THE ENERGY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK: DECEMBER 1973

Robert J. Kalter

December 1973

No. 73-25

THE ENERGY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK: DECEMBER, 1973 1

Introduction

The Middle Eastern crisis has increased the public's awareness of our energy problems. What is less well understood is the fact that even without an Arab-Israeli war and a 100 percent shutoff of Arab crude oil and products to the U.S., we would have had major energy problems in a number of sectors. Heating oil shortages this winter and a curtailment of gasoline consumption next summer were both expected by the experts. The degree of shortage would have depended on winter conditions and factors such as environmental regulations. The Mid-East situation has greatly aggravated the situation and this has been compounded by recent actions taken by Canada and other countries supplying our import needs (through export restrictions and higher prices).

It is not too simplistic to begin this discussion with the statement that our energy problem stems largely from a shortage of supply at prevailing prices. What I hope to do is review the historical factors that have led up to the current situation and then explore in depth the reasons for our present resource scarcity. As you will see, there are numerous institutional and governmentally created reasons for our current dilemma. After this review, I will attempt to provide an appraisal of both the short and long run outlook in the energy area.

Presented at the annual Economic Training School and Outlook Conference, December 12 and 18, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

Historical Background

Economic Indicators: Let us begin with a historical review of the energy situation. Referring first to the Table 1 (Appendix A), one can get a macro impression of the manner in which we have utilized energy resources in the past. Gross energy consumption in the United States has increased from 33 quadtrillion BTU's in 1947 to over 72 quadtrillion BTU's in 1972. represents a 3.1 percent annual rate of growth in energy demand. During the same period, net energy inputs increased at an average annual growth rate of 2.8 percent. Gross energy is merely the total inputs to the economy of primary fuels. Net energy usage consists of the use by each input sector after appropriate conversions in energy form have taken place. Largely as a result of increased electrical energy usage relative to total energy usage the conversion efficiency has decreased over the same time period from 88.5 percent in 1947 to 82.5 percent in 1972. I look for a continuation of all these trends in 1973 despite the energy problems that have developed late in the year. The 1974 situation of course could see a sharp break in use (depends on the extent of the oil boycott) but not in the efficiency decline.

These average annual rates of increase can be contrasted with a population increase over the same time period which has averaged only 1.4 percent per year. Another way of looking at these statistics is to indicate that gross energy inputs will double every 23 years if the average growth rate continues. On the other hand, population would double every 50 years. In general, these values indicate that both gross and net energy consumption per capita have continued to increase rather rapidly in the time period shown. On the other hand, the use of energy per dollar of gross national product is undergoing a moderate decline. While gross national product has increased at an average

annual rate of 3.7 percent, the gross energy consumption per dollar of GNP has declined at the rate of .6 of 1 percent per year.

Consumption: These indicators are somewhat indicative of the increasingly energy intensive nature of our society. However, as the data in Table 2 indicate the distribution of total gross consumption of energy resources among the major sources has continued to shift dramatically. Anthracite coal continues to decline in importance as an energy source due to its relative scarcity within the continental United States. On the other hand, although we are blessed with abundant resources of bituminous coal and lignite, production over the past 26 years has seen severe fluctuations and is currently at a lower level than occured in 1947. The reasons for this shift are numerous. To a large extent, changes in technology have been a driving force in shifting preferences among fuel sources. This has had a substantial effect on the coal use situation. More recent developments, largely of an environmental nature, have increased coal's problems.

Natural gas and petroleum products, on the other hand, have experienced soaring consumption. Natural gas has experienced over a 6.5 percent annual growth rate while petroleum, beginning from a larger base, shows a 4.2 percent annual increase over the past 26 years. Nuclear power is also experiencing a spectacular growth rate but still supplies only a small percentage of total U. S. energy demands (less than 1 percent). This is true despite massive R+D support by the government to the exclusion of other potential supply sources. Hydropower, another relatively small contributor to total energy resources, is slowing its rate of growth as potential sites are exploited. Seemingly large fluctuations in the annual production of hydro-

power can be traced directly to the weather conditions affecting reservoir utilization. A good example of this phenomenon is the recent experience in the Northwest where drought, rather than the Middle East crisis, has precipitated major efforts at energy conservation. In general, it can be seen that the United States economy is largely dependent for energy on fossil fuel sources although some rather interesting and spectacular shifts in demand among these sources has occured historically and continues to change our total supply picture. Year to year percentage changes in these various consumption patterns can be seen by referring to Table 3. The future picture is extremely uncertain, but increased emphasis on utilization of coal seems certain.

The values in Table 2 do not imply that all fossil fuels are used directly by final consuming sectors. In 1972, almost 21 percent of the total consumption of fossil fuels was used for electricity generation. This usage varied from 63 percent of total coal consumption to 7 percent for the petroleum sector and 18 percent of natural gas usage. In contrast, only 9 percent of total fossil fuel consumption was utilized for electrical production in 1947, with the bulk of this being supplied by coal.

