural and rural development and industrialization, and between the rural and urban sectors. Logically agricultural expansion should be designed to meet a planned, industrially induced, direct and indirect demand, requiring a policy on industrialization. Little if any attention has been given to how capital formation is to be divided between the capital goods sector and the consumer goods sector, or between the sectors servicing the rural areas, and those servicing the urban areas; or how agricultural policy fits into this pattern. Certainly surplus utilization is as important to socialists as surplus appropriation. (4) There is an awareness of this in Tanzania, at least by the President and some of the top leaders. And appropriate policies and plans were to be prepared for inclusion in the TFYP.

Since independence the improvement in the material welfare of the rural population has been so small as to be of grave concern. There is considerable grumbling and dissatisfaction among the rural and urban poor, the bulk of the population. Unless improvement is soon forthcoming reactions more serious than grumbling are likely to occur. A non-violent democratic revolution

in the attitudes and actions of a scattered conservative peasantry is, as the history of the most socialist agricultural policy has shown, not easy to effect. Although an ujamaa mode of life and social intercourse (virtually void of collective agricultural production) may have been the norm in Tanganyika during the pre- and early colonial times, there has been a continuous expanding movement away from this and toward private enterprise. The difficulty experienced in moving back to the ujamaa mode will be in direct proportion to how far the individuals, groups or areas have moved away from and are established in private enterprise, cash market economy agriculture.

The move to socialism and the establishment of ujamaa villages and collective production and other communal activities is a novel experiment in Africa. However, few Tanzanians have experienced communal society life for some time, therefore, ujamaa village life is a new and complicated experience. The web of social relations and contacts the people are placed in, in ujamaa villages, is intricate and generates severe stresses and strains. They must live together, work together, and practice a form of cooperation more intricate and demanding than traditional forms. Collective farming has proven to be a particularly trying experience. (32)

There is large demand by the masses for, and promise by leaders of, investment in social services. Like other services or programs social services must be financed from surplus production. And to assure surplus production, investment must be made in productive services. It is also crucial that investment be made in social services since social services are the basic attraction ujamaa villages have for the peasants. In essence then, social services rather than conviction of increased farm production and improved welfare from collective effort are the incentives and motivation which attract people into the villages.

Unless there is a careful balancing of investment in both productive and social services, the result could be a slowing down of development progress and a potential political setback. To date social services have received the lion's share of the investment. Yet it is possible that investment in social services for such things as pure water and control of the most serious health problems may result in production increases equal to those from making the same level of investment in direct productive services. Low yields may be as much due to poor health, and low resistance to diseases resulting in minimal energy and vitality, as to the lack of production services and inputs. The balancing of investments must give careful consideration to all aspects, but indications are that the current allocation is too heavily weighted to social services.

In the end the success or failure of Tanzania's ujamaaization efforts depends on her people--peasants, workers and leaders. Development is essentially a political problem dependent on the political process and commitment, and resource allocations are essentially political decisions. One of the nation's top priorities, if it is to develop a socialized rural and urban society, is to build a political party with the requisite organizational and ideological capacity and commitment. (32) The party exists in TANU, but it is questionable whether it can achieve its goal with an elitist group, which still exists, or with leaders who flout the leadership code.

Constraints

The constraints to be overcome, if the agricultural sector and agricultural production are to grow, are not too different from those of many other African countries. Technically trained people and competent managers are in short supply, and those currently in senior jobs have had limited practical experience. The nation has not existed long enough to develop and accumulate a reservoir of such experience in which the people moving through the system can assimilate through work, and from older personnel, requisite techniques and procedures. An attendant constraint is the separation of formal professional/technical training from actual practical farm work experience. The preservice curriculum needs to focus more time and attention on the students applying, under actual field conditions, what they are taught in lecture and laboratory, until they understand and master the technology/skills. Institutions are short of funds, staff and equipment, less than optimally organized, and are unable to provide inputs and services when and where required. New technology and innovations, adapted to and appropriate for local conditions, are not always available. Transportation and communication networks are inadequate. Finally, there may be a problem of incentives to farmers, if, under the socio-political system, prices are not allowed to perform this function.

The most critical administrative/logistical constraint to increased agricultural production appears to be the quantity and quality of trained manpower. Research stations, cooperative organizations, and other institutions are inadequately manned with qualified manpower. Administrative talents of existing staff need further development, and planners are in short supply. At the key farmer contact level there is both a quantity and quality shortage of manpower resources, such that increased numbers of extension field service staff is no guarantee of increased output, nor improvement in the life of the peasants. The situation appears worst in the food crops sub-sector which has been relatively neglected with the past emphasis upon export crops. In general, as one proceeds from top to bottom in organizations servicing agriculture the situation deteriorates. Over the past decade Tanzania has done well in expanding the number of trained individuals, but the sector has absorbed the increased numbers and expanded faster than the training output. Agricultural and rural development require many more and better trained and performing staff if the demands placed upon it are to be met.

Another related constraint is the inadequate and inefficient network of organizations providing agricultural services. The extension service reaches only a small minority of the approximately 2.4 million farm families. Moreover, one can question to what extent the extension agent's advice is practical to the peasants. With the exception of a few cash crops, extension is not well coupled with an integrated service system including research, credit, production inputs, marketing services, etc. The efficiency of the cooperative marketing organization needs improvement, and some cooperatives have been found to be corrupt. Inadequate transport, insufficient village level storage, and inexperienced management are three major cooperative problems. Inputs such as fertilizer and seeds are also handled through the cooperatives. Quantities distributed are increasing but tremendous expansions are required if a sizable proportion of the rural population is to be reached.

