Centralized implementation mandates of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Program require a full uniform payment to each person in an eligible household. In practice, however, communities do not receive enough funding to fully implement the program. Therefore, communities must exercise local discretion in allocating aid. We recover the preferences revealed by local communities’ aid allocations and find they are pro-poor, allocating more to underprivileged groups with lower wage earnings potential (e.g., teenage girls vs. teenage boys, adult women vs. adult men, elderly vs. working age adults). Despite communities’ pro-poor implementation, the program does not significantly lower overall poverty rates with constrained funding. In simulations with a full funding scenario, the program reduces poverty in both cases of centralized and decentralized program control, with different allocation criteria. The major policy takeaway is that the financial scale of the safety net program is more important to poverty reduction than the locus of control over implementation or targeting strategy.