Production: U. S. production of energy resources over the past 26 years is shown in Table 4. Production differs from consumption largely by imports and exports. As can be seen, natural gas has assumed the number one position (in terms of BTU's) among domestically produced energy resources, surpassing petroleum in 1963. Natural gas reserves continue to be produced annually at more than twice the rate of new discoveries. It should be noted that only coal, among our sources of fossil energy, results in product exports. We are net importers of oil and natural gas. Although natural gas production exceeds consumption (Table 4 versus Table 2) most of this excess is used for well rein-

jection and other domestic, nonconsumptive purposes. Table 4 also shows the beginning of a decline in domestic production of petroleum. This decline appears to have continued at an increasing rate into 1973 and will further decline in 1974. It reflects the fact that all domestic wells are currently producing at their maximum efficient rate and that domestic exploration has not kept pace with domestic demand. Table 5 shows the year by year percentage changes in the production of the various energy resources.

Table 6 provides further insight into why our economy has become increasingly energy intensive. In addition to rising incomes and increases in population, the cost of energy resources has exhibited either relative stability or an actual decline in real prices over the past 13 year period. The average wellhead price for natural gas is virtually identical to what is was 13 years ago, but will rise some during 1973-1974. On the other hand, domestic crude oil prices have actually dropped by an average of 1.5 percent annually over that time period. Of course, 1973 and 1974 will show substantial jumps in this value. Until this year, foreign crude oil prices have exhibited only a moderate annual increase and, contrary to good free market economics, have been maintained below the domestic market price by virtue of our oil import quota program. The average cost per kilowatthour of electricity has also declined by an average rate of 2.4 percent. Obviously, as labor costs have increased, it has been wise economics on the part of our industrial, commercial and transportation systems to replace manpower with the use of energy to drive mechanical devices. Only the price of domestically produced coal has increased to some extent and then, only in recent times due to environmental and safety regulations.

Commence of the commence of th

Although historical price data, along with our knowledge of other demand influencing factors, leads to a rational explanation for our increasing per capita consumption of energy resources, the data often seems counter-intuitive with respect to the supply or production of energy resources. As indicated in Table 4, natural gas and petroleum production have increased annually from domestic sources, with petroleum only falling off in the last year. This does not seem to correspond with the economist's notion of upward sloping supply function. However, the appropriate values to compare are not price and annual production but price and annual reserve discoveries and additions. All fossil fuel production takes place from known reserves and it is the annual rate of reserve finds which is the crucial factor in formulating future production schedules and contractual commitments for production. Annual reserve finds for crude oil have been less than annual production in \aleph of the past 13 years. For natural gas, reserve finds have been less than annual production in 4 of the last 5 years. These results indicate a declining reserve to production ratio which means an increasingly critical problem with domestic production from these sources in the intermediate future. We have been living off our past success. Only coal has sufficient known reserves to make its annual production directly dependent on market price.

Sectorial Demand: Tables 7, 8 and 9 provide a breakout of net energy inputs to the various final demand sectors. Energy statistics have traditionally classified these sectors as industrial, transportation, and household and commercial. No further breakout, on a comprehensive basis, is available for specific sectors such as agriculture.

Note that of the net energy consumption in the U.S. economy, almost 39 percent is attributable to the industrial sector, while the transportation and

household and commercial sectors utilize just over 30 percent each. Unfortunately these definitions are somewhat misleading. For example, the transportation component of each sector is included under the transportation sector and not as part of final household or industrial demand. For each individual sector of final demand, it is interesting to note the source of energy consumed. For the industrial component, over 46 percent of its net energy intake is derived from natural gas, with almost 24 percent from petroleum and only 19 percent from coal and 11 percent from electricity. For the transportation component, over 95 percent of net energy intake is from the petroleum sector. The household sector derives 42 percent of its net energy intake from natural gas and almost 37 percent from petroleum with 19 percent from electricity and the remainder from coal. The electrical energy sector, although not shown in table form, derives over 41 percent of its basic energy needs from coal with 22.5 percent from natural gas and 17.5 percent from petroleum.

Viewed from the standpoint of each individual source, the transportation sector accounts for almost 53 percent of total petroleum use whereas 20.5 percent is used by the household sector, 17 percent by the industrial sector and 10 percent by the electrical generating sector. Almost 46 percent of natural gas consumption takes place in the industrial sector with 33 percent in the household sector, 18 percent in the electrical sector. Almost 63 percent of coal is used to generate electricity and the remainder is largely used for industrial purposes. From these values, it is obvious that if petroleum is in a critical supply situation cuts in transportation usage are pre-ordained.

Reserves: Given some background in our historical and current rates of consumption and production, it will be instructive to briefly review the

state of energy reserves both domestically and worldwide. Are we running out of energy resources and does the future hold conditions of increasing energy scarcity? Unfortunately, data on our energy reserves are far from perfect. For most of the basic sources of energy only the discovered or proven resources which are recoverable at historical prices are tabulated. Known reserves available at higher prices are not usually estimated. Estimates of undiscovered reserves, of all types, are largely educated guesses. Estimates of these "speculative" and "probable" reserves vary over a wide range for the United States and are almost unknown for the world at large.