Credit is provided by the Tanzania Rural Development Bank which has only recently begun lending for food crop production. Quantities of credit are limited, but growing.

Technology is a constraint in most areas, for most crops, particularly food crops and livestock production. Adaptive, problem oriented research is needed, as is additional research on farming systems. Most crops yields are well below what might be achieved with existing varieties if appropriate cultural and management practices were used--timely and proper seed bed preparation, planting, spacing, cultivation and harvesting.

Another potential constraint to increased production is farmer incentive. Until recently farm prices have been held at low levels. For the large number of subsistence producers with little to market this, of course, may not be of great importance. However, there must be some incentive for them to want to increase production. Perhaps the new prices, announced in 1974 which compare favorably with prices in Kenya, but still below world prices, will provide incentive. Alternatively, it is thought by some leaders that the price/profit incentive may be replaced by peer group pressure, and a desire to help the nation as more and more people become members of ujamaa villages and understand the objectives of the government's development strategy.

Manpower - Another constraint on development will be the availability of qualified manpower. Special reference to technical agricultural manpower as a constraint is relevant. One might expect that the returns from technically trained agricultural manpower would be unusually high. This is not necessarily the case. During the years of colonial rule, getting an education was equated psychologically with getting a job in the money economy, and the higher the formal education, even agricultural education, the further a person was removed from physical labor such as farm work. The most highly educated still tend to cluster at universities, in professions such as medicine and law, and in the higher reaches of government. Agricultural manpower trained at middle level are found in the Ministry of Agriculture and as junior staff in parastatals, service industries and private firms, while the least educated--the so-called school leavers and others--attach to the lower rungs of the money economy ladder. (21) Some of them fall off the ladder into unemployment, but returning to the farm is avoided as a last ditch and painful action.

The upshot is that while those interested in agricultural development are worrying about technical manpower shortages and trying to fill these gaps, the problems of attitude and honorific ideas about job prestige continue. Meanwhile agricultural productivity suffers not only due to the shortage of skilled agricultural manpower, but also because the people who are trained do not apply their knowledge directly to production efforts or services. Most of them resort to administrative work in the Ministry, parastatals or the regions. Perhaps an appropriate approach would be to restructure wages and salaries in line with development demands, and to upgrade the technical abilities of the peasants who farm while downgrading the job sights of those who normally receive technical agricultural training. For while growing numbers of Tanzanians are trained in agriculture their performance in raising the rural sector's output and income has not been very well demonstrated.

One of the major requisites in any program design for agricultural and rural development is indigenous institutional capacity to train manpower, this Tanzania is developing. But the training/education must be meaningful to rural conditions, and relevant to its economic, social and development needs. This training needs to be directed toward all concerned with the agricultural sector, from the farmer who may be inefficient and unproductive at the producer level, to the Ministry/Government official who may be just as inefficient at the administrative or professional agriculturalist level.

Institutions - Institutions are likewise a major longer-run constraint affecting the achievement of social and economic goals. While there is no irrefutable evidence that poor growth performance is significantly correlated to the rapid institutional changes which have been taking place, there is reason to believe that the two are related. Fortunately, most of the major institutional changes - nationalization, creation of parastatals, decentralization, establishment of a broader role for TANU and its members, have already happened. It is expected that the next five or so years will be a period of consolidation and gradual strengthening of institutions at levels below the region and district, i.e., at the wards and villages. This will obviously have a significant impact on the extent to which the government is able to carry out its output and equity oriented programs in the rural areas.

Land - The potential quality of agricultural land may well be a development constraint. At first glance it would appear there is still more land than people to occupy and utilize it, since there are large tracts of empty or minimally used lands. This is partially an illusion. Due to the soil fertility, ecology, and paucity of minimally researched answers on technology and soil management, slash and burn/shifting cultivation remains about the most appropriate system of utilizing much of the land. Land left in fallow under this system returns to bush and is hardly distinguishable from wild bush or forests. The very small farms being cultivated due to inadequate technology and management systems, and peak season labor constraints, however, means that much land remains idle and uncultivated for long periods. And it will remain so until appropriate technology and soil management systems are devised that permit continuous cultivation and sustained cropping without serious loss of soil fertility and excessive weed problems.

There is little confirming research, but there is evidence that much of the land is less fertile than it first appears to be. Removal of natural vegetation exposes a very thin top soil with minimum tilth, and a year or two of cropping burns it out. Maintaining fertility with commercial fertilizers on such soils will probably remain unprofitable until appropriate research is conducted. It is currently estimated that only about 20 percent of the land is suitable for sustained cultivation and crop production. Sixty percent of the land area is infested by tsetse flies, and would be relatively expensive to clear and prepare for crop production. Other vast areas receive so little or such erratic rainfall that crop production would be extremely risky.

While not disagreeing with the generally expressed viewpoint that Tanzania could easily double or triple its agricultural output at reasonable costs, the fact remains that most of its fertile land is confined to a few major valleys and other specific areas of the country. Thus, the location for

establishing particular enterprises (crops vs. livestock for example) becomes very important if costs are to be reasonable, natural resources are to be appropriately utilized and conserved, and the ecology is not to deteriorate.

Ideology - A final potential constraint may be the ideology itself. To the extent that output goals are not accorded sufficiently high priority, relative to social and other goals, achievement of overall development aims could suffer. This is especially true during the present crisis in food grain supplies, since continued poor performance in food grain and other agricultural production could have consequences which would be drastic and immediate. Recent discussions between IBRD and Tanzanian officials indicate that a rather dramatic shift to output priorities is taking place. Acceleration of output, particularly output growth, is important in the longer run, since continued slow growth will delay the development of infrastructure and social services, as well as lengthen the period of time required for any given increase in effective income per capita and GDP.