Table 10 provides estimates of United States recoverable energy reserves as of December 31, 1971. Note that for coal, we have well over a hundred years supply at current rates of production without major price increases. On the other hand, the reserve to production ratio for both natural gas and crude oil has fallen to between 10-1 and 12-1 in recent years. For natural gas this has been a continuous drop from 37.5-1 in 1945. The ratio for crude oil has remained fairly constant over time due to periodic reserve additions from large discoveries such as Prudhoe Bay in Alaska.

On the other hand, American Petroleum Association estimates indicate that over 136 billion barrels of oil remain to be recovered domestically. Similarly, the Potential Gas Supply Committee has estimated that over 1,146 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves remain to be discovered. Of course, the probability of achieving all such speculative reserve estimates is unknown. However, it is certain that the cost required would mean market prices in excess of those currently prevailing. Drilling deeper wells and in deeper waters affshore will be required. As such prices increase, alternative energy sources such as shale and tar sands will also become economical. Some estimates of the reserves in this area are also shown in Table 10.

All estimates discussed above refer to the United States and its offshore waters. For the rest of the world, such estimates are highly speculative. However, it has been estimated by the U.S. Bureau of Mines that over
3.5 trillion short tons of coal, 857 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and
almost 500 billion barrels of oil can be classified as proven reserves. Of
the petroleum supply so indicated, over 350 billion barrels exist in the
Middle East. In addition, a potential exists for over 8 trillion barrels
of shale oil. In summary, most observers do not foresee shortages of energy
resources on a worldwide scale for the foreseeable future. Reserves are
available if the economic and institutional factors can be solved. Even with
respect to the domestic situation, adequate resources appear to be available
for the foreseeable future, although substantial price increases may be required to tap known and potential reserves.

Current Situation

Coal: The current problems with coal can be summarized quickly. They include:

- Environmental restrictions, including air pollution standard requirements and potential requirements with respect to strip mining.
- 2. The ramifications of the Mine, Health and Safety Act.
- 3. The location of reserves and the type of coal deposits prevalent in those reserves.

The single largest drawback to greater coal consumption in the United States has obviously been the regulations associated with our air quality standards.

Since most coal found in the eastern United States has a high sulfur content and cannot be used as mined in populated areas, the consumption of coal for electrical generation and industrial processes has been eroded over the past ten years. Current state, and proposed federal, strip mine regulations are also having a major effect on eastern United States production since much of the terrain for strip mining requires stringent reclamation procedures. These regulations and economic factors of production have spawned a major move toward strip mining coal in the western United States where reclamation processes are easier and current regulations not nearly as strict. However, western coal is at a locational disadvantage for use in the eastern United States. Moreover, although western coal is often of low sulfur content, it is also of lower heat content. Therefore, many experts feel that per unit of energy derived little difference in sulfur emmission will result from its use. Eastern coal needs assurance of continued demand if necessary investments to increase production are to be forthcoming.

The Mine, Health and Safety Act has increased deep mine production costs by approximately 10 percent. However, because coal prices on a BTU basis are currently far below those of oil, these safety requirements and reclamation requirements should not be a long run inhibition to increases in coal production. In the long run if desulfurization technology can be developed or if air pollution standards are relaxed, I would look toward a major increase in the production and consumption of coal (perhaps as much as doubling of current production by 1985). In the short run, the uncertainties associated with environmental regulations, the competition from petroleum products (due to locked in technology) and the large capital and equipment requirements necessary to substantially increase production will severely limit the amount

of increased production which we can expect from coal. Moreover, the shortage of railroad cars in much of the United States is inhibiting increased coal production from mines currently able to substantially increase output.

On the horizon, given higher prices for alternative fuel sources, is the use of coal for the production of synthetic natural gas and for use in liquefaction processes to produce synthetic oil. Already, synthetic natural gas plants using coal as the primary energy source are being constructed. The future expansion of such plants depends largely on our energy policies and market conditions with respect to other fuel sources. In any case, it is unlikely that synthetic natural gas or liquefaction processes will provide a substantial portion of our energy requirements before 1990.

Oil: For both the short and long run, petroleum is a much more critical area of concern for United States energy policy. Because of the dependence of our entire transportation sector on petroleum products, oil becomes a critical factor in the economic outlook of the nation. Even without the Middle Eastern war, petroleum products would have been in short supply this winter and for a number of years thereafter. This is due to several major factors. First, due to our oil import quota program, which was terminated last March by Presidential order, oil companies have not increased refinery capacity within the United States over the past 5 to 7 years. Because they could not be guaranteed of an assured source of oil supply from foreign sources (due to the quota program), no refinery construction was undertaken. At the same time much of the international oil company expenditure for exploration and resource development was channeled overseas because easily found reserves in the United States had been exhausted and the cost of overseas exploration per production unit was substantially lower. Therefore, maximization of

company profits called for foreign investments. United States tax laws have encouraged this trend. Reduced drilling and reserve finds in the United States resulted even though the quota program maintained domestic oil prices at a premium to foreign prices for landed oil. The differential involved was insufficient to maintain adequate domestic exploration.

These twin factors largely accounted for the failure of the oil import quota program and its replacement last spring with a tariff. That tariff was purposely created with a differential between crude oil and the petroleum product imports. Product imports were to be taxed at a higher rate so as to encourage domestic refinery construction. Prior to the Middle Eastern situation, the change in governmental policy seemed to be having the desired effect. Mumerous refinery construction starts were announced by oil companies. However, at the present time all of these announcements are in some doubt since the world situation again makes it difficult to assure a company a guaranteed long term source of crude oil supplies. Moreover, since refinery construction takes a minimum of 3 to 4 years, the major oil producing countries seem to have gained the upper hand in forcing crude oil supplies furnished by them to be refined on their own soil. I look for an increased emphasis on this point in the future by OPEC countries. This will make it more difficult for us to obtain self-sufficiency in refinery capacity unless we are able to maintain self-sufficiency in our production of crude oil itself.

Although policy changes made last spring would have beneficial, they are a good example of governmental policy which was at least 2 or 3 years too late. Moreover, the benefits of those announced changes were severely mitigated by the use of price controls over domestic production. For the first time in history, the price of foreign crude oil landed in the United States

exceeds (and sometimes by a substantial amount) that of domestic production.

Again, this has encouraged foreign exploration (for example, the North Sea)

rather than domestic. Although this policy problem has been recently alleviated to some extent by decontrolling the price of crude oil produced from new wells and from the so-called "stripper" wells, it is still having a dampening effect upon increased U. S. energy production. Equipment and supplies used in oil production are also in short supply due largely to price controls over certain items.

A third area of governmental policy causing problems in the oil sector is our use of the outer continental shelf areas. Although we have been actively leasing outer continental shelf lands for over 19 years, less than 2 million barrels per day of our domestic production stems from these areas. The dominant governmental policy has been to maximize revenue to the government from the leasing of these lands rather than to maximize production. In addition to increasing our dependency on foreign sources, this policy has resulted in a major capital drain that could have been used for exploration by the oil companies. U. S. Policy can be contrasted with that of Great Britain and the North Sea area. Here, exploration has been underway for less than 5 years and production is expected to reach more than 2 million barrels a day by 1978.

A fourth item contributing to the lack of domestic petroleum supply has been the failure to construct the Trans-Alaska pipeline. Although this pipeline will have little or no effect upon the supply-demand situation east of the Rockies, it would make the west coast of the United States substantially independent from foreign oil sources.

Fifth, most U. S. refineries are structured to process domestic crude which is of low sulfur content. Since foreign crude, on the other hand, is

largely high in sulfur content our refineries are not well suited to its processing. This has caused a further problem with our refinery capacity. Currently, although we are consuming 17.6 million barrels of oil per day, our refinery capacity is only 13.3 million barrels per day. The remainder must be satisfied by the import of petroleum products. Table 11 provides detail on our net trade with respect to petroleum (including both crude and product). As can be seen, our imports of petroleum products exceed those of foreign crude oil. However, the recent drop in oil quotas has not provided enough time to develop long term contracts for product imports.

Although the national security and national independence arguments for self-sufficiency now seem more persuasive than they did during the late fifties and early sixties, it is difficult to see how the United States with its requirements for imports of also one third of total petroleum usage can become self-sufficient in petroleum anywhere in the near future. Capital and equipment requirements for exploration and reserve development, alone, make this task nearly impossible. In addition, the current status of our offshore leasing policy (even though the acreage of annual lease sales was tripled recently) is still inadequate to make a substantial early reduction in import requirements.

Natural Gas: Contrary to popular opinion, most natural gas found in the United States is not associated with the production of oil. Over 70 percent of our natural gas production comes from wells unassociated with oil finds. Depending upon your viewpoint, the natural gas scarcity problem boils down to one of three factors. First, the lack of additional reserves available for discovery. Second, the monopolistic behavior of natural gas producers who are inhibiting production in order to maintain high profits in intrastate

(unregulated) markets. Third, the regulatory policies of the Federal Power Commission with respect to interstate wellhead gas prices. A fourth and possible contributing problem is the slow pace of leasing our outer continental shelf lands.

Most observers discount the first issue as being unsubstantiated by geological data. A great deal has been written concerning the competition question. I am not convinced, however, that monopoly power exists among natural gas producers. The predominant weight of economic opinion agrees with this conclusion. Rather, the artificially low wellhead prices established by the Federal Power Commission for interstate natural gas rates appear to be the major cause of our developing shortage. Rather than a highly elastic supply function for natural gas, which was thought to exist by many economists in the early sixties, it is now clear that the supply function is more inelastic and that artificially low prices have both restricted exploration and encouraged massive shifts in demand to natural gas. These shifts have been encouraged by our air pollution law requirements and by the convenience features of this energy source. As a result, natural gas has become the major energy source for the industrial and household sectors. Use of this pure energy form as a boiler fuel would never have developed to its current extent unless prices had been artificially low. On a BTU basis at the burner tip, the price of natural gas is currently less than one half that for petroleum products. Only in the transportation sector, where technology has locked us into petroleum, has a massive shift to the use of natural gas been avoided.