That Tanzanian ideology can be a potential constraint is especially obvious in the case of ujamaa villages, but the principle applies in other areas as well. Concerns such as these may of course be exaggerated since President Nyerere has maintained a relatively open government and a generally non-doctrinaire approach to the evolution of Tanzania's socialism, as well as an ability to focus on the ultimate human goals of ideology, rather than ideology itself.

Intermediate Technology - The Tanzania Agricultural Machinery Testing Unit (TAMTU) was established to identify, test, modify and develop intermediate technology machinery, equipment and tools. Once these are proven adaptable and profitable to local conditions they are to be produced in local or ujamaa village workshops for sale and use in increasing production. This includes training Tanzanians to build, repair and maintain the equipment, and involving the extension service in extending the technology to the rural population. Villages that are interested can obtain advice and assistance from TAMTU in establishing a workshop, and send personnel to TAMTU for appropriate training.

This approach seems much more appropriate to Tanzania's real needs for the foreseeable future than tractor mechanization, and deserves more attention than it is getting from TANU. According to Vail (34) government officials, more importantly its top political leaders, have not thrown their full support behind development of intermediate technology, emphasizing instead tractors as the magic cure all. Modernity to the political leaders, and most of the extension service means tractors, or at least factory manufactured equipment, not village manufactured production tools.

Some villages have been given tractors by the government. This tends to foster the attitude among both recipient and non-recipient villages that village workshop produced equipment and tools are a step backward rather than effective production tools for development. In the villages having tractors the collective shamba is plowed and planted and the village members generally fail to report for work on the collective farm until harvest, preferring to spend their time on their private shambas. They apparently feel that the tractor can handle the communal shamba. Without the hand cultivation

and other labor inputs production on the communal farms is consistently poor.

Promise of a tractor to take away drudgery of farm labor cannot be used as a general inducement to establish ujamaa villages. The cost alone for tractors for the 5,556 reportedly established ujamaa villages is beyond a reasonable share of the country's foreign exchange. In addition drivers and mechanics would have to be trained, spare parts procured and distributed, and a vast increase in the supply of fuel and oil provided.

Give-away mechanism seems to foster attitudes counterproductive to communal work. "The tractor does work for us, the tractor gives us freedom to work our own shambas." (34) Instead of self-reliance it promotes a dependent attitude and commandism: the tendency of ujamaa members to perceive the State as provider; and the tendency of public officials to see order-giving and coercion as the only means of inducing ujamaa members to work together. This defeats the purpose of ujamaa, to encourage voluntary cooperative activities, and to discourage individualistic production.

Other problems have also arisen. One example is the workshop established in Tanga. Private farmers want and purchase the equipment and tools and increase their production. TANU and government officials point with pride to the profit the workshop earns. (34) But the workshop output is not being used effectively to encourage ujamaa village establishment and development since nearly all the manufacture is sold to private farmers. And no particular effort is being made to get the intermediate technology/equipment into the ujamaa program. There have been cases of village cooperative workshops being established and workmen trained at village expense, with the trained workmen using the workshop to produce equipment and tools for private sale and profit, rather than the benefit of the village. This, to a degree, boils down to obstructionism by government functionaries, and an indication of the lack of commitment to socialism by the respective parts of the rural population.

THE RURAL CADRE

Developing and Organizing Local Leadership

The inherent poverty of a subsistence society places extreme limitations on the quality, quantity and availability of local leadership and is a serious problem requiring solution. (14) Decentralization is partially in response to this constraint, and Tanzania is devoting as much effort as any developing nation to organizing the population down to the village level, although modification of priorities in the current effort may increase the potential success of the effort. Six hierarchical layers are encompassed from the national government to the village: TANU National Executive Committee, central ministries, regional, district, ward and ten house cell.

TANU is actively involved in a national effort to overcome this handicap. All organs of government, under TANU's guidance, conduct training programs and discussions with leaders at all levels, particularly the local village and ward levels, on organization and leadership, the role of TANU,

socialization and ujamaaization, and means for increasing agricultural production and rural welfare. The ultimate goal is to achieve full and direct involvement of all relevant hierarchical layers, particularly the local levels, in every step of bottom-up planning and communication encompassed under decentralization.

As part of this effort there are a large number of TANU vehicles and teams traveling about the country holding meetings with groups of the rural inhabitants. However, it appears that most of the effort is expended on political orientation. Possibly greater development would accrue if some of the funds and support vehicles provided to TANU were budgeted to agriculture and the extension field service staff for a more comprehensive effort on farm management and agricultural production. A major constraint the field service faces is the lack of budget for vehicles and their operation and maintenance expenses; the transportation for getting into the field to do an effective field job. Although TANU officials generally involved may be dedicated, few of them have an agricultural background and, therefore, the requisite knowledge to gain the confidence of the farmers relative to agricultural practices and production.

The Cadre

Implementation of ujamaa depends upon a mass-based rural cadre as the major instrument, the importance of which is recognized. The reason for its importance, or its potential role is not fully appreciated, and maximum benefit from its utilization is not being realized. The principal concern has been on how to rapidly develop a public consciousness and acceptance of cooperative ownership, production, marketing and social relations nationwide. Yet the real needs, rationality, and the rural development policy, if the priorities are properly ordered, dictate that this principal concern logically should be an integral part of, but a junior partner to agricultural organization, production, growth and development in the total rural development effort.

In the absence of agricultural growth and improvement there is limited production and little to own or market, collectively or otherwise. Agricultural growth and development is the only horse Tanzania has to pull its cart of ownership, production, marketing and social relationships. Too much effort is being expended on building the cart, and too little on training the horse to pull, and nourishing it adequately to be equal to the task. A cart travels down hill by itself. The road to agricultural and rural development is a long uphill pull. Therefore, it seems logical that a much larger share of the budget and logistical support provided for planning and conducting this effort, and the responsibility for implementing it should be shifted from the political cadre to the technical cadre. This does not suggest eliminating the political role or activity in the rural effort. TANU would refuse to consider such a proposal. It does suggest a sharp reduction of the direct, overwhelming political role, and a refocusing of the rural activity, which would permit the urgently needed reordering of priorities in the rural development effort: the essential shifting of the primary focus to agricultural improvement with secondary focus on socio/political organization.

If the technical field service staff is properly oriented to the total

picture and end objective of ujamaa, which most of them are, the ownership, production, marketing and social organization aspects of ujamaa can be woven into the agricultural growth and development effort in the proper perspective and priority. A technical cadre, properly supported, is far more likely to keep its priorities ordered, communicate with and gain the confidence of the rural sector, and put the pieces of the subsistence agriculture rural development sector puzzle together, with less friction and impatience and more economic viability than is a political cadre with little or no technical training, and with their eyes on a doctrinaire target, frequently forgetting the horse in its impatience to find the cart.

There is no argument relative to the need for rural social organization, particularly at the local village level. But it must be developed around a productive activity, to improve the organization, output and development of the activity, through which the economic and social welfare of the people can be bettered. The reorganization of society must make economic and social welfare sense to the people involved before they will participate without undue force. And social welfare funding and support requires improved economic output of productive activity.

The recent decentralization placing all technical, professional and administrative personnel in the regions and districts under the Regional Development Directors, and their subordinate District Development Directors, seems a step in the right direction. The Regional Development Director and his technical/professional/administrative officers, junior staff and employees in these respective disciplines, and the district ward and ten house cell leaders make up the rural cadre.

The rural cadre primarily consisting of technically proficient personnel should be the prime instigators and innovators of rural transformation. To accomplish this they need an understanding of what socialism and socialist analysis encompasses, relative to class analysis, mass political and economic mobilization, and cooperative development in the context of a developing nation, and how to properly wed this to agricultural growth, development and efficient production. (22) The rural cadre must engage in the educational process, in the mobilization for self-help capital construction, and in political mobilization. Of course the commitment more than the training and understanding of the cadre will be the deciding factor.

Local Leader Compensation

The TANU leaders filling positions in the four upper layers of the hierarchy are paid a salary, as is necessary, since they work at the job full time. However, the leaders at the two lower levels, ward and ten house cell, were not compensated and expressed dissatisfaction with this. Demands were placed on them from above and their efforts were often unsatisfactory to their supervisors. Concomitantly, their constituents demanded a wide range of advice and services including being an intermediary with higher officials. This demand on their time detracted from time and effort required to feed and clothe their own families. Traditional society functions generally provide material compensation for leadership roles at all levels, which undoubtedly played a part in this dissatisfaction. To correct this oversight

the TANU National Executive Committee determined in 1971 that ward and ten house cell leaders should be compensated. They were authorized to retain 20 and 10 percent, respectively, of the TANU membership dues they collected. The effect on these local leaders' relationship with their constituents due to the leaders pocketing part of the dues collected is unknown. But since informal contributions were provided leaders in the past for community services, it will probably be accepted as long as the practice does not appear to the populace to run counter to the leadership code. Certainly it appears necessary for individuals in leadership roles to be compensated in cash, kind or labor assistance to assure their own welfare for time spent running village affairs.

As development proceeds there will be demand for more and better leaders at the local level and these must be developed. Hopefully local leadership capacity will expand along with the economy. But with increased demands on their time compensation should logically increase proportionately to sustain them for the expanded tasks. However, it is unlikely resources at the local level in the form of TANU dues will increase, therefore the increased compensation will have to come from the national level. (15) Tanzania's policy is to generate leadership at all levels, for the benefit of the people, not the benefit of the leaders themselves, and therefore it is expected problems of compensation will be resolved as required.

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF UJAMAA

There are very few published studies and evaluations of ujamaa, and those few assessments which have been made by the government are not readily available to non-government or non-authorized personnel. And non-authorized personnel contacts with ujamaa villages have been decidedly limited. Therefore, the assessment of ujamaa must rely mainly on scattered examples and sampling of Tanzanian/foreign sources familiar with rural Tanzania, and the very limited hard data available. Visitors to villages acknowledge a degree of success in a few, but for the most part there seems to be a growing number of problems. In general, views about ujamaa probably are prejudiced further by the knowledge that agricultural schemes of this kind have not worked well elsewhere. Thus, doubt exists about the potential success of ujamaa villages, if they are based on a policy of collective production.

National Ujamaaization

A movement of the magnitude of national ujamaa villagization will inevitably involve heavy short run costs and difficulties. Nevertheless strong arguments can be made in favor of some aspects of villagization and ujamaa, assuming voluntary membership and movement into a village. The arguments weaken relative to the collective production aspect.

Given the extreme transportation and communications problems the government justifies villagization on the basis that a wide range of social and economic services can be provided to villages at reasonable cost. The cost and effort of doing so for scattered farmers would multiply enormously. It is planned that schools, health services, potable water, housing, etc.,

will be provided or assisted as fast as possible, in the hope the village social environment will compete favorably with the attraction of urban life. If successful this could resolve much of the problem of the rural/urban drift and unproductive consumers in the urban areas. Another assumption is that viable cooperatives can be formed more easily and effectively with villages than with scatteration, and thereby more efficiently and effectively assure the delivery of production inputs, consumer supplies and the marketing of produce. In view of world wide minimal progress with agriculture and rural development, rural sector voluntary villagization could well be movement in the right direction in the long-run. However, to the maximum extent possible, villagization should occur in the area where people presently live.