The Outlook

Environmental restrictions on the use of coal, faulty governmental policies with respect to oil, and low regulated prices for natural gas have exasperated our fuel situation by causing massive shifts in demand growth and reduced exploration domestically. Governmental policy toward refineries and superports has further aggravated the situation. Technology aimed at reducing pollution emmission from the burning of petroleum products has increased our demand for oil products. Natural gas scarcities, which began to show up in 1970, resulted in further demand shifts toward a low sulfur petroleum and petroleum products. Finally, the monopoly power of the cartel known as OPEC resulted in worldwide disruptions of the energy market for economic and political reasons. What then is the short range and long range outlook for domestic energy.

First, I view the new Federal Energy Administration and the appointment of William Simon as its director as an extremely encouraging development. Centralization of most energy policy under one aggressive administrator should begin to provide direction and substance to what has previously been an aimlessly drifting ship. Mr. Simon is an able and aggressive administrator who can quickly analyze and evaluate problem areas and act with dispatch.

Second, we are currently experiencing a shortfall of petroleum of between 3 and 3.5 million barrels per day. Even if OPEC decides to modify their current boycott, it will be at least 90 days before new oil can arrive in the United States and be processed for use. Due to this and the fact that refinery output has been switched to encourage fuel oil production, we are guaranteed a shortage of gasoline, at current prices, during the summer months.

Third, with respect to this winter, some localized shortages of heating oil will occur but it would appear that a major shortfall may be avoided if

weather conditions stay mild. An increased severity in weather, failure to conserve at least 10 to 15 percent of last year's fuel oil consumption or a further worsening of the international situation could, however, result in severe fuel oil problems.

Fourth, the petroleum product now in critical supply appears to be the residual oil utilized by many east coast electrical utilities. Since much of this product is imported and requires a low sulfur content, brown outs and reduced voltage may be the rule along the east coast by the middle of January.

Fifth, as a result of the shortfall, higher prices for all petroleum products are guaranteed. These will probably result from a combination of market forces and increased federal taxes. Uncertainties surrounding the political negotiations make it very difficult to forecast but \$.75 to \$.80 per gallon of gasoline appears to be well within reality by late next spring. Prices of \$.35 per gallon of fuel oil are also considered attainable. The result will be a substantial increase in inflationary pressures but the final impact on the consumer price index will depend upon whether other components of the index offset the petroleum increases. Energy currently makes up approximately 6 percent of the value of the index.

Sixth, little difficulty should be experienced by residential consumers in obtaining adequate supplies of natural gas but interruptable service consumers may have difficulty if winter conditions become severe.

Seventh, conservation measures will have a relatively small effect on total oil demand in the short run (less than 7 percent of petroleum usage) but could be potentially valuable in the long run. Estimates of savings as high as 3.5 million barrels per day of crude oil by 1980 have been made if

a conserted effort is made to modify our transportation system and improve the efficiency of energy use for space heating and lighting purposes.

Eighth, although current users of natural gas and coal will have little trouble in obtaining needed supplies, the possibilities for substitution of these fuel sources for petroleum, when technology permits, will be severely curtailed and limited.

Finally, the pervasive dependence of our economy on readily available energy makes it likely that if a solution to the Middle East problem is not found within the next month, a severe recession will develop in the first and second quarters of 1974. Forecasts of a 10 percent unemployment rate do not appear to me to overstate the severity of the problem. This could well be accompanied by a zero or negative rate of real growth in gross national product and a 6-8 percent rate of inflation.

What of the longer term? First, given our seeming political resolve to become independent of a single petroleum supply source, prices will need to increase substantially in order to encourage domestic exploration, development of technology to utilize our abundant energy resource (coal), and to substantially reduce the rate of growth in domestic consumption. The alternative to such a course of action is a perpetual system of import dependence. Long run implementation of this policy will, however, maintain a continued upward pressure on the inflation indices. Some balance will need to be struck over the long term.

On the other hand, the OPEC countries are perfectly capable of doing an about face in their present export policies if they see a long term threat to their largest markets. It would not be surprising to see some reductions in foreign prices after several years. These reductions would probably be just sufficient to force the United States to reconsider development of substitute sources of energy.

Second, President Nixon's announced program - "Project Independence" to make this country self-sufficient in energy production by 1980 is considered by most exports to be infeasible and unworkable. This is particularly true in the petroleum sector. Even with sharp price increases curtailing the rate of growth in petroleum consumption and encouraging domestic
exploration, most forecasting models do not foresee any drop in our need
for imports on an absolute basis. Even with massive shifts in demand away
from petroleum to natural gas and/or coal resources and a substantial increase
in federal leasing policy for offshore areas, it is difficult to forecast
a U. S. production of more than 14.5 million barrels per day of crude oil
by 1985. At best, we will only be able to hold domestic consumption in 1985
to around 21 to 22 million barrels per day. Thus, at least modest annual
increases in our rate of imports must be accompodated. Forecasts like this
generally assume long term prices in the area of \$9 to \$10 per barrel at
the wellhead which is approximately 2.5-3.0 times last year's domestic price.