In intensively cultivated areas people are living in rather close proximity, and could be provided the social services from a centrally located facility with relative ease and feasibility. It does not seem necessary to have discrete villages with laid out streets in order to ujamaaize.

In other areas where people are more scattered, discrete villagization may be feasible, but the size of the village must be based on the population supporting capacity of the area, and kept small enough that farm plots are in reasonable proximity to the village.

Where population density, land scarcity and unemployment require that people move to another location, the site of the village must be determined from assessment of the ecological, technical and production potential of the area. And the plans for and move to the village must be feasible and orderly, with provisions for assuring no break in production. People living at subsistence level do not have a surplus to carry them through a lost crop season resulting from ill planned programs to meet a national ujamaaization goal.

Ujamaa (without the collective production aspect and compulsion to join villages) and decentralization might well be a partial solution to Africa's development. Certainly decentralization and its bottom-up total population involvement in decision making and development programs' design and implementation gets at the heart of participation. Voluntary villagization has desirable aspects, but the village location and size must be such that the distance to the farmers' plots is reasonable, otherwise they are too tired from the walk to do the necessary work. The provision of social services is a favorable factor, but they should be provided on the basis of priority needs. Health services should be limited initially to the most serious problem, such as malaria, internal parasites, etc., existing in the area. Clean water is important. However, emphasis on health services should be scaled down to the minimum level required initially to resolve the debilitating problems and increase the vitality of the people adequate to perform productive work. Other social services should receive similar scrutiny. Concurrently, emphasis should be vastly increased on productive services to maximize production so that production surpluses are available to finance the social services and other development needs.

Ujamaa is based on a philosophy of self-help, but TANU's discussions with and promises to the peasants too often have generated the attitude that government will provide most of the villages' needs. This may not have been

intended, but unfortunately resulted. Then when the peasants move to villages, voluntarily or forcibly, and find inadequate water and few if any of the expected social services and support, disappointment and antagonism set in.

Collectivization

Although there may be some optimism for appropriately planned and conducted villagization, there is less, perhaps even little reason for optimism with the collective agricultural production aspect of ujamaa philosophy. Tanzania requires vast production increases if it is to attain its goal of self-reliance and the development of a modern state. If, as it appears, insistence on collective production has resulted in rather large production decreases, compulsion is unlikely to change this trend, and the rural population apparently is unlikely to become willing collective farmers.

Collective farming is faced with several problems. The level of management and the capital requirements will multiply as the scale of operations increase. These are precisely the resources of which there is an acute shortage. Although these same resources will be required by individual farms the magnitude will be smaller and generally easier to provide, assuming the availability of appropriate technology, production inputs and incentives.

There is unlimited hard evidence that economies of scale are not realized in agricultural yield per acre as they generally are in expanding industry. Certainly Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and at least areas of other countries have conclusively proven that small, individual, intensively cultivated/managed farms produce more per acre than large scale individual farms, if they have comparable access to technology, inputs and incentives. And that large scale individual farms far out produce collective farms per acre. This indicates the economy of scale argument used as part of the justification for ujamaa might well be reconsidered. Perhaps the economies of scale should be in provision of services, inputs, credit, etc.

Ujamaa is based on traditional society and customs in which, according to historical literature collective agricultural production played very little if any role. However, regardless of what the experience may have been in pre-colonial Tanzania relative to mutual or joint endeavors and sharing, these experiences were pre-commercial market economy, and in the opinion of many have little relevance for modern production upon which rural and national development thoroughly depend. When given a choice, and even when under social/political pressure to do otherwise, ujamaa village members concentrate on their individual plots at the expense of the collective or communal farm. Even though it is government policy to direct and limit provided inputs to the collective ujamaa village farms, the farmers still manage to concentrate on their individual plots.

Experience to date with collective agricultural production has been dismal and introducing the factor of compulsion will very likely only stiffen resistance to cooperative activities. Tanzania has not been subjected to an oppressor class from which people grasp at any alternative to escape, and has experienced years of introduction to and participation in private enterprise farming. When the people look to ujamaa villages it is for social

services and similar benefits. (32) They do not perceive the collective production component as a means for improving their economic well being. (34)

Incentives

Doubts arise over the absence of a clear-cut incentive system in ujamaa. While help to the rural poor stands high on Tanzania's scale, prices paid to its farmers nonetheless have been below those paid to farmers in developed countries. (6) And the prices they receive for their commodities like maize, wheat and rice have in the past been considerably less than those paid in nearby Kenya. One gets the clear impression that very high Tanzanian officials put much stock in nonmaterial incentive - i.e., that people can be inspired to hard work by persuasion, praise, and example. For this reason, it is TANU policy that officials from the President down visit villages and provide the example by performing farm work with villagers. And to avoid profit as an incentive they talk of service incentives - i.e., education, medical care and housing.

It is difficult to have a clear insight for all the reasons why productivity decreases usually have resulted where ujamaa has been implemented. However, collective production is repeatedly singled out by farmers and government officials as the major reason. These reductions range from moderate to severe dependence on such factors as the size of private plots, the ethnic group involved, and economic achievements of the people prior to ujamaaization. In addition to apparent decreases in production there are laments in the government press about resistance to ujamaa. These criticisms sometimes contend that farmers prefer working their private plots rather than the communal village land. From time to time a more remarkable line of criticism is printed such as that recently appearing in print with regard to livestock development under the National Agricultural Company (NACO). NACO reportedly has experienced problems from already compensated people (squatters) who are not moving out of the ranches, rustling of animals, thieving of installed items, burning of grazing areas and general hatred of national projects and company staff, and lack of understanding and good neighborliness.