Third, without legislation to deregulate the wellhead price of natural gas or substantially higher regulated prices, our supply of natural gas will continue to dwindle with resultant curtailments in usage and economic dislocations. Free market pricing in the natural gas market could alleviate shortage situations within a period of 5 years.

Finally, it is now much more evident that our energy problems will be deeper and longer lasting than most Americans perceive. This will result in substantial changes in energy markets with the resultant effect that Americans will slowly be forced to realize that substitution in terms of their life styles may be economically beneficial. Thus, I look for slowly changing but ultimately rather pervasive switches in how America conducts its business over the next 10 years.

APPENDIX A Historical Energy Statistics

TABLE 1

SELECTED UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND ENERGY INDICATORS, 1947-1972

α ₂ (2)	
Conversion Efficiency ³	88 87.3 86.4 87.5 87.5 87.5 83.8 83.8 82.5 82.5
Net energy/capita (Millions of BTU)	202.8 194.8 206.7 211.5 217.2 227.2 227.3 253.8 253.8 268.5 27.7
Gross energy/capita (Millions of BTU)	229.0 223.2 223.2 239.3 246.8 246.8 256.9 266.9 320.5 320.5 320.8 345.3
Gross energy/ GNP (1000's of BTU)	106.4 95.7 91.1 91.1 88.3 86.3 87.3 92.6 92.6
Gross National Product (Billion of \$	309.9 355.3 438.0 487.7 497.2 529.8 551.0 675.2 720.0 741.7
Population (Millions)	144.1 152.3 165.9 180.7 188.8 198.5 194.2 202.6 204.8 207.0
Net energy input (Quadrillion BTU)	29.28 38.29.29 38.29.20 47.20.05 50.05.47.45.30 50.05.20
Gross energy input (Quadrillion BIU)	33.0 34.0 44.7 47.4 57.0 57.0 58.3 72.1 72.1
Year	1947 1950 1955 1960 1967 1967 1967 1972 1972

Source: U. S. Bureau of Mines

 $^{
m p}_{
m Prelininary}$

Gross energy is the total of inputs into the economy of the primary fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal, or their derivatives, plus the generation of hydro and nuclear power converted to equivalent including imports) energy inputs.

 2 Net energy is the sector inputs (household and commercial, transportation, and industrial), and consists of direct fuels and purchased electricity.

3 The conversion efficiency factor is the percent of total gross energy going into the sectors.

UNITED STATES TOTAL GROSS CONSUMPTION OF EMERGY RESOURCES BY M.JOR SOURCES, 1947-72 TABLE 2 (Trillion BTU)

Year	Anthracite	Bituminous coal and lignite	Natural ₂ gas, dry	Petroleum ³	Total fossil fuels	Hydropower	Nuclear power	Total gross energy inputs	Percentage change from prior year
1947 1950 1955 1960 1961 1965 1965 1966 1968 1969 1977	1,224 1,013 1,013 447 404 1404 365 363 365 290 274 224 226 186	14, 600 11, 900 10, 941 10, 941 10, 899 11, 580 11, 982 11, 982 11, 982 11, 887 12, 712	4,518 9,232 12,699 13,228 14,121 14,843 15,648 16,098 17,393 18,250 19,580 22,029 22,819	11,367 13,489 17,524 20,067 20,487 21,267 21,950 22,386 23,241 27,052 27,052 28,421 29,614 30,570	31,709 32,552 38,552 42,906 42,621 47,507 47,507 51,247 51,247 55,841 62,174 64,565 68,548	1,326 1,440 1,440 1,657 1,657 2,058 2,342 2,342 2,342 2,342 2,937	130 130 146 146 130 146 606	33, 035 33, 992 33, 992 44, 569 47, 422 49, 308 51, 240 53, 343 61, 763 61, 763 67, 414 68, 728	+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Source: U. S. Bureau of Mines

Gross energy is that contained in all types of commercial energy at the time it is incorporated in the Gross energy includes the energy used for the production, processing, and transportation of energy economy, whether the energy is produced domestically or imported. Gross energy comprises inputs of primary fuels (or their derivatives), and outputs of hydropower and nuclear power converted to theoretical energy inputs. proper.

2Excludes natural gas liguids.

3 Petroleum products including still gas, liquefied refinery gas, and natural gas liquids.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM PRIOR YEAR IN UNITED STATES TOTAL GROSS CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY RESOURCES BY MAJOR SOURCES, 1950-72