Equity

While there is some doubt about ujamaa as a viable concept of rural development, and its ability to fulfill the hopes that the Tanzanian government has placed on it, it must be acknowledged that the evidence for or against it certainly is not complete. And that there is no definite reason to abandon it pre-maturely before further attempts at modification, if appropriate modifications are made. When looking at sister African countries which have not adopted a social economic approach it is evident that their indigenous farmers are not better off, and from an equity viewpoint, may be worse off than Tanzanian African farmers. In a free-wheeling country like Nigeria, for example, agriculture is still a drag on that nation's growth, and its farmers are still desperately poor. Big private estates worked by tenants and landless laborers in Ethiopia were clearly related to the turbulence occurring in that country, as well as in so-called progressive countries like the Ivory Coast and Kenya, which are sometimes pointed out as examples of development. African farmers and herdsman clearly have shared

to a very limited extent in the development process.

While IBRD officers and a few other researchers are attempting to come forward with promising clues to the advancement of agriculture in Africa, the safest conclusion at this juncture is that no clear-cut solution to African agricultural problems has been found, and that there is still a groping for a reliable handle to uplift Africa's poor.

Indications of Modifications

Conjecture relative to the future can be, and often is wide of the mark, but there is no alternative in the absence of announced policy and actions TANU will pursue. Apparently in view of the production decreases and other problems experienced from the collective movement, the government agreed in principle in mid-1974 that development in the Geita and Kigoma areas could proceed along the lines of the previously attempted block farming program-contiguous family plots rather than a collective farm on a given area of land. This is a timely pragmatic course of action. It will permit continuance of the other, in the opinion of many, more favorable aspects of ujamaa villagization, without the unfavorable aspect, in much of the rural population's perception, of collective production.

Since a major concern of the government and TANU is to preclude personal accumulation of excessive wealth and land, a resulting landlord-tenant system and skewed distribution of benefits, the reader is referred to the previous discussion on limiting the acreage an individual or family could control.

The decisions for the Geita and Kigoma areas demonstrates pragmatism in the implementation of ujamaa, although there are no indications from TANU it is abandoning the ultimate collective social, political or equity goals of ujamaa, or the methods of pursuing and achieving them.

Social Services vs. Productive Services

Apparently in its impatience and strong desire to encourage ujamaaization TANU has oversold government provided free social services as an inducement to join a village. However, the government has been unable to deliver anything approaching the villagers' expectations for social services. This naturally results in disappointment on the part of the villagers, and frequently later turns to antagonism and resistance to other actions proposed for cooperative effort and development.

The social services are also generally pushed by TANU at the expense of productive services, which in itself further reduces an already declining production. It is too late for TANU to take back the promises of the social services, but to continue the present trend will likely magnify an already bad production/food supply problem, and delay development and growth of the rural sector. This implies the need for a backing off, and a more rational balance of resources allocation to productive and social services, to realize increased production from which the social services can be financed.

Decentralization

Decentralization is the most effective means of bringing the people and the government into closer, meaningful communication. If implemented properly decentralization will make the government more responsive to the people, while eliciting their participation in, and making them more responsible for their own, the rural sector's and the nation's growth and development. This requires governments efforts in organizing the people, and helping them to develop organizational capacity. Government must also encourage the people to develop and utilize local institutions, tied into regional and national associations, through which they can gain access to the means of production--the financial system, the market, inputs, knowledge and information, to all levels of the social, political, and economic systems, and government. And through this to make them feel responsible for and a part of, rather than subject to government. However, decentralization will not increase participation, create new opportunities, or result in effective local institutions and organizations if TANU/government retain the power of decision and uses coercion to implement policies. Although, in theory, decentralization gives the power of decision to the people, within their own locality, there are strong indications that in practice TANU retains it.

TANU Leadership Code

The code is good. The implementation and policing of the code would profit from more rigorous attention and enforcement. The percentage of offenders may be relatively small, but the negative impact on the population is great, particularly since the worst offenders are in the higher levels of authority and responsibility.

Reflections on Aspects of Ujamaa

The Past Golden Age - There is no question about the commitment and motivation of President Nyerere and some of TANU's leaders to socialism and ujamaa, nor can one doubt the seriousness of purpose, and the desire they have to formulate and implement programs designed to uplift the nation and assure equality for all. At times, however, the concept of ujamaa appears as an effort to hark back to a golden age. A basic problem even though much of the golden age may have existed in reality, is whether in the final analysis the majority of the nation is prepared to hark back.

Landless Agricultural Laborers - Much has been said about the evils of landless peasant agricultural labor, and other types of paid labor, and its effect on the society, particularly if the labor works for private enterprise. Yet this was a conscious choice of today's farm laborers consisting of 40 percent of the current wage earners. There is land available for farming which these individuals could have farmed had they chosen to do so. Since independence there have been no actions taken to force them to remain on the large-scale farms as laborers, therefore, this must have appeared more desirable than farming their own plot of land. Labor and wage laws, enacted since independence, would have netted them the same income whether these plantations were privately or state owned. And there have been no large demands from these laborers for ujamaa membership, or mass movement by them

to ujamaa villages. Therefore, there appears to be a question as to whether it is the laborers, or the leaders, who see this as a problem of and to society. This does not question the validity or intent of official policy or concern, only the peasants' actions, reactions, and choice of alternatives.

Private Enterprise Agriculture - Private enterprise cash crop, or capitalistic farming as it is termed in Tanzania, existed in limited form prior to the colonial period, having been introduced to the mainland from Zanzibar during pre-colonial times with the establishment of the plantation economy there. The colonial powers encouraged, hastened and spread private enterprise production. In the more developed areas of Tanzania, cash crop market economy farming is relatively widespread. It is in these areas that serious problems arise in implementing ujamaa, particularly the collectivized production aspect, and the people exhibit very little intention or desire to return to the golden age.

Successful Ujamaa Villages - There have been numerous announcements in the press, on the radio, and in government reports on successful villages. The validity, while there is little evidence on which it can be refuted, or reason why it should be refuted out of hand, is difficult to verify. Very little hard reliable data on the economic, political or social development and progress of the program are available to those outside the government. Nor is there any particular reason why it should be made available. Yet without such data there is little alternative to conjecture based on discussions, observations and prejudices.

On the basis of observation and discussions with and opinions of people living, working and traveling extensively in the rural areas of Tanzania, acquaintance and working relationships with officials of local government and peasants; and observing ujamaa villages from a distance as it were, general conclusions are that the program is making limited substantive progress. As of January 1974 it was reported that 342 ujamaa villages were registered as multi-purpose cooperative societies and were in the final stage of ujamaa. This implies that these ujamaa villages are performing at a relatively good level of collective ownership, production, marketing and social organization and relationships, resulting in comparatively readily apparent improved economic and social well being. And that these villages would be excellent successful operations for demonstrating to other rural inhabitants the advantages of ujamaa villages. Since this would average seventeen villages per region their distribution would be adequate so that at least potential leaders of potential new villages could visit and observe the successes. And this many actual successful operations in which the improved livelihood of the members was readily apparent and could be demonstrated to the other non-ujamaa, less fortunate rural inhabitants, would be the epitome of positive evidence and encouragement to follow suit. Yet, resistance to collective ownership, production and ujamaaization steadily increases rather than decreases. As stated previously the act of registration shows proof of registration in the records, but the actions and reactions of the rural populace do not readily or fully support the assessment of progress implied by such registration.

Ujamaa village organization and structure, superimposed on the cotton, tobacco, cashew and other cash crop production areas have been cited as examples

of successful ujamaa villages. Yet the question arises whether it was the concept and organization ujamaa, or the nature of the production enterprises that was in the final analysis responsible for the reported success. Apparently the cooperative processing and marketing aspects of these activities were functioning before ujamaa. And since these enterprises, with or without ujamaa, require cooperative processing, marketing and production input functions, they very likely would have expanded and developed these services to their present levels with or without ujamaa, so long as they received normal government services.

A small holder tobacco producer cannot afford to establish his own drying barn, and the nature of the enterprise makes cooperative marketing essentially necessary. The same is true of the initial processing and the marketing of cotton and cashews. Therefore, it seems a reasonable question of whether it was ujamaa that resulted in the success of these enterprises or whether equal success would have occurred in the absence of ujamaa? And whether their levels of growth and development would have been more or less without the superimposition of ujamaa?

DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

General

The development prospects for Tanzania are modest at best. While there is drilling in the nearby Indian Ocean no oil bonanza is on the horizon, nor is there knowledge of copper or other large mineral resources to be tapped. There is some iron and coal of unknown quality and quantity, a small diamond mining operation, and a few lesser minerals. The three prime sources of potential economic growth appear to be agriculture, tourism and transit trade. Manufacturing will be slower.

Tourism, faced with international inflation and increasing travel costs from Europe, is unlikely to register major growth. Tourist earnings in 1970, its best year, were a modest \$8.6 million. Growth from transit trade is predicated on the continuing flow of trade from and to Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi, and to a lesser extent Zaire. But Mozambique independence may make that route to the sea more feasible. Agriculture will remain the basis of the economy, and the number one earner of foreign exchange. For this reason development potential must center on it.

Given the government's continued commitment to the principles of ujamaa, the Arusha Declaration, decentralization, sectoral policies already announced, and exigencies of the prospective balance of payments situation, the development policies and priorities covering the next 20 years will probably reiterate the targets of: increased agricultural production; universal primary education; rural water development; universal access to rural health facilities; and the completion of the basic trunk and rural road system. They will probably also include targets for rural electrification, nutrition and population growth, as well as a detailed industrialization strategy. Relative to the SFYP the future effort probably will give greater emphasis to regional development, although the 9-towns strategy will likely be modified toward a more comprehensive

coverage of the 20 Regions. Dodoma and its region is also likely to receive particular attention due to the government's decision to move the capital there from Dar es Salaam over a 10-year period, unless this decision is influenced by the IMF and others.

The effort to foster the development of ujamaa villages will probably be intensified. However, some changes in approach appear necessary due to public reaction to forced villagization, and to deal with the more difficult problems of inducing prosperous cash crop producers to participate in ujamaaization. There would appear to be a need for, and may well be, structural changes of the ujamaa concept itself.

The completion of the TanZam communications links may permit a reduction in the percentage of Tanzania's resources devoted to infrastructure development. However, the inadequacy of the transport network, the need for rural infrastructure development, and the increased urgency of developing mineral resources and non-oil sources of power, will generate continued heavy demands on the budget for expenditures on infrastructure. These pressures will have to be balanced against the demand for resources needed to support production increases of food and export crops, as well as increased production of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods for both import-substitution and export. These later considerations will also affect the relative emphasis to be accorded to social or equity goals as opposed to production output goals. Should the major emphasis continue on ideology-forced villagization, collective agriculture and social services, at the expense of direct productive and economic growth and development supporting activities, the future overall picture is unlikely to show much improvement.

However these issues are resolved Tanzania will face a series of obvious constraints in accelerating GDP growth and agricultural and rural development, and simultaneously moving toward the development of more adequate infrastructure and fulfillment of the country's social goals. In the short-run the chief constraint will be the balance of payments, although the external resources constraint is likely to be a serious one in the longer-run as well. Among the longer-run constraints the most critical, in addition to the external resources constraint, are likely to be trained manpower, institutions, and possibly ideology. The latter could show itself through inflexible adherence to questionable economic policies.