Year	Anthracite	Bituminous coal and lignite	Natural gas, dry	Petroleum	Total fossil fuels	Hydropower	Nuclear power	Total gross energy inputs
0.00		C [7	5,91+	+11.3	+8+	9.0-	ı	+8.0
1770	74.	^	C & #	+8.6	8,0+	† * T+	t	+9.5
1777	الم. د م) · / · / · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	- + • •	-	+3,3	+4.	+200.0	. + +
COOT	^ \ o	ا پ پ	・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・	, r. +	+1.7	+7.4	+200.0	-T+
:	0.0°) c	υ α + Υ + +	1 00.	+14.5	+4.8	+33.3	9.4.
1707	Z.OT-	+ ~ -) r-	, c.	+4.2	-3.0	+41.7	+7+0
17007	0.5	+ + • • •	- + - +	. c	43.8	47.9	+2.9	6.8+
:: ±000 r	ન r (ر د د د د	r C \ \ \ \	CC +	+ 7.0	6.7+	+8.6	1.4.4
7907	1.01.	V ==	- + n ∝ v ⊂	+ 0	+5.9	+0.7	+50.0	+5.8
1,000 t	0.11.	, r) -(+	0.74	, O,	+13.1	+40.4	+3.3 .3.3
	ڻ ن) i	Λ· + +	, w	+6.2	-0.1	+62.5	+6.0
1,000	-7- 0 (٠. رون د) - L	+ • L	44.0	+13.5	+12.3	+5.2
Tyby	-13.2	か. つ. +	+ 0	1 C	\ \ \ \ \ \	, c,	+56.8	+3.8
1.970	-6.3	4.0	o. +	J • • •		ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο ο	+76 h	6,1+
1971	-11.4	.6.5	43.6	+3,5	+) ·	+ C U	У Т Т +
1972**	-19.9	+3.3	+2.1	+7.3). • t ₁ +	0 N +	0.00	•

P Preliminary

UNITED STATES TOTAL PRODUCTION OF ENERGY RESOURCES BY MAJOR SOURCES, 1947-72 (in Trillions of Etu) TABLE 4

Year	Anthracite	Bituminous coal and lignite	Natural gas, dry	Petroleum	Total fossil fuels	Hydropower	Nuclear power	Total gross energy inputs	Percentage change from prior year
1947 1950 1955 1960 1961 1963 1965 1967 1968 1970	1, 453 1, 120 665 478 443 443 8329 8378 8311 8222 180	16,522 13,527 12,080 10,662 10,308 10,722 13,904 13,904 13,904 13,451 14,372	1,0,0,0,1 1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,	10, 771 11, 449 11, 445 11, 445 11, 485 115, 495 115, 930 116, 925 119, 772 119, 772	33, 758 33, 758 39,937 46,939 46,939 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96 77,96	4,4,4,4,4,608,608,609,609,609,609,609,609,609,609,609,609	1130 1130 1146 1150 1160 1170 1170 1170 1170	35, 054 34, 352 39, 082 41, 353 42, 301 45, 990 47, 604 49, 074 58, 741 62, 033 61, 066 62, 033	+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Preliminary

l Denotes first year for which figures include Alaska and Hawaii

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE CHANGE FROM PRIOR YEAR IN UNITED STATES TOTAL PRODUCTION OF ENERGY RESOURCES BY MAJOR SOURCES, 1950-72

Year	Anthracite	Bituminous coal and lignite	Natural gas, dry	Petroleum	Total fossil fuels	Hydropower	Nuclear power	Total gross energy inputs
1950 1955 1960 1961 1962 1964 1965 1966 1969 1970		11 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +	+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +	++ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +	+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +	02+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++	+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +	+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
19/2	у. • ОТ.	۲. د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د د	۲. ۲.		())	•	1

Source: U. S. Bureau of Mines

 $^{\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{Preliminary}}}$

TAELE 6

FOSSIL FUEL PRICES: 1960-1972 (1972 dollars)*

Crude Oil: ## Gas Crude Oil:
4.03 A 4.00 A 6.00 A 7.00
Integrated Price P

Source: Office of the Secretary, U. S. Department of the Interior

^{*} Implicit price deflator for total gross national product used for columns 1,2,3,7 and 8; for imports for column 4, and for total personal consumption expenditures for columns 5 and 6.

TABLE 7

DEMAND FOR ENERGY INPUTS TO INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 1947-72

d d	1 の58 7 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total Sector Inputs Trillion BTU	13, 281 12, 909 15, 075 15, 948 15, 937 16, 651 17, 372 18, 242 20, 098 22, 262 22, 287 22, 287
rchased Trillion BrU	459 2,1,1,1,1,008 1,464 1,788 2,157 2,253 2,155 4,65
Electricity Purchased Billion Trillio Kilowatt-hours BTU	135 164 295 383 383 473 473 648 648 672
Trillion Bru	4, 4, 298 4, 4, 4, 4, 524 5, 7, 527 7, 1, 1, 224 4, 330 4, 157 1, 157
Coal Thousand short tons	273, 403 223, 507 214, 946 175, 225 168, 090 169, 995 178, 201 189, 561 200, 688 204, 945 191, 602 188, 586 188, 586 163, 993
roleum Trillion BTU	2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5,
Petroleum Million Trill barrels BTU	423.0 446.8 579.8 643.9 642.6 678.8 742.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6 744.6
Gas Trillion BTU	3, 007 8, 935 6, 471 6, 842 7, 451 10, 162 10, 723
Natural Gas Willion Tri cubic feet B	2,905,571 3,601,757 4,768,562 6,074,114 6,221,668 6,917,738 7,198,706 7,433,200 7,948,486 8,332,614 8,987,095 9,856,844 10,252,000 10,400,457
Year	1947 1950 1955 1962 1962 1963 1965 1966 1969 1970

Source: Division of Fossil Fuels, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior.