The SFYP assumed that external resources would be an increasingly constraining factor as the plan period progressed. In fact the current account was increasing throughout the early 1970s, although it was offset by fairly large aid inflows and dampened by rapid increases in the prices of Tanzania's exports. The widening of the external resource gap was, however, vastly accelerated by galloping oil prices after October 1973, the near failure of the 1973 long and short rains, and the delay in the 1974 long rains. The increased oil prices and the drought will probably increase the cost of 1974 imports 50 or more percent above the 1973 imports of \$500 million.

The overall balance of payments outcome for 1974 depends on export performance, imports, and other current and capital account items. The IMF had earlier projected a 1974 balance of payments deficit in the \$110 million range,

6% of the 1973 GNP, as compared with a \$30 million surplus in 1973. But this assumed increased oil and cereals imports of \$90-95 million, along with lower net capital inflows, and a slight deterioration in the current account balance. (12) Based on the higher current projections of cereal requirements due to production short falls and rising fertilizer prices, the balance of payments deficit for 1974 is likely to be \$300 million or greater, 20 percent of 1973 GNP. The percentage deficit to GNP will increase, if as is expected, the 1974 GNP decreases.

Since consumer goods imports have declined from over 50 percent of total imports in the early 1960s to less than 30 percent in 1974, imports cannot be reduced far without affecting development programs and production. Moreover, cash crops have been affected by the same factors that resulted in food crop short-falls, and 1974 export prices may be lower than anticipated due to recession in the industrial countries. Most primary product prices had started falling by May and June, 1974.

The availability of external resources is likely to remain a serious constraint for at least five years, particularly if oil and fertilizer prices remain at or near their present levels. The less favorable prospects for export crop/primary products combined with continued world-wide inflation will likely lead to a deterioration in international terms of trade, as contrasted with the general stability in the terms of trade since 1970. Although some progress has been made since independence in agricultural diversification, including export crops, three primary products (coffee, cotton, sisal) still accounted for 40 percent, and manufacturing for less than 10 percent, of 1973 exports of about \$360 million. Consequently the balance of payments will remain very sensitive to price changes for a limited number of primary products. Moreover, receipts from transit traffic may not rise as rapidly as earlier anticipated if independence in Mozambique leads to relatively heavier Zambian reliance on transport routes other than the TanZam road and railway.

Tanzania will require massive balance of payments support in the short-run and continued substantial capital and technical assistance in the longer-run. Although there is no comprehensive assessment available of the balance of payments assistance required in 1975 and 1976, it is clear that reserves cannot be drawn down much further, and that about \$150 million of external assistance will be required.

Capital and technical assistance requirements for the next five year period will become clearer with the publication of the TFYP in 1975. However, the IBRD reported to the Consultative Group meeting (January 1973) that the country would require about \$400 million over the subsequent five years on a disbursement basis, or \$550 million on a commitment basis. Allowing for price increases Tanzania will probably need capital inflows over the next five years of over \$100 million per year.

Tanzania's land and agricultural potential are its major, and about its only natural resource of any magnitude. Therefore, its hopes for the future require changes and improvements to transform a subsistence agriculture rural sector into a surplus production market economy rural sector. Regardless

of the ideology followed, agricultural production, surplus to the needs of the rural population, and increased efficiency and profitability must be achieved in agriculture, plus increased employment opportunities in the rural sector. This has not happened and in fact there has been a decline in the relative position of the farmers/rural sector recently. Although weather and other environmental conditions have been blamed for this declining situation, a drought has not persisted since 1969, during which period a general decline has been in process.

There are strong indications that the slump in development, production and revenues, resulting in the rather dismal situation in 1975 is a culmination of continually worsening conditions of recent years which greatly magnified the drought of 1973/74, but of which the drought itself was only a part of the total cause/effect. The major causes of this deteriorating situation have been rather inflexible adherence to questionable economic policies of the ideology. Hard data are not available to substantiate the contention that the existing doubtful economic policies of ujamaa ideology have been the major factors resulting in the current bleak picture. However, the evidence available indicates this has played a definite part.

Generally since 1967, and particularly since 1969, the continuing decrease in overall agricultural production and performance has been in direct proportion to the level and exuberance of implementation of the ideological/economic policies - nationalization of plantations/estates; monopoly marketing authority to cooperatives; nationalization of importing and wholesale distribution; increasing compulsion in ujamaa villagization and collective agricultural production; services and support limited to ujamaa and collective farms, etc. Therefore, the picture is unlikely to improve unless the policies and actions which caused and resulted in the situation are modified to foster improvement.

It is difficult to predict the economic and social systems that will finally emerge in Tanzania, or what compromises can be reached if resistance to ujamaa stiffens. It should be kept in mind that while Tanzania represents a diverse society, its principles about development, and its pride as a nation are nonetheless very firm. There is no question that some TANU leaders as high as the President have been reasonably pragmatic, and have actively sought improvements.

It is hoped that future decisions affecting the direction of ujamaa, allocation of resources, and development efforts will not continue to be weighted more heavily to ideology than to economic realities. It remains to be seen whether economics and experience, and the preferences of farmers and the rural sector entering the cash market economy can prevail against the philosophical and theoretical goals of the country's ideological leaders. If as happened in 1974 when forced movement to villages was vigorously pursued, and ideology and questionable economic policies prevailed, backed up by compulsion and a degree of irrationality, Tanzania's current social, political, production and financial problems will likely multiply.

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