 $p_{Preliminary}$

TABLE 8

DEMAND FOR ENERGY INPUTS IN TRANSPORTATION SECTOR 1947-1972

Total Energy Input Trillion BTU	8,820 8,640 10,836 11,433 11,433 11,981 12,732 15,801 15,801 17,075
Trillion BTU	29 11 11 12 13 14 14 15 16 17 17 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Utility Electricity Purchased Billion Trillio Kilowatt-hours BTU	ω Γ-Ο ΓΛΟ ΓΛΟ ΓΛ
Gas Trillion BrU	130 130 359 359 451 751 766 799
Natural Gas Million Tri cubic feet B	Neg 125, 546 245, 246 347, 075 377, 607 382, 496 423, 783 435, 570 590, 524 535, 353 575, 752 590, 965 630, 962 774, 788
Petroleum ion Trillion els BTU	5,761 6,785 9,109 10,372 11,001 11,506 11,791 12,777 13,408 14,535 15,125 15,286
Petr Million barrels	1,050.3 1,248.8 1,691.4 1,934.1 1,934.1 2,051.3 2,198.9 2,382.6 2,497.1 2,615.8 3,032.3
1. Trillion BIU	3, 030 1, 701 464 87 118 118 119 119 88 88
Coall Thousand Ti	113, 324 63, 783 17, 429 3, 294 3, 294 670 670 711 655 609 467 41.7 214 214
Year	1947 1950 1955 1960 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1972

Source: Division of Fossil Fuels, Bureau of Mines, U. S. Department of the Interior

Includes anthracite, bituminous, and lignite coals.

2 Includes burkers and military transportation.

 $^{^{}m p}_{
m Freliminary}$

TABLE 9

DEMAND FOR ENERGY INPUTS IN HOUSEHOLD AND COMMERCIAL SECTORS, 1947-1972

Total Energy Inputs Trillion	Biru		8,139														
Purchased Trillion	BTO	391	545	, 854 , 67,0	1,262	1,385	1,490	1,645	1,792	1,948	2,101	2,257	2,467	2,752	3,000	3,209	3,449
Electricity Purchased Billion Trillio	Kilowatt-hours	115	160	250	3,70	400	437	482	525	571	616	199	723	807	879	941	1,011
L	BTU		2,913		80 80 80 80 80 80	868	872	731	609	678	677	585	529	ረ ተተ	427	408	384
Coal Thousand	short tons	128,657	110,422	66,039	37,180	32,805	32,955	27,603	22,949	25,676	25, 587	22,134	19,983	16,875	16, 114	15,253	14,356
etroleum n Trillion	BIU		3,038														
Petr Million	barrels		526.2					915.0	903.7		000	078.	.690	660	1,128.4	131.	
Gas Trillion	BTU	1,125	1,642	2, 849 6/5	4,268	4,477	4, 849	5,027	5,343	5,517	5,945	6,223	6,451	6,890	7,108	7,366	7,629
Natural Gas	cubic feet	087,	1,586,207	(53)	123,	325	685,	856,	162,	346,	760,	029,	250,	682	894,	144	399,
	Year	1947	1950	1925	1960	1901	1902	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971,	1972*

Source: Division of Fossil Fuels, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior.

 $^{
m p}_{
m Preliminary}$

TABLE 1.0

ESTIMATES OF UNITED STATES RECOVERABLE ENERGY RESERVES - Dec. 31, 1971 1

Energy Source	Units	Quantity	Trillion BTU
l. Anthracite Coal	,000 short tons	8,035,300	204,097
2. Bituminous Coal and Lignite	,000 short tons	578,397,000	14,089,751
3. Crude Oil	,000 barrels	38,062,957	220,765
4. Natural Gas Liquids	,000 barrels	7,304,227	33,746
5. Natural Gas	,000,000 cu. ft.	278,805,618	287,449
6. Uranium	,000 pounds recoverable U ₃ 08	546,424	
7. Shale Oil	,000 barrels	600,000,000	3,480,000
8. Tar Sands	,000 barrels	17.7-27,600,000	

Coal reserves based upon economically recoverable resource at current prices. Uranium reserves based upon \$8.00 per pound U₃O₈. Oil and gas reserves based upon API and AGA power reserve estimates. Shale oil reserves include only Green River Formation reserves which average 25 gallons of oil per ton.

Source: U. S. Bureau of Mines

TABLE 11
UNITED STATES NET TRADE, CRUDE OIL- 1947-72
(In Million BBLS)

*	Expo	rts	Impo	rts .	Net t	rade
Year	Crude oil	Product	Crude oil	Product	Crude oil	Product
1947	-46	-118	98	62	52	- 56
1950	- 35	-77	178	133	143	+56
1955	-12	-123	285	170	273	+47
1960	-3	-71	372	293	369	+222
L965	-1	-67	452	449	451	+382
L970	- 5	-90 -81	483	765	478	+675
1971 ;	-1		613	820	612	+739
1972 ^p	-0.2	-80	798	917	798	+837

Source: U. S. Bureau of Mines

 $\mathbf{p}_{\texttt{Preliminary}}$